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Abstract
Judgments of personal taste such as “Haggis is delicious” are puzzling.
On the one hand they express the speaker’s personal taste. On the other
hand it is normal to disagree about the truth of such judgments. Giving
semantics for predicates of taste that can accommodate both intuitions
has proven challenging. Let us call the phenomenon that the truth of
judgments of taste depends on variable tastes perspective dependence.
The thesis discusses two most popular semantic accounts for predicates
of taste. Contextualists hold that the speaker’s perspective is an element
of the content of predicates of taste. However, the view has trouble ex-
plaining what disagreements of taste are about if speakers in fact make
compatible judgments. Semantic relativism is a recent framework which
is motivated by its alleged ability to explain both perspective dependence
and disagreements. Relativists hold that whereas the content of a judg-
ment of taste doesn’t refer to a perspective, it gets a truth-value only
when evaluated relative to a perspective.
I argue that neither account is successful, and their fundamental mis-
take is to hold that people know that judgments of taste are perspective-
dependent. I argue that majority of speakers take judgments of taste to be
true or false irrespective of their personal preferences. If such “folk object-
ivism” is true, perspective-independent semantics for predicates of taste
becomes a plausible view. However, a metaphysical presupposition that all
the theorists agree on is that taste properties are perspective-dependent.
Therefore a perspective-independent semantics will be committed to an
error theory. I question the metasemantics behind the error theory and
conclude that we should adopt a more externalist metasemantics. That
allows us to explain how predicates of taste can be perspective-dependent
despite of folk objectivism. The resulting perspectivist view can thus ac-
count both for perspective dependence and for why people disagree about
taste.
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Introduction
Some traditional discussions of taste and the variability of taste
have centred primarily on such questions as fashionable preferences,
or personal likes and dislikes. These are of relatively low philosophic
interest. – Frank Sibley (2001a), “About Taste”
Judgments of personal taste such as “Anchovies are delicious” pose the following
problem. On the one hand the truth of judgments of taste seems to depend on
our personal tastes, or perspectives as we will call them. On the other hand
we disagree over the truth of those judgments as if there were perspective-
independent truths about the matter. Recently there has been a lively debate
concerning the correct semantics for predicates of taste whose paradigmatic
examples are delicious, tasty, fun and disgusting.
This thesis discusses contextualist, semantic relativist and error theoretic
accounts, concludes that none of them is satisfactory and develops a new per-
spectivist approach. The starting point for the recent theories of predicates of
taste are the following three intuitions. First, there is variation in the perspect-
ives that make judgments of taste true. In other words, the truth of judgments
of taste doesn’t merely depend on e.g. the tastes of the ideal judges. Second,
when a speaker makes a sincere judgment of personal taste they are judging
correctly. For example, if anchovies taste horrible to you it seems that you can
truly judge “Anchovies are disgusting”. Third, people disagree about matters of
taste. The contemporary accounts try to accommodate each of these intuitions
at least to some extent.
Contextualists hold that the semantic values of predicates of taste depend
on the perspective of the speaker or a relevant group that is determined by the
context. For example, according to speaker-centered contextualism an utterance
of “Anchovies are disgusting” by me can be paraphrased as having the content
“Anchovies are disgusting to Sanna”. The basic problem of contextualism is that
it has trouble explaining why people disagree about taste when in an apparent
disagreement of taste their judgments are not in fact contradictory.
Semantic relativism is a novel framework that comes in moderate and rad-
ical forms. The standard Kaplanian formal semantics takes the contents of
utterances to be true or false relative to a circumstance of evaluation which
10
is normally just a possible world. Relativists argue that we should posit more
parameters to the circumstances of evaluation so that contents get a truth-value
relative to say, a possible world, time, and a perspective. Distributing elements
of truth-conditions from the content to the circumstance of evaluation is sup-
posed to help to explain puzzling linguistic data like disagreements of taste. The
relativist idea is that people disagree about taste since they express contradict-
ory contents, but they nevertheless speak the truth since their judgments are
true relative to their own perspectives.
The existing contextualist and relativist accounts are all committed to speak-
ers knowing that the truth of judgments of taste depends on various perspectives.
Throughout the chapters we will see how that commitment makes it extremely
diﬃcult for contextualists and relativists to provide satisfactory accounts of
the various linguistic data we consider, including disagreements of taste. The
alternatives to contextualism and relativism that I put forward give up the
assumption.
An error theory of judgments of taste holds that people’s uses of judgments of
taste are best explained by taking them to hold an objectivist folk metaphysical
view about taste properties. In other words, they believe that taste properties
exist independently of any particular perspectives and that their judgments of
taste attribute those properties. Therefore they treat judgments of taste as
perspective-independent judgments which causes them to disagree over their
truth. The error theory holds that since people intend to talk about objective
taste properties, the meaning of predicates of taste is consequently perspective-
independent. However, there are no perspective-independent properties to make
such judgments true which is why the view is an error theory.
The perspectivist view I defend agrees with the error theory regarding people’s
commitment to folk objectivism. However, I argue that the error theorist is
wrong in taking people to intend to talk about objective taste properties. I de-
fend an account which holds that people are not in a privileged position to know
their intentions. Instead, we should attribute them the intentions that best ex-
plain their actions. Even if people don’t realise it they intend to talk about
perspective-dependent taste properties since those are what cause and explain
their judgments. This metasemantic approach holds that people can system-
atically refer to some object while having mistaken views about the nature of
the thing they are talking about. Thus, perspectivism explains disagreements
of taste as a consequence of speakers misinterpreting the contents of their ut-
terances. Nevertheless they speak the truth since they are in fact attributing
11
perspective-dependent properties.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. The first part presents the relevant
background for our discussions. Ch. 1: Judgments of Personal Taste illustrates
the basic problem of disagreements of taste and lists the expressions that we
focus on. I introduce three basic intuitions that theorists of personal taste have
relied on: the intuition that the truth of judgments of taste depends on diﬀerent
perspectives, that people who make sincere judgments of taste on the basis of
their own taste are faultless, and that there are disagreements of taste. An
acceptable theory has to account for those intuitions one way or another. I
also illustrate the problem of disagreement by considering simple subjectivism,
the simplest view that can account for perspective dependence of judgments of
taste.
Ch. 2: The Evaluative Dimension of Judgments of Taste asks whether pre-
dicates of taste attribute value and if they do, what is the nature of that value.
The question is interesting first, because of worries related to the existence of
values, and second, in order to know whether the evaluation is part of the con-
tent of predicates of taste or merely a consequence of pragmatics. We discuss
and reject taste objectivism, a view which holds that there are perspective-
independent taste properties. I conclude that judgments of taste attribute
response-dependent values.
Ch. 3: Gradability and Perspective Dependence summarises the recently
influential scalar analysis of gradable adjectives. Predicates of taste are gradable
adjectives so the chapter provides the background of what the semantics of them
should minimally be like. We then consider whether the gradability suﬃces to
explain what disagreements of taste are about, concluding that it cannot.
Ch. 4: Perspective Dependence and Subjective Attitude Verbs discusses the
semantics of find. Sæbø has argued that find and certain other verbs are sub-
jective attitude verbs which can only embed lexically “subjective” predicates. If
he is right his arguments would support the idea that there is a distinct cat-
egory of subjective predicates that are clearly encoded in English and other
languages which have subjective attitude verbs. I provide counterexamples to
Sæbø’s account and present an alternative to explain the felicity patters on find.
Ch. 5: The Grounds of Judgments of Taste argues that a judgment of
taste can normally be felicitously made only if one has been in a grounding
experiential state. For example, one cannot judge that dancing is fun if one
has no experiences of dancing. The role that experiential states play help us
understand at least one aspect in which judgments of taste are “subjective”. We
12
then look at cases where someone else’s experiential states matter.
The second part of the thesis discusses contextualist accounts. Ch. 6: Two
Contextualist Approaches shows that contextualism is a prima facie promising
account to explain the data about the variability of the relevant experiencers
discussed in the previous chapter. I distinguish between contextualist accounts
that take the context sensitivity to be lexically encoded from accounts which
take the context sensitivity to be a consequence of pragmatic mechanisms. Of
the two kinds of views the former have been popular, and Ch. 7: Arguments for
Semantics-Based Contextualism discusses the arguments that have been presen-
ted in favour of the view. I conclude that the arguments are not convincing.
Ch. 8: Flexible Contextualism looks in detail Glanzberg’s semantics-based
contextualism which builds on the semantics of gradable adjectives discussed
in Ch. 3. I show that the view makes unacceptable predictions in ordinary
cases and summarise other problems that have been presented in the literature.
Finally we consider whether pragmatics-based contextualism could avoid the
problems and conclude that it cannot.
Part Three discusses Semantic relativism. Ch. 9: Moderate Relativism
presents the moderate relativist semantic framework and the motivation for
it that comes from so-called “faultless disagreements”. Ch. 10: A Closer Look
at Relativist Accounts discusses the relativist frameworks of Kölbel, Lasersohn
and MacFarlane. The focus is on their accounts of disagreements, and I argue
that none of them can show that relativist semantics would help in explaining
why people disagree about taste.
Ch. 11: Relativism and Contents of Thoughts argues that relativist se-
mantics is not helpful since it has no consequences on the level of thought.
Since people think in terms of complete, truth-evaluable propositions, they are
able to evaluate the judgments of others from their perspectives. Therefore
they have no reasons to disagree. I then consider whether relativists can rely on
people’s egocentrism as an explanation for disagreements, and argue that it’s
not a plausible psychological account.
Ch. 12: Normative Disagreement discusses whether relativists can explain
disagreement in a Gibbardian way as an attempt at coordinating attitudes. I
argue that Gibbard’s coordination story cannot be applied to discussions about
taste. We then consider other accounts which don’t take disagreements of taste
to be over the truth of propositions but conclude that they are not satisfactory
either.
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The last part of the thesis presents two accounts which both diﬀer radically
from the contextualist and relativist accounts we have discussed. Ch. 13: An
Error Theory for Discourses About Taste argues that people’s use of judgments
of taste is best explained by their beliefs in objectivism about taste. If one also
accepts a metasemantic account that takes the contents of expressions to be
determined by speakers’ intentions, one can argue that speakers intend to make
perspective-independent judgments of taste. This allows us to explain their
disagreement behaviour as attempts at finding out the truth about matters of
taste. However, we have already concluded that taste objectivism is a false
metaphysical view. Therefore the perspective-independent semantics leads to
an error theory about judgments of taste. I discuss some objections to the view
and conclude that it can explain the linguistic data better than contextualism
or relativism.
Ch. 14: Perspectivism takes up the metasemantics that leads to the perspective-
independent error theory. I argue that the error theorist is wrong in attributing
speakers intentions on the basis of their folk metaphysics and its accompanying
folk semantics. In other words, speakers have mistaken views about the mean-
ings of their words which is why the attribute themselves intentions that they
don’t actually have. I defend an alternative method which has as a consequence
that speakers intend to talk about those things that cause their beliefs. Judg-
ments of taste are caused by perspective-dependent properties, and hence those
should be the referents of predicates of taste.
The Appendix discusses surveys by experimental philosophers which aim to
find out whether speakers are objectivists or subjectivists about taste.
14
Part I
Background
1 Judgments of Personal Taste
The aim of this chapter is to provide an intuitive grasp of the problems that a
theory of judgments of personal taste has to answer. I begin with a comparison of
disagreements of taste to other kinds of disagreements. I then list the predicates
that diﬀerent theorists have taken to be predicates of personal taste, and settle
on a brief list of predicates which will be our focus.
In section 1.3 I discuss and give examples of three intuitions that are prom-
inent in the recent literature on predicates of taste: the Intuition of Many
Relevant Perspectives, the Intuition of No Fault, and the Intuition of Disagree-
ment. These intuitions form the background of our discussions in the following
chapters, where they will be re-examined in more detail. In the last section I dis-
cuss a view which I call simple subjectivism in order to illustrate what is wrong
with the most basic account that could do justice to the idea that judgments of
personal taste are expressions of our personal experiences.
1.1 An Illustration: The Quarrelsome Party
Imagine that the following conversations are taking place in a party:
Dialogue 1: The nationality of Jean-Luc Godard
(1) Anja: Godard is the best Swiss movie director.
(2) Benoit: What are you talking about, Godard is French!
Dialogue 2: The eﬃcacy of austerity as an economic policy
(3) Alla: The government’s economic policy is just deepening the crisis.
Bob: No, you’re totally wrong about that.
Dialogue 3: The injustice of inheriting property
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(4) Alex: It’s unjust that people are allowed to inherit the property of their
parents.
Brigitte: There’s nothing wrong with that.
Dialogue 4: The deliciousness of horse lasagne
(5) Ann (Eating horse lasagne that’s served at the party): The horse lasagne
is delicious!
Benyamin: It’s disgusting.
The atmosphere of the party seems less than harmonious since each dialogue
is –at least prima facie– a disagreement; the people hold incompatible opin-
ions about the topics they are discussing. However, there are also interesting
dissimilarities between the dialogues and how they might go on. One of the
main diﬀerences comes from considerations of evidence for the judgments: what
would count as evidence, whether evidence is available and whether there might
be equally good evidence for both of the opposing judgments.
The first argument on the nationality of Godard can be easily solved by
finding out the relevant facts. The second argument about the economic policies
cannot be solved as easily since the data comes from particular cases of past
policies where many other factors besides austerity have influenced the economy.
There may thus be further disagreements regarding the adequacy of the evidence
that is taken to support the diﬀerent views.
The third argument is about whether it’s just that people can inherit the
property of their parents. Comparing with the previous two dialogues, it’s not
clear what counts as evidence. There are many considerations in favour of
both views, and getting more information will hardly play a decisive role in the
argument which may be partly about the notion of justice. Even if Alex and
Brigitte agreed on all the relevant information they might hold diﬀering views
on what justice amounts to.
Finally there is Ann and Benyamin’s dispute over the deliciousness of the
horse lasagne. As we will see, many philosophers have shown parallels between
discussions of morality and aesthetics, and in the relevant respects judgments
about personal taste are similar to aesthetic judgments. First, judgments in
each of these fields have an evaluative dimension; judging something to be mor-
ally wrong, beautiful or delicious typically conveys that the speaker values or
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disvalues the object, event or action. Such judgments may also function as
recommendations or condemnations.
Some philosophers have held that disagreements over evaluative matters are
hard to solve because agreement over the non-evaluative features leaves open
the possibility of contradicting judgments over the evaluative features. Steven-
son (1944) defended the view for moral arguments and Foot (2002a) who calls
the phenomenon the breakdown of arguments, discusses it in connection to judg-
ments of taste. A similar claim was made by Sibley (1959) regarding aesthetic
qualities; he held that aesthetic qualities depend on the non-aesthetic qualities
but no amount of information regarding the latter would suﬃce for knowledge
about the aesthetic qualities of the object.
Returning to our examples, if we compare the disagreements over inheritance
and horse lasagne, both might remain unresolved even when the disputants share
their knowledge over the relevant facts. However, in the moral argument there
is an abundance of relevant non-moral considerations to take into account. In
contrast, in the dispute of taste we face a scarcity of them. There are hardly any
non-evaluative qualities in the lasagne that count in favour of either judgment.
For example, one might say that it contains cheddar instead of parmesan but
that matters only if one thinks that a lasagne ought to contain parmesan, and
that is just another way to make the evaluative claim that a lasagne is better
if it contains parmesan. The arguments that Ann or Benyamin might give –for
example that eating horse is disgusting, that the meat is chewy or that the pasta
is cooked just right– are simply further judgments of taste.
Now, Ann and Benyamin’s further judgments of taste may show how the
other perceives the lasagne or its parts (e.g. the meat as chewy) and the speakers
may partially agree (e.g. both might hold that the pasta is cooked just right).
But eventually their tastes may be too diﬀerent for them to be able to agree
on the core question, namely the deliciousness of the lasagne. Ann happens to
really like the lasagne with its cheddar and all, and Ben still finds the taste of
the lasagne bad even if he comes to agree that eating horse is not disgusting.
What is special with taste is the widespread view that even though people’s
tastes diﬀer, the variable tastes are equally correct. Hence the recommendation
that de gustibus non est disputandum. Ann and Benyamin should simply agree
to disagree and leave it at that.
However, what gives rise to a lot of philosophical puzzlement is that dis-
agreements of taste are ubiquitous and they often don’t end briefly with an
agreement to disagree. So despite of the considerations regarding the scarcity of
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non-evaluative reasons for judgments of taste and the apparent acknowledged
variability of tastes, disagreements of taste appear to be more than mere ex-
pressions of how things are from one’s personal point of view.
The last observation has lead to the core problem from the point of view of
philosophy of language: what kind of judgment can both be “relative” to the
speaker’s taste but still allow for disagreements over its truth? Ideally we should
provide a theory of the semantics and pragmatics of predicates of taste which
does justice to the variability of tastes, holds that persons are equal regarding
their epistemological status with respect to matters of taste, and makes sense
of disagreements of taste. That is the challenge we take up in the following
chapters.
1.2 Examples of Predicates of Personal Taste
By far I have talked broadly of judgments of personal taste. By a judgment of
personal taste I mean a judgment which applies a predicate of personal taste to
an object (in the broad sense, including events and actions). Here is a list of some
expressions or phrases that have been given as examples of predicates of taste
in the literature: spicy, funny, disgusting, fun, delicious, nauseating (Cappelen
and Hawthorne, 2007); elegant and smart as applied to clothes; good-looking,
fair of face; good, appetising and delicious as applied to foods and drinks, go
well together when speaking of colours (Foot 2002c; 2002b), cool, sexy, yucky,
handsome and attractive (Richard, 2008).
Some authors include aesthetic judgements like Picasso is better than Ma-
tisse within judgments of personal taste (Kölbel, 2003). Others explicitly take
predicates of personal taste to be a subset of aesthetic predicates (Sundell, 2011)
or treat the theories applied to predicates of taste as applicable to aesthetic pre-
dicates (Baker, 2012).
Now, few philosophers have tried to oﬀer strict criteria for what makes a
predicate a predicate of personal taste. Below we will encounter the core features
that are taken to characterise them. However, rather than to expect to find
conditions that will infallibly identify a predicate of taste we should at best
expect there to be certain prototypical features, shared more or less by diﬀerent
predicates. In Chapter 4: Perspective Dependence and Subjective Attitude Verbs
we will look at so-called subjective attitude verbs that have been claimed to
embed only predicates of taste; however, we will show the claim to be false.
In what follows we will proceed with our vague, intuitive understanding
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of which predicates are predicates of taste. I will mainly use as examples fun,
delicious, tasty and disgusting because they are the main examples used by other
theorists, but more importantly because they are genuinely “personal” unlike
e.g. elegant, fashionable, stylish, good-looking, or the traditionally aesthetic
predicates like beautiful or good / bad (as applied to works of art). I take the
diﬀerence to come from the grounds of the judgments. Judgments of personal
taste are (in most cases) based only on one’s experiential states. In contrast, a
judgment about say, the fashionable or the stylish is mostly dependent on the
norms of the society and the opinions of the experts. The role of the grounds
will be discussed more in Ch. 5: The Grounds of Judgments of Taste.
1.3 Intuitions About Judgments of Personal Taste
Let me make some terminological remarks. First, by a judgment I refer both
to mental acts of judging and to utterances, except when the context makes it
clear that we are only talking of utterances. The recent theories of semantics
of predicates of personal taste rely strongly on a couple of widely shared “intu-
itions”. I call them intuitions since the authors who rely on them claim that the
judgments in question are held by ordinary speakers and hence they are not a
result of philosophical theorising.
Consequently the authors who cite the intuitions often oﬀer no further con-
siderations in their support; rather than adopting the intuitions as resulting
from arguments they take them to be part and parcel of the metaphysics that
underlies ordinary language. The task of the philosopher is then taken to be to
provide a semantic theory that matches the contents of judgments of taste to
the metaphysics –supposing that the metaphysics is correct (we will also explore
the possibility that it is not).
There are three core intuitions that have formed the background of the recent
theories of personal taste. In this section we will have a preliminary look at them
as they are expressed in the literature. The aim is to provide the background for
the main approaches to the semantics / pragmatics of predicates of taste which
take accounting for those intuitions as their desideratum. These theories will
be investigated mainly from chapter 6: Two Contextualist Approaches onwards,
when we will also explore the intuitions with a more critical eye.
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1.3.1 The Intuition of Many Relevant Perspectives
The first intuition which I’ll call The Intuition of Many Relevant Perspectives
presupposes that taste predicates refer to relations between objects or events
and individuals or groups. The idea is that whether something is for example fun
or tasty always depends on the reactions of one or more people (or other sentient
beings). Following the contemporary terminology, let me call the individual or
group whose reactions matter for the truth of a judgment of personal taste a
perspective.1
The Intuition of Many Relevant Perspectives holds that the truth of judg-
ments of taste may depend on diﬀerent perspectives. To illustrate, if two cul-
tures have conflicting views on what kind of food is delicious, the intuition is
that both views may be correct since the relevant perspectives diﬀer. Hence,
the intuition concerns the truth values of judgments of personal taste. Here
is a quote from Philippa Foot (2002b) where she states the Intuition of Many
Relevant Perspectives.
I am thinking, for instance, of certain judgements of ’taste’, such
as those asserting that some people but not others are good-looking,
that some food or drink is appetising or delicious, or that certain col-
ours go well together for furnishings or clothes. Here, it seems, we
find wide variations in judgements between diﬀerent cultures and dif-
ferent generations. One does not have to go as far as ancient Mexico
to find a set of faces that we find ugly while supposing that they were
once admired, and while we think Nureyev’s a better-looking face
than Valentino’s there was a time when the verdict would probably
have gone the other way. It is obvious that there is the same kind
of disagreement about the palatability of food and drink; [...] The
reason why such judgements seem undoubtedly relativistic is not, of
course, that a wide variety of opinions exist, but rather that no one
set of these opinions appears to have any more claim to truth than
any other. (Foot, 2002b, 22; emphasis added).
She makes two points: that there is a lot of variation in judgments of taste, and
that each of these judgments track truth equally well.
1It is equally common to say that the truth of a judgment of taste depends on a judge. I
don’t have any deep reasons for preferring the terminology of perspectives. I take these terms
to refer to the same phenomena, and to keep the terminology unified I talk of a perspective
where some other authors talk of a judge.
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The claim that truth depends on a person, a group or a culture is what is
traditionally known as relativism and Foot defends relativism about matters
of taste in that sense. As we will see there are many ways to account for the
dependence of truth on perspectives. Hence, to accept the Intuition of Many
Relevant Perspectives doesn’t yet commit a theorist to much. But it does rule
out some views. First there’s the view which holds that the truth of a judgment
of taste doesn’t depend on any perspective at all, i.e. properties like deliciousness
refer to non-relational properties akin to e.g. the property of being a dog. I
don’t think that anyone has defended the view for predicates of taste, but we
will discuss its problems in section 2.3: Taste Objectivism.
The second view that is ruled out is a view that holds that taste properties
are relations to perspectives but the relevant perspective is always the same,
for example that of the ideal perceiver / judge or an average of aggregating the
tastes of all humans. Our focus is on views that accept the intuition of many
relevant perspectives, but we will consider views which reject it once we’ve
encountered the problems of perspective-dependent accounts.
1.3.2 The Intuition of No Fault
The second intuition is about the epistemic status of agents who make judgments
of taste. It holds that speakers who make sincere judgments of taste on the
basis of their own tastes cannot be mistaken (except in certain special cases to
be discussed below); let us call it the Intuition of No Fault. The intuition holds
that speakers are epistemically flawless when they make judgments of taste,
even if they make judgments that appear to be contradictory. Exceptions are
formed by cases where one is “out of touch with one’s taste”, for example while
sick or in another unusual but temporary state. From now on I’ll talk about the
infallibility of speakers who make judgments of taste, but strictly speaking the
intuition holds that they are only near-infallible due to the exceptional cases.
The intuition has been widely appealed to as an argument in favour of
speaker relativity, i.e. the view according to which the relevant perspective
is typically the speaker’s. Below are some expressions of the intuition:
[The disagreement over the deliciousness of rhubarb] is, we feel—or
is likely to be—a disagreement which there is no point in trying to
settle, because it concerns no real matter of fact but is merely an
expression of diﬀerent, permissibly idiosyncratic tastes. Nobody’s
wrong. (Wright, 2006, 38).
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Kölbel (2003) follows Wright in claiming that most people have the intuition
that disagreements of taste are normally faultless: even though the speakers
disagree, neither of them has made a mistake or is at fault. Mark Richard also
states the conflict between the intuitions of disagreement and faultlessness:
If Arroyo consistently strikes you as good-looking, that is all
that’s needed to certify your utterance of ’Arroyo is good-looking’;
if he consistently strikes your neighbour as plain and gaunt, that
is all that’s needed to certify his utterance of ’Arroyo is not good-
looking’. Here we have genuine relativity of some sort, for it seems
that both you and your neighbour speak correctly, but you seem to
disagree. (Richard, 2008, 125).
The Intuition of No Fault has been appealed to primarily by semantic relativists
including Kölbel, MacFarlane and Richard. Philosophers who take the Intuition
of Many Relevant Perspectives seriously but oppose the Intuition of No Fault
usually defend a view where the relevant perspective is that of a group or a
community. For example Foot doesn’t share the intuition, and in contrast she
holds that one can easily be in error when making judgments of taste. The
above citation by Richard is particularly relevant since Foot’s example of a
mistaken judgment of taste is of a man who erroneously thinks that his wife is
good-looking (Foot, 2002c).
The conflict emphasises the diﬀerences between the predicates that are taken
to be predicates of personal taste and other predicates related to taste. For
example the Intuition of No Fault seems much more plausible in the case of e.g.
tasty, delicious and fun than with fashionable, stylish, or good-looking. That
is because the grounds for the judgments are diﬀerent; whereas judgments of
personal taste are made either uniquely or mainly on the basis of one’s personal
experiences, judgments about the fashionable, stylishness or perhaps good looks
depend also on the judgments of the community and its experts. Hence, whereas
one can be mistaken on questions of fashion or style since they depend on the
views of others, judgments of personal taste are supposed to be infallible because
they only depend on one’s own taste. Wright expresses the role of experiences
in the Intuition of No Fault as follows:
The rhetoric of ‘no fact of the matter’ expresses the natural,
folk-philosophical view: such disputes are potentially irresolvable,
we think, not because the facts in question can transcend our im-
pressions but because the impressions themselves are in some way
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basic and constitutive; so when they conflict, there need be no further
court of appeal. (Wright, 2006, 41; emphasis added).
In Ch. 5: The Grounds of Judgments of Taste I will oﬀer arguments to show that
the grounds of the judgments of personal taste are one’s personal experiences.
1.3.3 The Intuition of Disagreement
The third intuition holds that there at least seem to be disagreements of taste.
One of the core problems for a theory of predicates of taste is how to accom-
modate both the Intuition of No Fault and the Intuition of Disagreement. If
speakers are near infallible in their judgments of taste, one would expect them
not to disagree since everyone is right. Here is a concise expression of the main
problem:
Consider two speakers, Alphie and Betty. Alphie utters sentence
(1a). Betty utters sentence (1b).
1) (a) Eggo Waﬄe Cereal is delicious.
(b) Nuh uh, Eggo Waﬄe Cereal is not delicious.
Two intuitive ideas about dialogue (1) are in conflict with each other.
On the one hand, it seems possible that neither Alphie nor Betty
is mistaken. On the other hand, it seems that Alphie and Betty
disagree. (Sundell, 2011, 267-8).
In the beginning of this chapter we contrasted a dispute over the deliciousness
of horse lasagne with disputes over questions of justice or economic policies.
Most theorists share the intuition that a disagreement of taste at least seems to
be a disagreement just like the other disputes. However, it’s another question
whether they are disagreements in the same sense, and what is it that creates
the impression of disagreement in each case. Let us next look at the basic
problem that accounting for both the Intuition of No Fault and the Intuition of
Disagreement creates.
1.4 Subjectivism and the Problem of Disagreement
Trying to account for all the intuitions about taste seems to preclude the simplest
answers to why we disagree over taste. For example, one natural way to account
for the Intuition of No Fault is to take the truth of judgments of taste to depend
on the speaker’s perspective. The dependence can be accounted for by taking
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the judgment as referring to that perspective. But if the content of judgments
of taste is thus relativised to the speakers, then when two people appear to be
disagreeing, their utterances are in fact compatible. The question then becomes:
why compatible utterances would create an impression of disagreement? Peter
Lasersohn puts the problem in a nutshell:
This is our central dilemma. It seems intuitively like sentences
containing predicates of personal taste could be true relative to one
person but false relative to another, but if we analyse them in this
way, it appears to force us into claiming that they express diﬀerent
contents for diﬀerent speakers, and then we no longer seem to be
able to explain accurately which utterances contradict each other
and which don’t. (Lasersohn, 2005, 649-650).
Lasersohn’s citation reveals certain theoretical assumptions that will be dis-
cussed in the chapters to come:
(i) The dependence of truth on the speaker’s perspective has to be accounted
for by taking predicates of taste as implicitly referring to the speaker’s perspect-
ive.
(ii) An impression of disagreement has to be caused by contradicting con-
tents.
Denying one or both of these has been the strategy employed by most theorists.
Explaining what goes on in disagreements of taste has been the major concern
of theories committed to speaker relativity, and in the coming chapters we will
encounter numerous attempts at refuting (ii). In this section we have a closer
look at the problems of the simplest view that supposes (i). I call the view
“simple subjectivism” since it is modelled on the metaethical view known as
“subjectivism”.
Above we briefly discussed the role of personal experiences as the grounds
of judgments of taste. Let us now elaborate that a bit. We may identify certain
experiential states as the grounds for certain judgments of taste, for example
to judge that something is fun is to experience having fun, or to judge that
something is disgusting is to experience disgust. Call judgments like I am hav-
ing fun / bored / disgusted by x / attracted by x “judgments about grounding
experiential states”.
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Simple subjectivism treats judgments of personal taste as having the same
content as judgments about grounding experiential states.2 Moreover, the view
takes speakers to be competently using judgments of taste to state their exper-
iential states, and hearers to competently interpret them as such. Therefore
one would expect judgments of personal taste to have pragmatics that is pretty
much analogous to judgments that express the speaker’s experiential states. In
other words, speakers and hearers should treat the two kinds of judgments alike
in conversation since their content is known to be the same. Now, we need
not expect a perfect analogy since if a language contains two ways of saying
the same thing these ways might come to have diﬀerent uses or even diﬀerent
compositional semantics.3
However, in what follows we see that judgments of taste and judgments
about experiential states diﬀer regarding the core pragmatic phenomena such
as when the judgments can be disputed, judged false, or disagreed with. We also
have diﬀerent intuitions about what information is conveyed by the judgments.
Hence the defender of simple subjectivism needs to explain what is the cause
for these diﬀerences. Let us now look at some examples:
(6) This movie is fun.
(7) I like this movie.
The first diﬀerence to note is when the judgments can be evaluated as true or
false. A hearer can judge (6) as true or false depending on whether she found
the movie fun or not. In contrast, the hearer is normally not in a position to
say anything about the truth or falsity of (7) except in the rare case where she
suspects the speaker of lying.4 The diﬀerence between the truth-value judgments
corresponds with what we intuitively take the contents of the judgments to
2A slightly more elaborate theory would treat judgments of taste as asserting that the
speaker is generally disposed to be in the relevant experiential state. That would allow for
judgments like “surfing is fun” to be true even when the speaker is on a terrible mood and
currently not enjoying surfing at all. The criticism presented in this section applies equally to
both views.
3For example, round and spherical might seem to have the same lexical meaning, but as
pointed out by Lasersohn (1999) round allows for more deviation from perfect roundness than
does spherical, including allowing for degree modifiers like very.
4True is more flexible than false in that one can use true like me too if one shares the
mental state of the speaker, but false cannot be used to express that one’s state is diﬀerent.
Here is an example:
(8) Akiko: I’m so pleased he could make it in time.
Brody: True.
Cathy: *False.
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be: (7) is a judgment primarily about the speaker whereas (6) is a judgment
primarily about the movie.
If our intuitions about the contents are correct, it explains why it is diﬃcult
to agree or disagree with judgments like (7); that would require insight into the
speaker’s experiential state which only the speaker has direct access to. It is
rare that one could expect to know the mental state of another person better
than they do and to consequently disagree with their report about their own
state. (6) in contrast seems to say that the movie causes amusement which is
not a property of the speaker but of the movie. Since the judgment is not about
the speaker, agreement or disagreement requires no access to the speaker’s mind
but only to the properties of the movie.
Judgments of personal taste and judgments about psychological states also
diﬀer regarding the impressions of disagreement we get. The criticism that
subjectivism cannot explain the impression of disagreements goes back to at
least Moore (1922) who states the following about moral disagreements:
Don’t people, in fact, sometimes really diﬀer in opinion on a
moral question? Certainly all appearances are in favour of the view
that they do: and yet, if they do, that can only be if when I think
a thing to be wrong, and you think it not to be wrong, I mean
by “wrong” the very same characteristic which you mean, and am
thinking that the action possesses this characteristic while you are
thinking it does not. It must be the very same characteristic which
we both mean; it cannot be, as this view says it is, merely that I
am thinking that it has to my feelings the very same relation, which
you are thinking that it has not got to yours; since, if this were all,
then there would be no diﬀerence of opinion between us. (Moore,
1922, 334).
Moore expresses the two core aspects of the problem of disagreement for sub-
jectivism:
(1) There appear to be moral disagreements, and
(2) There can be moral disagreements only if the speakers are expressing
contradictory judgments.
As we saw in the beginning of this section, Lasersohn repeats Moore’s worry
when he formulates the problem of judgments of personal taste.
Now, for the moment we may remain neutral about the truth of (2). Nev-
ertheless, simple subjectivism faces the problem that judgments of taste and
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judgments about grounding experiential states diﬀer in the impressions of dis-
agreement that they give. Let me give some examples. Below we have two
dialogues:
(9) Alexia: The party was great fun.
Basil: No it wasn’t.
(10) Ana: I had a lot of fun at the party.
Bebel: I didn’t have fun at all.
Only the first dialogue gives an impression of disagreement; it looks like Alexia
and Basil are disagreeing over how the party was whereas Ana and Bebel are
only saying how they experienced the party.
Now suppose that Alexia’s and Ana’s judgments do have the same content
–as held by simple subjectivism– so that both assert that the they, the speakers,
had a lot of fun at the party. What should one say about Basil’s and Bebel’s
responses; do they have the same content too? Simple subjectivism has two
alternatives for how to understand Basil’s statement “No it wasn’t”: either he
is denying that Alexia had fun, or denying that he himself had fun. We can
paraphrase the two options as follows:
(11) Basil: You didn’t have fun at all.
or
(12) Basil: I didn’t have fun at all.
As was mentioned it is rare that a hearer can question a psychological report
of a speaker, so in the normal case Basil’s statement should be paraphrased as
(12). That would also be reasonable since it makes the two dialogues analogous.
But now, look at the following dialogue:
(13) Alexia: The party was great fun.
Basil: I didn’t have fun at all.
Here we don’t get an impression of disagreement as we do in dialogue (9). But
according to simple subjectivism the two dialogues are supposed to have the
same contents, and the speakers know it.
So now we have the following cases to contrast:
(i) A judgment of taste and an apparent negation of it.
(ii) A judgment of an experiential state and a judgment of the contrary
experiential state in another person.
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(iii) A judgment of taste and a judgment of an experiential state.
If the two kinds of judgments had the same content these three dialogues should
appear at least highly similar –but they don’t. In contrast, each pair gives
diﬀerent impressions of disagreement. Let us add the final pair: a judgment of
an experiential state and a judgment of taste.
(14) Anna: I didn’t have fun at the party.
Boris: The party was great fun.
This dialogue should be analogous to (10) with just the order reversed:
(10) Ana: I had a lot of fun at the party.
Bebel: I didn’t have fun at all.
But again, in (14) we get some impression of disagreement, as if Boris was
saying that something was wrong with Anna since she didn’t enjoy the fun party.
There thus seems to be diﬀerent degrees of impressions of disagreement: two
judgments of contrary experiential states in diﬀerent people give no impression
of disagreement (dialogue (10)); a judgment of taste and a judgment of an
experiential state that’s incompatible with the grounding experiential state of
the judgment of taste gives some impression of disagreement (dialogues (13)
and (14)), and two contrary judgments of taste give a strong impression of
disagreement (dialogue (9)).
As has been emphasised, simple subjectivism supposes that speakers are
competent language users who know the contents of their utterances, and can
correctly interpret the utterances of others. Hence, if two dialogues have the
same content they should know that that is the case. Since the dialogues diﬀer
(a) regarding the possible truth-value judgments, (b) our intuitions about the
contents of the dialogues as well as (c) the impressions of disagreement they give,
the data speaks prima facie against a theory which simply identifies judgments
of personal taste with judgments of psychological states.
As we mentioned, there might be a story to tell about why the two kinds
of judgments would have such diﬀerent pragmatics despite of having the same
semantic content.5 Nevertheless, given its problems the view hasn’t been taken
5One attempt at explaining the diﬀerent pragmatics comes from Lopez de Sa (2007; 2008)
who defends simple subjectivism for predicates of taste and moral expressions and argues
that it can explain disagreements since there is a presupposition that the participants to the
conversation share their standards in taste or morality. Baker (2012) shows with convincing
amount of detail that judgments of taste have no such presuppositions. Moreover, the pre-
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as a serious alternative.
1.5 Summary of Chapter 1
The aim of the first chapter was to provide an intuitive grasp of what are
judgments of personal taste and what are the issues they raise in philosophy of
language. I brought up some commonly made claims about judgments of taste.
First, a disagreement of taste is not supposed to be like a disagreement over
whether Godard is Swiss because we cannot likewise cite non-evaluative facts
that would settle the disagreement of taste. We will discuss the distinction
between evaluative and non-evaluative facts in the next chapter.
Second, a disagreement of taste diﬀers from moral disagreements because in
the latter case there is usually an abundance of relevant non-evaluative facts
whereas in the case of taste there is a scarcity of them. It thus seems diﬃcult
to give arguments for judgments of taste that are not themselves judgments of
taste. Third, since judgments of taste are taken to be made on the basis of one’s
personal taste, disagreements about taste are often taken to be suspicious and
not worth having as illustrated by the proverb De gustibus non est disputandum.
Nevertheless, people at least seem to be disagreeing about taste.
I stated three common intuitions, the Intuition of Many Relevant Perspect-
ives, the Intuition of No Fault, and the Intuition of Disagreement, which are
often cited by theorists of taste as truths which ought to be accommodated.
We will encounter these intuitions in various forms later. Accommodating the
Intuition of No Fault with the Intuition of Disagreement is the problem that
has occupied theorists the most.
In the last section of this chapter I illustrated the problems faced by simple
subjectivism, a view which identifies the content of judgments of personal taste
with the contents of judgments about one’s experiential states. Simple subject-
ivism can account for the Intuition of No Fault, but it is implausible because
of the diﬀerent pragmatics of judgments of taste and judgments about exper-
iential states. I showed that they diﬀer regarding our truth-value intuitions
about them, our intuitions about their contents, as well as our impressions of
disagreement we get from them.
I also gave a list of predicates that are commonly taken as predicates of
personal taste. Many theorists don’t distinguish between predicates of personal
suppositional account could not explain the problems of contextualism we will encounter in
ch. 8, e.g. why it’s ok to report judgments of taste across diﬀerent contexts.
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taste and aesthetic predicates. It’s not easy to give criteria for what makes a
predicate a predicate of personal taste, but for the moment we will exclude the
prototypical aesthetic predicates and rely on a small list of adjectives that are
the most common examples used in the literature on taste, such as fun, delicious
or tasty. Ch. 4: Perspective Dependence and Subjective Attitude Verbs discusses
one particular criterion that has been suggested as helping to identify predicates
of personal taste from other predicates.
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2 The Evaluative Dimension of Judgments of Taste
Many philosophers have treated morality and aesthetics alike (See e.g. Hume
(1998; 1999; 2000) Ayer (2001), Railton (2003)) both with respect to their meta-
physics and philosophy of language. Recently some philosophers have advanced
a single view for both moral expressions and predicates of personal taste.6 The
main reasons have to do with metaphysics of value.
Both judgments of taste and moral judgments attribute value to objects or
events. A metaethical tradition that dates back at least to Ayer takes facts and
values to be of metaphysically diﬀerent kinds. Ayer’s suspicion of values is due
to his verificationist commitments that he adopted from logical positivists, but
even after logical positivism the status of values has remained questionable. In
the last chapter I cited Stevenson (1944) and Foot (2002a) who advocated the
view that with moral judgments and judgments of taste agreement on facts does
not suﬃce for agreement on values, and Sibley (1959) held the view for aesthetic
qualities. The distinction between facts and values is commonplace.
Once one distinguishes between facts and values, it is natural to wonder what
kind of things values are. Many philosophers question the existence of the kind of
values that could make moral judgments true. Error theorists like Mackie (1977)
and Joyce (2001) have argued that the values that moral judgments presuppose
are simply metaphysically too weird to exist. Loeb (2003) in his part argues
that given the similarities of moral judgments and evaluative judgments about
food or drink, same ontological considerations about value will support either
what he calls “realism” or “anti-realism” about both domains. What he means
by “realism” is a view which holds that judgments value such as “Genocide is
wrong” are true independently of what people believe about the matter.
In this chapter we focus on the evaluativeness of judgments of taste and on
the nature of the value they attribute. The chapter has two aims. First, since
we are interested in the semantics of predicates of taste it is useful to know
whether they have evaluative content or if their evaluativeness is merely a matter
of pragmatics. If the evaluative dimension does not come from their content,
then we wouldn’t have to worry about the nature of the value that judgments
of taste attribute since the truth of the attributions would not depend on that.
However, I conclude that predicates of taste do have evaluative content.
The second aim is negative. I argue that whether or not there are meta-
6See e.g. Kölbel (2003, 2004) and MacFarlane (2014), who argues for radical Relativism
for tasty and moral ought.
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physical worries with respect to the values that moral judgments attribute,
judgments of taste are evaluative in a very naturalistic way since the values
they attribute are fully dependent on the dispositions of the people. Therefore
we may safely proceed with our inquiries into the language of taste without
worrying about the metaphysics of value more generally.
2.1 Types of Evaluative Expressions
Let us begin by analysing the ways in which expressions may be evaluative or
their uses convey an evaluation. A classic starting point is Williams (1985) who
introduced the terminology of thick and thin terms in his critical discussion of
the fact / value distinction in ethics. He distinguishes between terms that have
both descriptive and evaluative content –the thick terms– and terms with only
evaluative content –the thin terms.
Williams’ examples of thick terms include treachery, brutality and courage
which intuitively are factual and evaluative. Hence they put descriptive condi-
tions on how the world or the object must be like and also attribute positive or
negative value to it. For example, we may suppose that treachery attributes the
quality of betraying someone’s trust in a way that is bad. Because of the evalu-
ative aspect, the use of a thick term also potentially guides action: if an action
A has positive value, then one has a pro tanto reason to do A. Examples of thin
concepts include moral good or right which are supposed to merely attribute
value without any descriptive content.7
7Let me mention some diﬃculties related to good and bad so that we don’t rely too much
on them as examples. Hare (1952) argued that good has both a descriptive and evaluative
meaning so that e.g. in “He bought a good car ” good attributes the car certain properties
which depend on the standards of the goodness of cars at that time, and also commends
the car. Hare holds that the evaluative dimension of good is it’s “primary” meaning, and
the descriptive part “secondary”, by which he roughly means that any use of good is always
evaluative whereas the descriptive dimensions may be more or less present and also change
with times.
Geach (1956) targeted Hare by arguing that in fact good and bad do not commend at all.
First he emphasised the distinction between predicative and attributive uses of predicates. A
predicative use predicates a property, e.g. “He was right”. An attributive use modifies another
predicate, e.g. “he found the right tool” or “he bought a good car ”. Some predicates are always
attributive, e.g. small, big, former etc. so that even when the predicates appears by itself,
the modified predicate is provided pragmatically. Geach argued that good and bad are always
attributive so that judging something to be good implicitly contains a predicate that good
modifies. Furthermore, he claimed that attributive uses do not commend or provide reasons
for actions.
Williams in his part is discussing a third position since he gives good as an example of a
thin term that has only evaluative meaning. Given these competing viewpoints we do better
avoiding taking a stance on good and bad altogether since that would take us outside the
scope of our topic. However, the issues related to these expressions are worth keeping in mind
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Another analysis of the descriptive / evaluative distinction comes from Sib-
ley’s (2001b) discussion of aesthetic expressions which complements Williams’
distinction. Sibley distinguishes between three kinds of evaluative terms: (a)
intrinsically evaluative terms, (b) descriptive merit terms, and (c) evaluation-
added terms. Let us look at each category in turn.
Intrinsically evaluative terms. These expressions correspond most closely
to thin terms; Sibley’s examples are good, bad, mediocre, nice, nasty, obnoxious,
valuable, eﬀective, ineﬀectual and worthless. Here is how he describes them:
First, there may be terms the correct application of which to
a thing indicates that the thing has some value without it thereby
also being asserted that the thing has some particular or specified
quality. [...] with explainable exceptions in special contexts, they [in-
trinsically evaluative terms] will be evaluative (pro or con) whatever
the subject-matter they are applied to, and may be applied to any
subject to which their application makes sense. (Sibley, 2001b, 92).
Descriptive merit terms. These terms are descriptive terms which attribute
a property that is a merit in the object given its usual function. Sibley’s ex-
amples are sharp for razors, selective for wireless sets and spherical for tennis
balls. Their meaning is purely descriptive, and it is contingent that the prop-
erty attributed by the expression has positive or negative value. Hence being
a competent user of the term does not require knowledge of the merit that is
typically accompanied by the object that has the property.
Evaluation-added terms. The third category corresponds most closely
to thick terms as Williams defines them, although many terms that are often
considered thick will in fact come out as descriptive merit terms. Sibley describes
evaluation-added terms thus:
These are terms which are supposed to have both a descriptive
and evaluative component: that is, when they are applied to some-
thing, not only is a property being attributed to it but an indication
is being given that the speaker has a favourable or unfavourable at-
titude to that property. If there are such terms in the language, it
would be a rule of their use that they are so used; they would be both
since some examples in the literature on predicates of taste use good.
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descriptive, as indicating that a thing had a quality, P, and evaluat-
ive, in indicating that the speaker values or disvalues the quality P.
(Sibley, 2001b, 92).
Sibley’s examples from the aesthetic realm include tasty, insipid, fragrant, noi-
some, cacophonous, brash and rancid.
Once we look at the criteria for descriptive merit terms and evaluation-added
terms we see that Sibley’s distinction cuts through the class of thick terms. For
example, Sibley would count the usual examples of thick terms (courageous,
honest, considerate) as descriptive merit terms rather than evaluation-added
terms. And indeed, we can easily imagine plenty of contexts were honest doesn’t
convey a positive attitude but merely the descriptive content has a tendency to
speak the truth.
Given Sibley’s distinctions, we see that if an apparently evaluative expression
turns out to be a descriptive merit term, then the evaluative dimension is not
part of the content but merely something its uses may convey –or not, depending
on the context.
2.2 The Evaluativeness of Predicates of Taste
Now, the first aim of this chapter is to find out whether predicates of taste have
evaluative content. Therefore, let us classify some of the typical predicates of
taste within Sibley’s tripartite distinction. First, nice, good, bad and the other
intrinsically evaluative terms listed by Sibley can be all used of the same objects
and in the same contexts as the more specific taste predicates like delicious can
be used; indeed, it’s doubtful that there is any diﬀerence in meaning between
delicious and very good or excellent, or between tasty and nice as applied to
foods. Delicious and tasty don’t have any more descriptive content than good
or nice but their domain is narrower.
However, many other taste predicates seem to have some descriptive content
as well. Compare good-looking and attractive; both attribute positive qualities
to persons, but one ascribes a pleasing visual appearance, the other a disposition
to attract. Spicy, salty and tasty are evaluations of the flavour of foods or drinks
(salty and spicy can be either purely descriptive or descriptive and evaluative,
meaning too salty / spicy), and each attributes other qualities too (too much
salt / hotness; tasty may attribute a lot of flavour although it is often used to
just mean has a good taste).
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In many of the cases the descriptive content is dispositional; it describes a
specific disposition that the object in question has, e.g. a disposition to cause
amusement (fun, funny), to attract (attractive), or to disgust (disgusting). So it
seems like some predicates of taste are thin / intrinsically evaluative, but others
belong either to descriptive merit terms or evaluation-added terms. Since we
want to know whether all predicates of taste attribute value we need to look
closer at the two last categories.
How can we tell whether a term is one or the other? Sibley’s criterion
was that when one learns to use evaluation-added terms one learns that they
attribute value, whereas to learn to use a descriptive merit term only consists of
knowing which descriptive property it attributes. Thus, with evaluation-added
terms the evaluation is a necessary part of the use whereas with descriptive
merit terms we can imagine cases where the property lacks its usual merit. One
of Sibley’s examples of descriptive merit terms was sharp as applied to razors,
and indeed we can imagine contexts where it’s not a valuable property of razors
that they are sharp. For example, think of a group of artists who are using old
razors for an art work; they would take the sharp ones to be the least desirable
ones since they accidentally cut themselves with them.
An evaluation-added term in contrast always attributes value. For example,
tasty seems to attribute the positive value of having a pleasing taste. Therefore,
it’s not possible to use tasty without thereby making a positive evaluation.
However, the cases are not always very clear cut. For example, imagine a tribe
of people who have such unlucky genetics that anything they consider tasty
happens also to be highly unhealthy to them, causing them to immediately gain
a lot of weight if they eat it. Consequently in their culture tastiness is always
considered bad and dangerous.
The case is similar to the case of the artists who use razors in that tastiness
and sharpness are not seeked after by the agents of the cases. However, tastiness
hasn’t lost its value as being gustatorily pleasurable and therefore valuable; it is
simply that the link between tastiness and obesity is an obstacle to enjoying the
value of tastiness. In contrast, the value of sharpness seems entirely dependent
on the needs for sharp objects, and on the possible value gained by having or
using them.
The contrast of the cases above suggests that we can locate the diﬀerence
between evaluative and descriptive terms to whether the value is intrinsic or
extrinsic / instrumental. More importantly, whether a term is evaluation-added
or a descriptive merit term can be decided by looking at whether the value of the
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property resides in the property (e.g. deliciousness is valuable) or depends on
the relation of the property to something else which is valuable (e.g. sometimes
the honesty of a person saves one from being tricked, and not being tricked is
valuable).
To conclude, it looks like predicates of taste are evaluative by being either
thin / intrinsically evaluative terms or evaluation-added terms. Therefore we
need to consider what kind of value judgments of taste attribute, and whether
the nature of that value poses metaphysical worries.
2.3 Taste Objectivism
Let us again look at those predicates of personal taste which seem to have
some descriptive content as well: funny, fun, attractive, good-looking, tasty and
disgusting. I have mentioned before that judgments of taste are made on the
grounds of one’s experiential state, for example on the grounds of being disgus-
ted by something. There are two ways to see the disgust: as a reaction to some
properties of the object which are not in themselves disgusting but which cause
disgust to the particular experiencer, or as the object having disgust properties,
which cause being disgusted in any accurate perceiver.
The latter view would take the evaluative taste properties as independent of
the responses or beliefs of anyone. Let us call the view taste objectivism. Thus,
disgusting objects would have the disgust properties irrespective of whether any-
one experiences them as such. Nevertheless, a person who accurately perceives
disgustingness properties would judge the right objects to be disgusting, and
have the relevant pro tanto reasons for avoiding them. However, the view faces
problems. Firstly we may note that it is in conflict with the Intuition of Many
Relevant Perceivers and the Intuition of No Fault.
Of course those are mere intuitions and we are open to giving up their ver-
dicts if there does not seem to be a theory that can account for all of them.
Nevertheless, from taste objectivism it would follow that there is always a
perspective-independent fact of whether something is delicious, fun or disgust-
ing, and therefore people may very well be at fault when judging matters of
taste. On the positive side the view can explain disagreements of taste as dis-
agreements of the ordinary kind. Moreover, it does justice to the way we speak
about taste including giving arguments in favour of our views, encouraging oth-
ers to try things we enjoy and so on.
However, taste objectivism is implausible. It presupposes that there are
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perspective-independent truths about matters of taste. Regarding experiences
of fun, common sense tells us that people are very diﬀerent regarding what they
enjoy. And it just seems way too far-fetched to think that some people might
be correctly tracking fun whereas others are unable to, and hence mistakenly
think that e.g. their hobbies are fun whereas they are not. The same holds of
disgustingness. Some people are disgusted by cockroaches or the sight of infected
wounds whereas some are not. But there isn’t anything that is disgusting as
such. Perhaps humans have tendencies to feel disgust towards particular things
for evolutionary reasons, but such convergence rather shows that those things
are worth avoiding by humans, not that the things are objectively disgusting.
Regarding experiences of flavour, empirical studies have shown that there is
a lot of genetic variation in how foods taste to people. For example, people can
be divided into nontasters, tasters, and supertasters regarding how a chemical
6-n-propylthiouracil (PROP) tastes to them. Nontasters don’t taste the chem-
ical whereas it tastes mildly bitter to the taster and unpleasantly bitter to the
supertaster. The natural relative of the chemical is present in a variety of veget-
ables and other foodstuﬀ, causing them to taste bitter to the supertaster. (For
an overview of genetic diﬀerences in taste perception, see Garcia-Bailo et al.
(2009).)
The three genetically diﬀerent groups are estimated to be roughly equally
large with some diﬀerences in distribution between the genders and around the
globe. Flavour perception naturally plays a major role in evaluative judgments.
Given that there is no reason to consider any of the groups as being somehow
deficient in their ability to taste (in contrast to various forms of colour blind-
ness), it would be arbitrary to claim that one of them has better access to flavour
properties than the others, and thereby also have better grasp of the evaluative
properties. For example, the flavours and evaluative qualities of wines are often
considered to be objectively in the wines, to be discerned by the connoisseurs.
However, at least one study found that judgments of a wine’s bitterness, astrin-
gency and acidity correlated with the subjects’ PROP taster status (Pickering
et al., 2004).
Not only do humans begin their lives as having diﬀerent experiences of foods,
subsequent experiences also make for a very large diﬀerences in later food pref-
erences (Prescott, 2012). Given the roles of both genetic variation and one’s
eating history in determining one’s judgments of taste, it seems rather absurd
to think that there might nevertheless be the evaluative properties of foods out
there to be discovered by the perfect judges. Therefore I suggest that taste
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objectivism is not a plausible view about the nature of values attributed by
judgments of taste.
2.4 Judgments of Taste Attribute Response-Dependent
Values
The approach we will take towards the nature of values attributed by judgments
of taste is that the value comes from our positive or negative experiences towards
the objects. Hence the values are “subjective”: their existence depends on our
responses. Hence, values are tied to our valuations of things, or to what matters
to us as in the following quote by Railton:
we need to ask whether we can locate a compelling case for saying
that subjectivity is essential to value. I believe the best case to be a
highly abstract one. According to this case, value enters the picture
when mattering does. (Nihilists thus have hit on an apt phrase
when they say, “Nothing matters.”) If we imagine a world without
any locus of mattering or concern – say, a world composed entirely of
oxygen molecules in random motion – no issues of value would arise
internal to that world. Within that stark world it couldn’t matter
less what happens, because it doesn’t matter at all. If to this world
we add some beings to whom something matters, then questions of
value might have a foothold. (Railton, 2003, 88)
The experiences which underlie our evaluations of objects of taste are numerous.
Positive evaluations are grounded in for example, experiences of having fun, in
experiences of tasty or delicious food or of perceiving someone attractive or
sexy, whereas negative evaluations are grounded in experiencing disgust, lack of
intellectual stimulation etc. For example, if something is disgusting to one then
it is intrinsically of negative value to that person; seeing, tasting, smelling or
touching it makes her experience disgust.
In the previous chapter when we discussed the Intuition of No Fault we saw
its link to the idea that people make judgments of personal taste on the basis of
their own experiential states. Grounding experiential states depend on sensory
modalities. These sense modalities may be directly referred to as well, as when
we say that something tastes disgusting. However, usually the relevant sensory
mode of experience is omitted from judgments of taste. For example, we say that
something is disgusting even though it might be perfectly nice to touch and to
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look at and only disgusting when tasted. Normally it is pragmatics that makes
clear which sense modality is intended. We are supposing that judgments of
taste basically attribute dispositions to bring about positive or negative sensory
experiential states. Therefore the values that judgments of taste attribute are
straightforwardly dependent on our responses.
Let us now compare moral and taste judgments. The contrast with moral
judgments becomes quite obvious when we consider the role of sensory exper-
iences with respect to matters of taste. Predicates of taste bear an obvious
relation to our experiences and normally one cannot make a judgment of taste
without having been in the grounding experiential state (this will be argued
for in detail in chapter (5)). Nothing like that is true of moral judgments: we
can make moral judgments about actions or events without having experienced
them. Most people have not experienced say, the burning of humans but nev-
ertheless anyone can felicitously make moral judgments about that.
Secondly, many philosophers hold that morality is “inescapable” as Joyce
(2001) puts it. Moral principles must be followed even by the murderous so-
ciopath who wishes for the destruction of everything. Whether that is true of
morality or not, probably no one thinks it true of taste. If a person is deficient
in a relevant sensory modality they are excluded from the commendatory force
of judgments of taste. For example, if a person cannot perceive flavours we
don’t insist that he should still eat ice cream because it’s delicious.
Hence, the values that judgments of taste attribute seem to be firmly groun-
ded in the dispositions of the people and consequently, judgments of taste are
less universal in their scope than moral judgments. That is probably related to
the fact that morality concerns our relations to others whereas tastes are mostly
of private concern. No one is harmed if a person fails to like ice cream whereas
a murderous sociopath poses a risk for the others. But whatever the reason is
for the more acceptable relativity in the case of taste, that should be reflected
in our thoughts and judgments about the two domains.
We have seen that taste objectivism is not plausible, whereas it is plausible
to think that the taste-related values depend on our responses to the objects.
Therefore there is no reason to worry about the metaphysics of value in the case
of taste. I don’t pretend to have anything like a full account of the metaphysics
of taste, and giving one hasn’t been our aim anyway. What matters is that the
evaluative dimension of judgments of taste does not pose metaphysical worries.
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2.5 Summary of Chapter 2
We have seen that predicates of taste are inherently evaluative. Some philosoph-
ers who find values metaphysically suspicious have advanced similar anti-realist
arguments for both judgments of morality and of aesthetic judgments and judg-
ments of taste. However, I’ve argued that the value judgments of taste attribute
depends on our sensory experiences. What matters for our purposes is that there
is nothing metaphysically suspect about the values attributed by judgments of
taste, and hence the anti-realist or non-cognitivist arguments in metaethics that
are based on metaphysics have no relevance for the theory of taste.
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3 Gradability and Perspective Dependence
In this chapter we turn our focus to the semantics of predicates of personal taste.
One of the core semantic features of them is that they are gradable adjectives.
I present Kennedy’s (1999; 2007) and Kennedy & McNally’s (2005) account
of the semantics of gradable adjectives which is currently something like the
mainstream view. The aim of the chapter is to highlight the characteristics that
predicates of taste have in virtue of being gradable adjectives, and also to start
addressing issues related to context and perspective dependence more generally.
I then discuss a simple view by Barker (2013) which explains the “faultless
disagreements” that judgments of taste give rise to as a consequence of semantic
indeterminacy over the relevant contextual standards. Hence he holds that pre-
dicates of taste can be given the same non-perspectival semantics as all the other
gradable adjectives. One of the questions we face in evaluating the proposals is
whether gradability as such is enough to explain all disagreements of taste. I
argue that Barker’s theory ignores the role of experiential grounds for judgments
of taste which makes them stand apart from other gradable adjectives.
I conclude that gradability is important to take into account given its role
in creating one kind of faultless disagreement, but in addition we have to posit
perspective-dependence for predicates of taste to account for all the intuitions
about them.
3.1 The Scalar Analysis of Gradable Adjectives
In this section we look at Kennedy’s (1999; 2007) and Kennedy & McNally’s
(2005) recent and influential scalar analysis of gradable adjectives. An alternat-
ive to their analysis are so-called vagueness approaches (see e.g. Klein (1980)),
but the diﬀerences between the two kinds of views don’t matter for our purposes.
Let us begin by looking at the general characteristics of gradable adjectives.
First, they can be recognised by the following features:
(i) They can be modified by degree modifiers (e.g. very, somewhat, fairly, quite).
(ii) They can appear in syntactic environments which Kennedy calls degree con-
structions. These contain an adjective and a degree morpheme (e.g. er/more,
less, as, too, enough, so, how) and take the form [Deg (Adv)* __] [__ Deg].
(Kennedy, 1999) Below are two examples of degree constructions:
(15) Sea otters are cuter than coati.
(16) How long does it take to cross the Channel by swimming?
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Gradable adjectives contrast with absolute adjectives which include e.g. preg-
nant, dead, former, infinite, round and square. We should be aware that cer-
tain absolute adjectives can be grammatically used in degree constructions (e.g.
“round enough”), but these uses are limited unlike with bona fide gradable ad-
jectives.
According to Kennedy and McNally (2005), gradable adjectives express
gradient properties which things can have more or less. When we look at the
above list of absolute adjectives it is clear that these express properties that
things either have or do not, but cannot have to a degree: nothing can be
somewhat dead or very square except metaphorically.
3.2 Scale
Formally the semantic type of gradable adjectives is a function that takes an
object as an argument and returns a point on a scale as a value. A scale
consists of a set of degrees ordered according to a dimension. The dimension
specifies what is measured: for example, height, weight, smartness, beauty or
disgustingness. Linear adjectives are ones whose comparative form -er than
allows a linear ordering of all the objects to which the adjective applies (Klein,
1980). An example is tall : there is a unique scale of tallness to which all objects
that have a length can be mapped.
In contrast, non-linear adjectives like clever have several dimensions: clev-
erness in philosophical thinking does not, alas, entail being clever in ordinary
life. Thus, clever can express several diﬀerent properties which will correlate
with diﬀerent scales. Kennedy takes adjectives with several scales to be am-
biguous (1999, 100) or polysemous (2007, 6), rather than a matter of context
sensitivity. Once a dimension is selected, a linear total ordering of suitable
objects follows.
Given a dimension, there is an ordering of the adjective’s arguments to the
degrees on the scale. The ordering depends on the adjective meaning: antonyms
like rich / poor both use the same scale of degrees of wealth, but the ordering
is inverse. So imagine the scale for rich and poor having degrees of wealth from
huge amounts of debts to huge amounts of wealth. The context will determine
the standard for richness and poorness, i.e. the threshold for counting as rich or
poor, and the way the objects get mapped onto the degrees will be exactly the
inverse for rich and for poor. That also ensures that we can make valid inferences
such as Peter is rich |= Peter is not poor, though only within a context given
42
the context dependence of the standard.
Kennedy and McNally (2005) argue that there are four diﬀerent kinds of
scales which correlate with diﬀerent kinds of adjective meanings. Furthermore,
they argue that only one scale type correlates with context sensitivity. Which
kind of scale an adjective is associated with can be tested by checking which
modifiers the adjective licences. Perfectly, completely and totally express having
the maximum degree on the scale. If an adjective cannot be modified with any
of them, the scale of the adjective does not have an upper bound. Slightly
expresses having the property just above the minimum degree so if an adjective
cannot be modified with slightly, it does not have a lower bound.
If an adjective cannot be modified neither with perfectly etc. nor with
slightly, then the scale is open on both ends. And if it can be modified with
both kinds of modifiers, the scale is closed on both ends. A further test to see
whether an adjective has a closed or open scale is oﬀered by proportional modi-
fiers like half, mostly and most of the way, which can only combine with closed
scale adjectives.
This classifies adjectives into four kinds, depending on the kind of scale they
map their arguments to:
(i) Totally open scale (e.g. short, smart, handsome).
(ii) Closed on the lower end of the scale (dirty, wet).
(iii) Closed on the upper end of the scale (clean, dry).
(iv) Totally closed on both ends (full, empty).
Kennedy and McNally (2005) argue that it is only adjectives with open scales
that display context sensitivity (for a discussion, see Kennedy and McNally
(2005, 357)). If that is right, then for example whether something is wet is
not a context-sensitive matter: something is wet if and only if the degree of
humidity of the object is above a certain (rather high) degree. Depending on
the adjective’s scale type, gradable adjectives themselves divide into relative
and absolute: closed scale adjectives are absolute, open scale ones relative.
Intuitively predicates of taste are context-sensitive, but let us verify that by
testing which kind of scale they are associated with. Prima facie they are all
open scale adjectives since they cannot be modified with e.g. half, mostly or
most of the way. However, we need to pay attention to a further complication in
testing the modifiers they can take. Perfectly, completely and totally are each
used to emphasise that something has some property, even if the property in
question cannot be had to a maximum degree. Similar uses exist with the other
modifiers: even if some property F does not sensibly divide into quantities so
43
that one could measure a half of it, half F is used to say that something has a
bit of F ; for example, someone can be called a half-decent violinist. Same holds
to a lesser degree of slightly. Let me call these uses emphasis uses for simplicity.
To show that taste predicates are open scale adjectives we should aim to
find examples which show the infelicity of combining them with the modifiers of
closed scale adjectives. Since all the modifiers can have emphasis uses (especially
with the right stress), the results are not entirely infelicitous. However, they
are clearly odd as compared to sentences where the modifier is combined with
a closed scale adjective.
(17) ??The party was perfectly boring / fun / amusing / entertaining.
(18) ??Her paintings were half nice / fascinating.
(19) ??Her new husband is completely handsome / good-looking.
(20) ??The home-made wine was half disgusting / delicious / tasty.
Based on these examples we may conclude that at least most predicates of taste
are open scale adjectives, and therefore – according to the theory of Kennedy
and McNally – context-sensitive.
3.3 Context Sensitivity of Gradable Adjectives
Kennedy and McNally (2005) hold that the context-sensitive element of open
scale gradable adjectives is the standard, which is the degree above or below
which an object must have the gradient property in order for the predication
to be true. In addition, Kennedy (2007) argues that which objects are being
compared –the so-called comparison class– depends on the context.
To understand in intuitive terms how the semantics work let us look at some
examples. As we saw tall has one dimension, height, so it maps objects onto
degrees of height. However, whether something is tall depends on what is being
compared: a context where the discussion concerns the heights of 10-year-olds
will set the standard much lower than a context where the heights of basketball
players are at issue. For example, when discussing the heights of female ballet
dancers the context will determine the comparison class (some salient female
ballet dancers) and a standard. The standard is set somewhere above the aver-
age height of the members in the comparison class. Any attribution of tallness
to a female ballet dancer will then be true iﬀ the height of the dancer exceeds
the contextually set standard.
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Things get more complicated with non-linear adjectives that have multiple
dimensions. Kennedy and McNally treat multiple dimensions like ambiguity so
the speaker who uses the adjective must select one of the possible dimensions.
Suppose the discussion concerns stylishness which has many dimensions. The
dimension that is intended will often depend on the comparison class. For
example, if the discussion is about which philosophers are stylish, the kind
of stylishness under discussion is probably diﬀerent from the stylishness that
would be in question if the discussion concerned bankers. In that case the
dimension of stylishness depends on the comparison class. However, it might be
selected independently of the comparison class too; a banker who discusses the
stylishness of philosophers might very well intend the banker kind of stylishness
and conclude that most philosophers lack style.
To summarise, an open scale gradable adjective like a predicate of taste
has two context-sensitive elements: the comparison class and the standard. In
addition, if the adjective has many dimensions, the speaker must select one of
them.
3.4 Can Gradability Explain Disagreements of Taste?
3.4.1 “Faultless Disagreements” and Vagueness
Barker (2013) argues that all gradable adjectives including predicates of taste
exhibit indeterminacy regarding the relevant contextual values. Hence, when
one makes an assertion with a gradable adjective one not only attributes the
property but also thereby constrains the acceptable standards in the discourse.
A disagreement over an attribution of a gradable adjective may consequently be
either over the facts (e.g. whether Jones is over 190 cm tall), or over the con-
textual standards (e.g. whether 190 cm counts as tall in the context). Barker
defends his view within the framework of dynamic semantics, but for our pur-
poses we can ignore the dynamic aspects since the essence of his view does not
depend on them.
Barker’s claim is that if speakers don’t agree over the relevant contextual
standards, the result is a “faultless disagreement”, i.e. a disagreement where
neither speaker is at fault. His argument is that since gradable adjectives are
by nature indeterminate, nothing settles which contextual standards ought to
prevail. Hence, each participant to the conversation may be equally correct
while still disagreeing with each other. The aim of such disagreements then
becomes to coordinate with others on how to understand the context, or to
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influence others regarding how they should understand it.
Here is Barker’s description of his position (note that what Kennedy calls a
standard Barker calls a cutoﬀ point):
Here is how it works: at any given moment in a discourse, the dis-
course participants are prepared to entertain a (constrained) range
of possible cutoﬀ points for the applicability of a vague predicate.
For instance, we may have some idea of how tall a person needs to be
to count as tall, without having a fully precise idea. Then accepting
an assertion of ‘John is tall’ constrains the set of viable cutoﬀs, since
it commits a discourse participant to agreeing that anyone who is at
least as tall as John must also count as tall. [...] The kind of faultless
disagreement under consideration here occurs when discourse parti-
cipants agree (in all relevant respects) on facts about the world, but
maintain incompatible assumptions about the range of viable cutoﬀs
for some vague predicate. (Barker, 2013, 242).
Furthermore, Barker holds that a faultless disagreement over gradable adjective
attributions results from two factors. The first is the irrelevance of non-linguistic
facts in solving the issue, and the second is the epistemically symmetrical situ-
ation of the discourse participants; none of them have better access to what the
values of the contextual parameters are.
Now, the important element in Barker’s account is the indeterminacy or
indeterminability of where the standard is set. He takes it to be the essence
of vagueness that one cannot know the standard (whether or not there is a
fact about what the standard actually is), and hence there is bound to be
disagreements over gradable properties where the speakers are epistemically
faultless.
Without taking a stance on whether there is a determinate standard with
gradable adjectives, let us call indeterminacy the feature that the participants
to the conversation may not be able to know where the standard is set. As we
will see, perspective-dependent views where the perspective is that of just one
person need not be committed to indeterminacy since it may be the person’s
perspective that determines the standard. (Of course it’s possible to accept
indeterminacy since one’s perspective might nevertheless not fully determine the
standard.) But in a non-perspectival view like Barker’s indeterminacy can be
expected in usual conversations (except when the speakers deliberately stipulate
a standard).
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3.4.2 Evaluating Barker’s Account
Let us suppose that predicates of taste do not have any special perspective de-
pendence so that their semantics is exactly as Kennedy and McNally’s semantics
for gradable adjectives. In other words, the context determines a comparison
class and a standard, and if the adjective has several dimensions the speaker se-
lects one. Let us now see what Barker’s theory would say of Ann and Benyamin’s
disagreement over horse lasagne, repeated here:
(21) Ann (Eating horse lasagne that’s served at the party): The horse lasagne
is delicious!
Benyamin: It’s disgusting.
Let’s suppose that the conversational context has focused on the foods served
at the party so the comparison class includes only those dishes. Based on
the comparison class the context is supposed to set a standard and to order
the dishes according to their deliciousness. But in trying to imagine how the
ordering happens we encounter the main problem of Barker’s view: the idea of
something being delicious independent of anyone’s responses to it just makes no
sense, as was argued in the previous chapter. There simply is no perspective-
independent property of deliciousness which could determine the ordering. So
whose perspective then determines it?
Here is one way Barker might address the question. Deliciousness is a prop-
erty like greenness in that it depends on our responses. But that doesn’t mean
greenness is dependent on any particular perspective. Rather, which things are
green depends on the average colour vision in the linguistic community (more
or less), and likewise, what determines the ordering in the case of deliciousness
is the average response to those foods. Hence, what settles whether the lasagne
is delicious is the usage of delicious in the community, and Ann and Ben are
merely trying to use the word according to the prevalent norms. In making
her utterance Ann is trying to approximate the correct usage. Furthermore,
supposing that some amount of contextual negotiation is allowed, she may also
be trying to influence what is an acceptable standard in the conversation (even
if it wouldn’t be acceptable by the standards of the larger community). That is
what Lewis (1983) called accommodation.
Let us suppose that that is Barker’s view on what Ann is doing when she
judges the horse lasagne to be delicious. Now, Benyamin’s response can be
interpreted in two ways in Barker’s account. First, he might think that Ann
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has gotten the norms of the use of delicious wrong so that the community
would not count the lasagne as delicious. Another option, more centred on the
particular context, is that Ben is refusing to accept Ann’s attempt to influence
the context. Ben’s utterance could be seen an example of accommodation: he
refuses to accept Ann’s attempt to make horse lasagne count as delicious in the
context, and instead he takes a stance for it to count as disgusting.
Is that a plausible description of what the disagreement is about? There are
good reasons to think not. Since Barker would take the dispute to be over the
correct usage of delicious (and disgusting), Ann and Ben could advance their
inquiry by asking the opinions of others in the party. Suppose they do that,
and the consensus is that the horse lasagne does count as delicious. Now, what
can explain that Ben can always refuse to accept the consensus and state “I still
think it’s disgusting”? He might be self-confident enough to think that he has
better access to the norms that govern the use of delicious, but that is hardly
likely. According to the theory Ben’s refusal to accept the consensus is entirely
irrational since the community’s consensus is all there is to determining the
extension of vague terms.
Moreover, if we compare the above dispute to say, a quarrel over whether
some particular wallpaper is green or blue, we see that the reasons given for the
judgments are not quite of the same kind. For example, it is perfectly reasonable
to ask the opinion of others in the case of the wallpaper, and if one were to find
out that the majority of speakers took the wallpaper to be green, that would
constitute a decisive reason to adopt that belief and to adjust one’s use of
green and blue. However, the same considerations do not apply with judgments
of taste. Even if the whole community disagrees with one’s judgment about
the deliciousness of something, there is no feeling that the speaker is making
a linguistic mistake. What we rather conclude is that he is physiologically
diﬀerent; he just doesn’t experience the taste of the object as others do.
I think the above considerations suﬃce to show that Barker’s account fails to
appreciate the diﬀerence between disagreements generated merely by vagueness
and disagreements of taste: the latter are usually not only over language or over
contextual sharpening of an expression. I say usually since I think that some
uses of predicates of taste do take into account the community in general. I give
examples in chapter 5: The Grounds of Judgments of Taste. However, there I
will argue that even in those cases the question is not merely over how the word
is correctly used, but over the more substantive matter of how things are from
the perspective of the community.
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We have seen considerations against Barker’s account as a suﬃcient explana-
tion for what goes on in disagreements of taste. But we should also ask whether
it can accommodate the Intuition of Many Relevant Perspectives, i.e. that judg-
ments of taste display some kind of perspective dependence, and the Intuition
of No Fault, i.e. that people are faultless because their judgments are made on
the basis of their own taste. Barker’s motivation for his view is to explain how
“faultless disagreement” is possible, and he emphasises the existence of faultless-
ness that is due to vagueness. However, the faultlessness that people advocate
for judgments of taste is taken to have a diﬀerent source: the fact that people’s
tastes vary, and that judgments of taste are made on the basis of one’s personal
taste. So his view is useful in accounting for a certain form of faultless disagree-
ments, those which are about the standards in the context, but the view cannot
accommodate the Intuition of No Fault in its specific sense of “faultlessness”.
Therefore, if one adopts Barker’s theory one has to explain away the Intuition
of Many Relevant Perspectives, and the Intuition of No Fault. What are the
consequences of rejecting these two intuitions? Most importantly, the truth
of judgments of taste will be independent of the tastes of the speakers in the
context. Hence, if they do make a judgment of taste based on their own taste
they run a risk of being mistaken. And given the widespread diﬀerence in
tastes, the risk is very real indeed. Barker is thus denying the infallibility of
direct experience as a method for judging matters of taste. The problem is that
people do make judgments of taste based on their own direct experiences rather
than on the basis of their assessments of how the community in general judges.
One could suggest that that is because of a general but mistaken assumption
about people’s similarity to others. In other words, we typically think that our
taste is representative of everyone’s tastes and hence use it as a method to make
universal judgments. I think there is a lot of truth to that claim. However, what
is more worrying than people’s reliance on a bad method is the consequences of
the method: Barker’s theory predicts that very often people’s judgments of taste
are false, even if they are epistemically faultless as a consequence of vagueness.
After all, if truth depends on the linguistic community, then supposedly it is the
majority’s judgment that determines whether e.g. a Big Mac falls within the
extension of tasty. It doesn’t matter if you’re a master chef, if your judgment
diﬀers from that of the majority you are saying something false.
To conclude, the problems of Barker’s theory are quite serious. First, it
severs the link between personal experience about matters of taste and truth of
judgments of taste which is why perspective-dependent theories are so appealing
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in the first place. That need not be a problem if perspective-dependent accounts
simply cannot be made to work; that is the topic of the coming chapters. Second,
because truth about taste depends on the speaker only to the extent that they
too belong to the linguistic community, the speakers’ judgments of taste may
easily be false. There is something quite implausible about the idea that judg-
ments of “personal” taste are not actually personal at all: their truth is as little
dependent on the way the speaker is as the truth of “Trees are green” is. For
the moment we will set aside the view but we return to discuss perspective-
independent accounts in Ch. 13: An Error Theory for Discourses About Taste
once the problems of contextualist and relativist accounts have become clear.
3.5 Summary of Chapter 3
The aim of this chapter was to show the semantic features that predicates of
personal taste have in virtue of being gradable adjectives. I’ve presented the
influential theory by Kennedy and McNally which treat adjectives as functions
from objects to points on a scale.
We’ve concluded that predicates of taste are relative gradable adjectives
which means that they are context-sensitive in two ways: the context determ-
ines the comparison class and the standard. What their theory leaves open
is how exactly the context does that; these metasemantic questions will be
addressed later. Additionally, in the case of multidimensional adjectives the
speakers selects a dimension.
The second part of the chapter considered Barker’s theory which holds that
the semantics of predicates of taste are just like the semantics of other gradable
adjectives in that there is no extra perspective dependence. Barker argues that
the existence of disagreements of taste where neither speaker is at fault is due
to the indeterminacy of where the standard is set. I’ve argued that the view is
problematic in many ways.
First, whereas it seems somewhat plausible to take a disagreement over
greenness to be over the standard for green in the context, what counts as
green is not dependent only on the speakers’ perceptions. The extension of
green depends on how the word is used in the linguistic community, and since
no one has access to such facts the speakers are indeed epistemically faultless. In
contrast, judgments of taste are made on the grounds of one’s experiences, and
they don’t aim at stating what is e.g. delicious according to the community.
Instead, one can felicitously make judgments of taste while disagreeing with
50
everyone. For the moment we will thus set aside views like Barker’s which posit
no perspective dependence, but they will be reconsidered in part IV.
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4 Perspective Dependence and Subjective Atti-
tude Verbs
By far we have proceeded with an intuitive understanding of which expressions
are predicates of personal taste. In this chapter we will consider a suggested cri-
terion for identifying predicates of personal taste. Several linguists have argued
that verbs find, consider and other so-called “subjective attitude verbs” have a
special relation to perspective-dependent predicates (Mitchell (1986), Lasersohn
(2009), Sæbø (2009) and Kennedy (2013)).
Sæbø (2009) argues that the attitude sense of find can only embed semantic-
ally perspective-dependent predicates (“subjective” predicates in his termino-
logy) which he takes to include predicates of personal taste. If Sæbø’s argument
is correct, it is important for two reasons. First, it would oﬀer evidence from
linguistics that predicates of personal taste are indeed semantically perspective-
dependent. Second, as argued by Kennedy (2013), one could use the felicity
judgments of compatibility with find as a test for whether a predicate is lexic-
ally perspective-dependent.
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate Sæbø’s and Kennedy’s claims about
the relation of find to subjectivity. I will show that find can embed predicates
that aren’t perspective-dependent. The positive part of the chapter suggests
that (i) find can only embed gradable expressions, and (ii) find judgments re-
quire experience as grounds. As will be show in the next chapter, Ch. 5: The
Grounds of Judgments of Taste, judgments of taste normally require experience
as grounds too which explains why there seems to be a special match between
find and predicates of taste.
4.1 Subjective Attitude Verbs
Sæbø (2009) discusses a group of verbs which include find and consider in
English, finden in German, trouver in French, and tycker in Swedish. Each of
these verbs is ambiguous, for example find has the discovery sense as in “I found
my keys”, and the psychological attitude sense as in “I found the movie boring”.
Sæbø’s argument only concerns the senses which express attitudes. Sæbø calls
the attitude senses of these verbs “subjective attitude verbs” because he thinks
the verbs in question can only embed “subjective” predicates. His main example
of subjective predicates are predicates of personal taste.
Let us first look at the data about the attitude verb find and its French and
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Swedish counterparts trouver and tycker.8
(22) #I find her pregnant.
(23) #I find that she is pregnant.
(24) I find her beautiful.
(25) I find that she is beautiful.
Someone’s possible pregnancy is a common topic in the web and it is perfectly
felicitous to think or believe that someone is pregnant. However, speakers do
not “find” that someone is pregnant. On the contrary, finding someone beautiful
is a very common attitude to have. Below we have translations of the sentences
in French and Swedish (note that tycker diﬀers from find and trouver by only
taking a propositional complement.)
(26) #Je trouve qu’elle est enceinte.
(27) Je trouve qu’elle est belle.
(28) #Jag tycker att hon är gravid.
(29) Jag tycker att hon är vacker.
The pattern is the same as in English: the attitudes trouver and tycker are not
held towards possible pregnancies, unlike penser and tror (think / believe), but
the former two are widely used with belle and vacker (beautiful).
The results are uniform between the three verbs we have considered and show
a remarkable contrast between our example sentences. We can immediately rule
out that the diﬀerences are due to syntax since we have considered sentences
with identical syntactic forms such as (22) and (24). Hence we are safe to assume
that the diﬀerence lies in semantics.
Sæbø and Lasersohn both count consider among subjective attitude verbs,
and indeed we get the same contrast as above with beautiful and pregnant.
However, consider does not otherwise pattern with find. Lasersohn is aware
that consider combines less well with predicates of taste but he nevertheless
thinks that some kind of perspective dependence is involved:
8The felicity / infelicity judgments are based on the number of matches in Google; a
felicitous sentence in English normally gets from thousands to millions of matches depending
on the topic and an infelicitous one hardly any.
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Actually, consider combines with a much wider class of clauses
than just those which express personal taste; but they all, it seems
to me, involve some sort of evaluative judgment or decision on the
part of anyone assessing them for truth. (Lasersohn, 2009, 365)
Here are some examples of the contrasts with find and consider from Kennedy
(2013, 266)):
(30) Homer considers/??finds himself gay.
(31) Homer considers/??finds trippa alla romana vegetarian.
One should also be careful not to make too broad conclusions regarding the
non-English verbs we’ve looked at. As Sæbø acknowledges, there are diﬀerences
between find and its apparent cross-linguistic counterparts:
It is in fact diﬃcult to identify an attitude verb as unequivocally
subjective and equivalent to a verb in some other, not too closely
related language. The Swedish tycka and the Norwegian synes are
good candidates, but once they are compared to the French trouver
or the German finden, they turn out to have not only a somewhat
narrower but also a slightly wider distribution, corresponding to
croire or glauben when the relevant predicate in the complement
clause is a verb of perception and the two subjects corefer (as, for
example, in we thought we heard a nightingale). (Sæbø, 2009, 350-
351).
For a fuller treatment of the topic it would be important to make cross-linguistic
comparisons. However, given the narrow scope of our inquiry we will henceforth
only consider the data with find. That is the main example used by Sæbø, and
if it looks like even find doesn’t actually require lexically subjective predicates,
it is doubtful that that would be the case with the other subjective attitude
verbs.
4.2 Find and Subjectivity
Sæbø argues that find selects for “subjective” predicates. He takes subjectivity
to be lexically encoded and the examples of subjective predicates he gives are
predicates of taste, dimensional adjectives and deontic flavours of modals. Below
is his main claim:
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Generalisation
A subjective attitude verb is only felicitous with a complement
clause whose character, intension or extension is a nonconstant func-
tion from judges. (Sæbø, 2009, 333)
The problem in evaluating Sæbø’s proposal is that he doesn’t oﬀer criteria for
what makes a predicate subjective, i.e. for when the character, intension or
extension of a complement clause is a nonconstant function from judges (or
perspectives). Nevertheless, we may rely on intuition as he does. Kennedy
(2013) builds his account of the subjectivity of expressions partly on Sæbø’s
view, and he suggests a criterion for subjectivity. He holds that evaluative
expressions are subjective, and that one can recognise an evaluative expression
because its presence suﬃces for a faultless disagreement (Kennedy, 2013, 271).
However, that criterion is not very useful either since it’s doubtful that we have
clear intuitions on which topics are subject to faultless disagreements.
Let us look at some examples. The following predicates have nothing sub-
jective about them, at least intuitively:
(32) I find hardbacks too heavy to carry around.
(33) I find television very educating.9
(34) I find your analysis flawed.
(35) I find this piece of cake heavy/light/dense. (Kennedy, 2013, 265)
The last example is worth discussing in more detail. Kennedy (2013, 271) argues
that words like heavy, light and dense are ambiguous between a “dimensional /
objective” sense (heavy and light in weight, dense in density) and an “qualitative
/ subjective” sense: “how it sits in the stomach or feels on the tongue” (Kennedy,
2013, 265). Kennedy claims that in examples like (35) find forces a reading of
heavy / light / dense which corresponds to a subjective, evaluative sense:
The examples in (35) [12b], however, have only the latter [eval-
uative] reading: these sentences are ways of reporting a subjective
experience of the cake, made in virtue of tasting it, but they are
not good ways of describing the cake’s physical properties, made in
virtue of, for example, weighing it on a scale. (Kennedy, 2013, 265)
9Apparently this was said by Groucho Marx. The citation continues: “Every
time somebody turns on the set, I go into the other room and read a book.”
http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/850.html
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If Kennedy is right, then predicates which intuitively are not subjective might
appear so just because they have two senses of which one is indeed not subjective.
Thus we have a counterexample to Sæbø’s generalisation that find requires
subjectivity only if we have a case where find is acceptable with a dimensional
/ objective reading of such ambiguous predicates. And indeed, there are such
cases. We can think of perfectly felicitous examples of the attitude sense of find
with the dimensional / objective sense of the above adjectives and other similar
ones. For example, suppose Anna and Ben are on the beach:
(36) (a) Anna: Didn’t you pack the inflatable mattress?
(b) Ben: I found it too heavy.
Suppose that a person is selecting models for a catwalk show and after checking
the measurements and photos of the candidates she says of a model:
(37) I find her short.
Also, consider the following example:
(38) I found the Toshiba laptop heavier than the Mac. But we weighed them
and in fact they are equally heavy.
Kennedy would have to say that the two sentences contain a diﬀerence sense of
heavy : the first sentence attributes a subjective, evaluative sense of heaviness
and the second one a dimensional, objective sense. That’s just doesn’t seem
plausible.
Finally, Sæbø gives examples where find embeds two predicates with a fa-
miliar pattern of felicity:
(39) [24] (a) You must be handsome and below 45.
(b) #She finds him handsome and below 45.
(c) She finds him handsome and pleasant to be with. (Sæbø, 2009, 338)
Sæbø claims that (b) is infelicitous because “a judge-sensitive predicate can
be coordinated with another predicate, but if the clause is embedded under a
subjective attitude, the other predicate must be judge-sensitive too.” Here is a
counterexample:
(40) She finds him good-looking but young.
Again, Kennedy would have to say that young gets a subjective, evaluative sense
here. However, the sentence is perfectly felicitous even if the person has learnt
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the age say, from a passport. Thus we have examples of felicitous sentences
where find embeds the “objective” readings of heavy, short and young. Based
on the felicity reports we can conclude that contrary to the accounts of Sæbø
and Kennedy, there is no match between intuitive subjectivity and felicity with
find.
4.3 The Role of Experience
Now, I think that Kennedy is right in holding that find sentences have a relation
to experience. But even if experience itself is subjective in a very obvious
way, the properties that we experience need not be subjective.We can have
experiences of objective, dimensional qualities like weight, height and density.
For example, lifting a piece of cake up is a way to experience its weight, and in
such a context it is perfectly fine to say “I find the piece of cake heavy”.
In other words, one cannot argue that if a property can be experienced then
that property is subjective. What seems to be going on is that Kennedy takes
the experience implied by a find judgment to come from the predicate which
find embeds. The hypothesis is natural given that there is some restriction
on the predicates that find can embed. But why not rather think that the
experience is implied by find itself and the explanation for the restriction comes
from elsewhere? In this section we will look for another explanation for the
patterns of felicity and infelicity.
Let us first consider Stephenson’s (2007b) account. She argues that S finds p
is true iﬀ S believes p on the grounds of having direct experience of the relevant
object or event. As was mentioned, experience clearly has a role to play in the
right account. However, Stephenson’s view cannot be the whole story. First,
it faces diﬃculties in explaining certain data about the uses of find. Below is
a dialogue which shows how find is used to retreat to a weaker stance in a
disagreement, but believe / think isn’t:
(41) (a) Alice: This fondue is delicious.
(b) Björn: I don’t think so. There’s too much kirsch in it.
(c) Alice: Well, I find it delicious.
(c*) Alice: Well, I think it’s delicious.
Alice’s I find it delicious sounds weaker than her judgment (a), and it is some-
thing she can say to avoid a disagreement. However, (c*) does not avoid dis-
agreement; instead it sounds like she is reaﬃrming (a) and sticking to her guns.
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We are imagining a case where Alice has tried the fondue, and therefore she
has direct experience of it. Hence, (c) and (c*) have the same grounds and
they should have the same truth-conditions. Nevertheless we can see a clear
diﬀerence between the eﬀects of them which sheds doubt on the claim that their
truth-conditions are the same.
A second and more serious problem for Stephenson’s view is that it doesn’t
predict or explain what is infelicitous about many judgments, for example the
following:
(42) #I find myself pregnant.
(43) #Homer finds himself gay. (Sæbø, 2009)
(44) #She finds the house two-storied.
(45) #I find the room square / decorated in Art Deco style.
One can obviously have direct experience of being pregnant or gay, and via
perceptual experience we can learn that a room is square and a house two-
storied. Moreover, trying to refine the view to rule out perceptual experience
won’t do. There is no relevant diﬀerence with respect to the experiences of
perceiving that a room is square or decorated in Art Deco style, or perceiving
that it’s beautiful or messy, but the latter are felicitous unlike the former.
4.3.1 Find Requires Experience as Grounds
I think focusing on find in relation to predicates of taste has mislead theorists
who have failed to see that there are other verbs which share similarities with
find : see, hear, feel and perceive, as well as looks, seems and appears. Common
to all these verbs is that they (or more specifically, the relevant senses of them)
require that the agent of the judgment must have direct experience of the object
or event, via the relevant sensory modality. For example, one cannot say “Peter
looked tired” without having seen Peter; if testimony is involved, the appropriate
thing to say is something like “Apparently Peter looked tired”, or “Lucy said that
Peter looked tired”. Let us call these verbs verbs of perceptual experience.
It’s important to note that verbs of perceptual experience can be used meta-
phorically. For example see is also used to mean roughly the same as understand
(e.g. “He saw then that the marriage was over”) and it looks / seems / appears
can be used to indicate the likelihood of something without any relevant visual
experience (e.g. “It looks like our flight will be canceled” is perfectly fine after
58
hearing from the radio that a snow storm has closed down airports). So in
exploring the similarities between find and the other verbs we will focus on the
non-metaphorical uses.
What I want to argue for is that find is similar to verbs of perception in that
the agent’s experience of the relevant object or event is necessary for a felicitous
use of find. However, whereas some of the perceptual verbs attribute very spe-
cific perceptual experience, find allows for a much broader range of experiences
ranging from perceptions of flavour to experiences of various properties (“I find
this luggage heavy”, “I find the choreography diﬃcult”).
The first suggestion is thus that in order to felicitously judge that S finds x F
requires that S has experience-based evidence for x ’s being F which S takes to
support x ’s being F. It’s important to emphasise that a find judgment doesn’t
merely require that there is (possibly defeasible) evidence, but that the speaker
takes the evidence to support the predication. Otherwise it should be ok to say
things like “I don’t find the curry delicious although I know it is”. In that sense
there is a diﬀerence between a find judgment and for example a looks judgment,
since although a speaker can take the looks of something to be evidence, a looks
judgment may also merely attribute a look. For example, it’s ok to say “It looks
like they’re not home since the curtains are drawn but I know they’re home”.
Thus we can think of a find judgment as akin to a judgment about how things
seem: the speaker is taking a stance in behalf of the truth of some proposition
without fully believing it, and the stance is based on evidence from experience.
An important consequence of the account is that to find x F is weaker than
to believe that x is F, just like to believe that x seems F is weaker than to
believe that x is F. This explains the diﬀerence observed between the uses
of find and think in example (41), which Stephenson’s theory cannot account
for. Furthermore, in section 4.4 on page 62 below I will argue that find can
only embed gradable expressions, and there we will discuss the link between
gradability and experience.
4.3.2 Experience As a Semantic Presupposition?
I’ve argued that for judgments of the form S finds x F to be felicitous, S must
have experience-based evidence for x ’s being F. But there is also evidence for
a stronger claim that a find judgment semantically presupposes that the agent
has experience. Below I will oﬀer considerations in favour of the claim but I
won’t try to establish it here. However, the data that supports the stronger
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thesis also supports our weaker thesis about the necessity of experience.
A common account of semantic presupposition holds that a sentence S se-
mantically presupposes p iﬀ S gets no truth-value in the possible worlds in
which p is not the case (see e.g. Heim and Kratzer (1998)). There are several
tests that are standardly used to identify a semantic presupposition which I will
use to argue that find semantically presupposes that the subject has experience
of the relevant object or event.
The first test relies on presupposition projection. If an assertion of a sentence
presupposes the truth of a proposition, the presupposition is preserved also when
the sentence is not asserted but embedded in a question, negation, conditional
and so on. There is thus a contrast between what the sentence asserts and what
it presupposes. Here is an example:
(46) Mary saw your sister yesterday.
(47) Mary didn’t see your sister yesterday.
(46) presupposes that the addressee has a sister since even when (46) is negated
the presupposition is preserved; if your sister fails to refer neither sentence is
truth-evaluable. In contrast, the asserted content of (46), i.e. that Mary saw the
addressee’s sister the day before the utterance context, is not preserved under
negation.
When testing for presupposition projection under negation, we notice that
find is subject to Neg-raising which is common to some attitude verbs. For
example,
(48) Olof thinks she will be late.
(49) Olof doesn’t think she will be late.
The natural reading of (49) is that Olof thinks that she will not be late, not It’s
not the case that Olof thinks she will be late (which can be true if Olof has no
thoughts regarding her possible lateness). We observe the same phenomenon
with find :
(50) I find the luggage heavy.
(51) I don’t find the luggage heavy.
(51) is the natural negation of (50), and despite of its appearance it means that
the speaker finds the luggage not heavy. Here it seems that both sentences
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presuppose that the subject has experience of the luggage’s weight, for example
that she has lifted it up. However, given the presence of Neg-raising the data is
inconclusive and we do better to focus on other forms of embedding.
Here are some examples of questions with find, where the presupposition
of the subject’s experience of the relevant object or event is preserved under
embedding:
(52) John finds the luggage heavy.
(53) Does John find the luggage heavy?
(54) Mary found the trip long.
(55) Did Mary find the trip long?
Another test we can use to uncover presuppositions is from von Fintel (2004)
(who says it’s a variation of a test by Shanon (1976)). If p is presupposed by a
sentence, then one can felicitously say “Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that
p.” Here is an example (von Fintel, 2004, 317):
(56) (a) The mathematician who proved Goldbach’s Conjecture is a woman.
(b) Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that someone proved Goldbach’s
Conjecture.
(b*) #Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that that was a woman.
Again, find easily passes the test:
(57) (a) I found Romania extremely beautiful.
(b) Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea you’ve been to Romania.
(58) (a) Mary found your curry delicious.
(b) Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that Mary ate the curry too.
Finally, the oddity of some cases from the literature can be explained as resulting
from the absence of direct experience. Here are some examples from Kennedy
(2013) (who oﬀers the examples to support Sæbø’s view):
(59) ?? Anna finds the cat food tasty (because the cat ate it all up).
(60) ?? I’m sorry, sir, but the airline finds this bag heavy. You will have to
pay an extra baggage fee.
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The because of the first example states that the grounds for Anna’s finding the
cat food tasty is the cat’s behaviour. Hence there is a mismatch between the
presupposition about direct experience required by find and what the subclause
states: the find sentence requires that Anna has direct experience of the food,
not the cat. We may compare the sentence to “Anna finds the cat food tasty
because she tasted it” which is fine. In the second sentence the oddity is due to
the airline not being the kind of subject that can have direct experiences.
We’ve spoken generally about experience but ideally we would want to know
what counts as the relevant kind of experience. After all, when we compared
find to other verbs of perceptual experience we saw that many of them require
very specific kind of experience, e.g. looks requires seeing, sounds hearing and
so on. Find is much broader in its uses and doesn’t require an experience
acquired via any specific sensory modality. Most things can be experienced
one way or another, and it seems that there are degrees of acceptability of find
judgments that correlate with whether the presence of the relevant property can
be experienced. For example “I find Anna rich” isn’t clearly infelicitous, but it
seems like it would be better to say “I consider Anna rich”. I would thus predict
that the more diﬃcult a property is to experience, the more infelicitous a find
judgment about the property is.
4.4 Hypothesis: Find Requires Gradability
A second constraint that I will argue for is that find can only embed gradable
adjectives (and possibly other gradable constructions, although I won’t discuss
them here; prima facie at least gradable adverbs are fine, as in “I find that
he sang poorly”). Let us begin by looking at the requirement that the embed-
ded clause attributes a gradable property. Let me repeat some of the example
sentences with find :
(61) #I find her pregnant.
(62) I find her beautiful.
(63) #Homer finds himself gay.
(64) #She finds the house two-storied.
(65) #I find the room square / decorated in Art Deco style.
(66) I find what he did wrong / right / inexcusable / evil / bad.
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(67) Peter finds proving the theorem diﬃcult / hard / easy / impossible /
possible.
Pregnant, gay, two-storied, square, decorated in Art Deco style are all non-
gradable whereas the other adjectives are gradable. The requirement that find
embeds a gradable property predicts most of the infelicities whereas the rest
was explained by the experience requirement.
An interesting example in favour of our hypothesis is oﬀered by adjectives of
nationality like Swedish which are ambiguous between the non-gradable reading
(either one has or doesn’t have a Swedish nationality) and the gradable reading
of having characteristics typical to a Swede. Using find forces the latter reading:
(68) I find her Swedish.
In other words, (68) can only mean that the speaker finds the referent to have
some characteristics typical to a Swede, not that her nationality is Swedish.
Now, what could explain the requirement that the embedded predicate is
gradable? Sæbø’s general claim was that find embeds subjective predicates.
However, we’ve seen counterexamples to his view and we’ve suggested another
way to account for the link between find and subjectivity: the requirement of
personal experience which is paradigmatically subjective. But there doesn’t
seem to be any obvious link between the gradedness of properties and the pos-
sibility to experience them. In the following section we consider one explanation
which might be a part of the story.
Before that, let us consider some objections and possible counterexamples
to the view I’ve given. First, why is it not ok to look at an empty glass and
say “I find the glass empty”, even though the speaker has direct experience and
empty is gradable?10 There’s a perfectly natural Gricean explanation. A find
judgment is weaker than a judgment that attributes the property (e.g. “The
glass is empty”). But when one sees an empty glass one knows the glass to be
empty. To say that one merely finds it empty would be odd from the point of
view of communication, and thereby it would probably trigger the expectation
that some implicature is intended.
Another problem is posed by the acceptability of some moral predicates
with find. The problem is that one need not have experience of some event or
action in order to make a find judgment that attributes a moral predicate.11
10Thanks for an anonymous referee for asking the question.
11Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out the problem.
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For example, it’s ok to say “I find suicide wrong”. However, what is important
to notice is that many other judgments are odd, for example the following:
(69) ??I find vegetarianism good / right / bad / wrong.
(70) ??I find beating children wrong / right / bad.
Now, judgments of the form “I find that [moral judgment]” sound better, but
find that sentences do not have the kind of restrictions as bare find judgments
have. Sæbø’s arguments for the subjectivity of find judgments do not extend
to find that judgments, and likewise I am not arguing that the experience and
gradability requirements hold for find that judgments either. It looks like most
moral judgments are not ok with bare find as our theory predicts, and the
remaining acceptable ones can be taken to be metaphorical uses where the
experience requirement doesn’t hold. As mentioned, other verbs of perception
have metaphorical uses so we may expect find to have them as well.
4.4.1 Subjectivity, Vagueness, and Find
Finally, let us consider one possible explanation for why find judgments only al-
low embedding gradable predicates. It’s possible that find judgments are mainly
used for the contextual negotiation of the threshold of graded properties. In the
previous chapter we saw that gradable adjectives, especially relative gradable
adjectives which display context sensitivity, have an element of “subjectivity”
that is due to their vagueness. As we saw, Barker (2013) emphasises that the
contents of context-sensitive gradable adjectives are vague and indeterminate in
a context, and this gives rise to faultless disagreements where we feel like the
speakers are disagreeing but neither of them need to be mistaken.
I’ve argued that to find x F is weaker than to believe x to be F, and the judg-
ment requires experience as grounds. What links the requirement of experience
and gradability is that since gradable adjectives typically leave room for many
suitable standards or cutoﬀ points in the context, a find judgment is a way to
take a stance on where to set the threshold. The absence of a clear cutoﬀ point
in the relevant context creates the need for a judgment that is weaker than a
straight x is F judgment.
Hence, a first-person find judgment can play several conversational roles.
First, one might just want to express one’s experience of the relevant object,
either because one is unsure of the standards of the context, or because one
knows that the other participants to the conversation do not agree with the
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speaker about where to set the standard. For example, if a speaker knows that
her taste is diﬀerent from the participants to the conversation, she can avoid a
conflict by saying “I find x delicious”.
Second, one might want to influence the standards of the context without
taking a strong stance on them. An all-out judgment, e.g. “John is rich” is a
much more direct attempt at fixing the standards, but such assertions can lead
to disagreements. Instead, find judgments cannot be directly disagreed with
given that they are grounded in the speaker’s experience to which no one else
has access. One can influence the contextual standards by accommodation, i.e.
by making a judgment that aims at setting the standard. A judgment with find
is a subtle way to take a stance on where the standard ought to be.
Now, even if the uses mentioned above are the main uses of find judgments,
what we need to understand is why find cannot embed non-gradable adjectives.
I don’t have a theory about it but we can speculate. First, graded properties
might generally bear a closer relation to experience than non-graded properties.
However, some gradable adjectives like rich are somewhat infelicitous with find,
and that would be explained by the fact that richness cannot necessarily be
experienced.
Nevertheless, we’ve seen that many non-graded properties can be experi-
enced too, for example whether a room is square, in Art Deco style or if you’re
gay or pregnant. However, if gradable adjectives actually do bear a closer re-
lation to experience, as a matter of use find could have become specialised so
that it is now only used with gradable adjectives. When one wants to hedge a
judgment about a non-gradable property, one has to use verbs like believe or
think instead, as in “I think I’m gay / pregnant”. In other words, there need be
no philosophically interesting or necessary link between experience and finding
something to be some way, but as a matter of use the diﬀerent verbs could have
come to be used with diﬀerent types of adjectives.
4.5 Summary of Chapter 4
To conclude, I’ve oﬀered plenty of counterexamples to show that find doesn’t
only embed predicates that are intuitively perspective-dependent. Hence the
data doesn’t support Sæbø’s claim that find binds a covert experiencer argu-
ment, and we can reject the claim that the data from find could be used to
identify predicates of personal taste, or “subjective” predicates more generally.
I suggested an alternative account which holds that a find judgment pre-
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supposes experience of the relevant object and the embedded predicate must
be gradable. The view explains the data extremely well while still incorpor-
ating Sæbø’s insight that subjectivity plays some role as well as Stephenson’s
emphasis on direct experience. As we will see in the next chapter, judgments
of personal taste also require experience as grounds. The fact that find presup-
poses experience and find ’s link to gradability explains why many have been
tempted to link find specifically with predicates of taste. Given that not all
gradable properties can be experienced but all taste properties are both grad-
able and linked to experience explains why one might think there is a special
match.
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5 The Grounds of Judgments of Taste
In chapter 1.3.2 we introduced the idea that judgments of taste are made on
the basis of one’s sensory experiences of the relevant object or event, and we
called these grounding experiential states. In this chapter we will look more
closely at the role played by these states. The aim is to get an understanding
of what is required to be in a position to make a judgment of taste. Hence we
are remaining neutral on what their content may be and simply focus on data
about pragmatics. Mostly our considerations are about judgments of felicity
and relevance.
I will argue that being in a grounding experiential state is normally necessary
but often not suﬃcient for making a judgment of taste. What is additionally
required is knowledge of the grounding experiential states of other relevant ex-
periencers. However, there are also contexts where the speakers are excluded
from being relevant experiencers. What determines the relevant experiencers is
the context, especially the topic and aims of the conversation. Finally we will
consider the role of “ideal experiencers” in discussions about taste.
5.1 Grounding Experiential States
In most cases a judgment of taste requires that the speaker makes the judgment
at least in part on the basis of their own reactions to the object in question: I
will call these the normal cases. As we will see there are exceptions which will
be discussed later, but we’ll begin with some generalisations about the normal
cases.
Grounding experiential states can be expressed by judgments that make
explicit whose experience is in question. For example, the judgment This movie
is boring is grounded in the state expressible by This movie bores me. If a
person makes a certain judgment of taste, one can infer –albeit defeasibly– that
she also makes a judgment about her grounding experiential state. Here are
some examples; if the speaker judges the former, then one can normally infer
that she also judges the latter:
x is fun -> I am enjoying myself when doing x.
x is boring -> x bores me.
x is funny -> x amuses me.
x is disgusting -> x disgusts me.
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x is attractive -> I am attracted to x.
x is tasty -> x tastes good to me.
Evidence for the inferential relations and hence the requirement of having been
in the experiential state is also provided by judgments of felicity and infelicity.
Pearson (2013) gives the following examples that show that a judgment of an
experiential state which violates the above inference patterns sounds infelicitous:
(71) [(19)] The cake that Mary and I ate was tasty. #But I didn’t like it.
(Pearson, 2013, 111)
That contrasts with the following example:
(72) [(22)] The cake that Mary and I ate was tasty. But she didn’t like it.
(Pearson, 2013, 112)
The latter example shows that a judgment of taste can exclude the experiential
state of another salient experiencer whereas only very special contexts allow the
exclusion of the speaker’s experiential state.
Some predicates of taste have a close conceptual connection to an expression
which describes an experiential state, as is shown by the examples (e.g. boring
and being bored). However, it is more important to note the diﬀerences between
these expressions and especially the prima facie linguistic form of the sentences
in which they appear: a judgment about an experiential state predicates a state
to a person whereas a judgment of taste predicates a property to an object or
event. (I say a prima facie form since the surface grammar of a sentence may
give a misleading picture of its actual structure.)
Let us call taste qualities the qualities or dispositions of objects that people
experience when they are in an experiential state. As argued in Ch. 2: The
Evaluative Dimension of Judgments of Taste we are supposing that taste qualit-
ies are response-dependent so that an object is for example delicious only given
an experiencer. The presupposition is shared by all theorists of taste but it
is important not to overstate its consequences. Even if being in a grounding
experiential state is a necessary condition for a judgment of taste it may not
always be suﬃcient. For example, MacFarlane (2014) moves from having an
experience of tastiness to being in a position to make a judgment of tastiness:
TP. If you know first-hand how something tastes, call it “tasty”
just in case its flavour is pleasing to you, and “not tasty” just in case
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its flavour is not pleasing to you. MacFarlane (2014, 4).12
MacFarlane is hence supposing that experience of an object’s taste allows one
to call the object tasty. We have emphasised that such knowledge allows one
to make a statement of one’s own state, e.g. I find this tasty, and that the
knowledge is normally the minimal required grounds for a judgment of taste. In
the next section we will see that a judgment of taste often requires more than
that. What should be emphasised is that we do often use judgments of taste
and judgments of experiential states interchangeably, and it is more natural and
common to say Petanque is fun than Petanque amuses me. However, the two
kinds of judgments are by no means interchangeable in all contexts.
The view that personal experience is necessary for a judgment of taste is
widespread. Historically theorists of taste contrasted the exercise of reason and
the faculty of taste. Here is an example from Kant:
If someone reads me his poem or takes me to a play that in
the end fails to please my taste, then he can adduce Batteux or
Lessing, or even older and more famous critics of taste, and adduce
all the rules they established as proofs that his poem is beautiful
[...] I will stop my ears, listen to no reasons and arguments, and
would rather believe that those rules of the critics are false [...] than
allow that my judgment should be determined by means of a priori
grounds of proof, since it is supposed to be a judgment of taste and
not of the understanding of reason. (Kant, 2000, 165)
Frank Sibley’s (1959) most famous claim about aesthetic judgments echoes
Kant. Sibley held that aesthetic features depend on the non-aesthetic features
of an object. However, it is an essential feature of aesthetic concepts that there
are no conditions (neither necessary nor suﬃcient) describable by non-aesthetic
terms that determine whether the object has a certain aesthetic quality. Only
the exercise of taste allows one judge the aesthetic features of an object.
We have talked of being in a grounding experiential state as necessary for
making a judgment of taste (in the normal cases). However, the state also
seems to be necessary for forming beliefs about matters of taste, as pointed out
by Ryan Doerfler:
12MacFarlane holds that one has first hand knowledge of the taste of something if one has
tasted the object. He adds that some physiological conditions like cold or having just brushed
your teeth will not count as cases where you can gain knowledge of a food’s taste by tasting.
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Whereas discourse about prosaically factual subject matter ap-
pears to allow for an individual to become warranted in believing
that p on the basis of testimony that p alone [...] when the con-
versation turns to comedy, or aesthetics generally, testimony that p
appears never to suﬃce by itself for an individual to be warranted
in believing that p. (Doerfler, 2012, 496).
Doerfler further states that it seems impossible to imagine cases where a speaker
makes a felicitous assertion about something’s being funny without having direct
experience of it (Doerfler, 2012). We will see some such cases but indeed they
are highly exceptional.
In the next section we will look at more detail the role of grounding experi-
ential states. I present cases which show that:
(i) Being in a grounding experiential state is normally necessary for making
a judgment of taste.
(ii) There are cases where being in a grounding experiential state is not
necessary for making a judgment of taste, and
(iii) There are plenty of cases where being in a grounding experiential state
is not suﬃcient for making a judgment of taste.
5.2 The Relevant Experiencer
In the normal case a judgment of taste implies the presence of a grounding
experiential state and hence a hearer can conclude that the speaker also makes
the correlating judgment about the relevant experiential state. For example,
from an utterance of Eels are disgusting one can infer that the speaker believes
Eels disgust me. But the inferences do not go the other way round: one cannot
infer a judgment of taste from a judgment about a grounding experiential state.
Contrast the following judgments:
(73) Alexia: The party was great fun.
(74) Ana: I had a lot of fun at the party.
If Craig asks whether the party was fun, Alexia’s and Ana’s judgments give very
diﬀerent information. From Ana’s judgments they can conclude nothing about
the party in general; everyone else might have been bored except Ana. Hence
Ana’s report about her experiential state doesn’t allow one to infer that she
would also judge that the party was fun, or that anyone else was having fun.
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In contrast, it seems like Alexia’s judgment entails that she had fun and
second, that many other people were having fun. The latter is shown by the
fact that normally the following seems contradictory (unless it’s ironic):
(75) The party was great fun but most people were bored.
This suggests that normally not only the speaker but other people as well should
be in the grounding experiential state. But there are some contexts, to be
discussed below, where (75) is an ok thing to say.
Another example which shows that a judgment of taste is not merely an
expression of a experiential state is that judgments of taste work better as
reasons for recommendations. Here we can see the contrast:
(76) I had a lot of fun in San Francisco. You should visit it!
(77) San Francisco was a lot of fun. You should visit it!
(78) I find the new visiting scholar really good-looking. Why don’t you ask
him out?
(79) The new visiting scholar is really good-looking. Why don’t you ask him
out?
There is something strange and self-centered in making a recommendation on
the basis of one’s experiential states. In contrast, a judgment of taste works as
a recommendation even without explicitly adding a recommendation.
In a normal case the speaker who makes the judgment of taste is in the
grounding experiential state. But I mentioned that there are also cases where
someone else’s grounding experiential state matters instead. Generally, a judg-
ment of taste requires that someone has been in the grounding experiential state;
let us call that person the relevant experiencer. Some judgments of taste are
made merely on the basis of beliefs about the grounding experiential states of
a relevant experiencer (or a group of them). Who the relevant experiencer is
depends on the features of the context, for example on what the topic and the
aim of the conversation is.
Let me give some examples to show both variation in the relevant experien-
cers and the influences of the context to the choice of the experiencer. Above
we saw that the following sounds normally rather contradictory:
(80) The party was great fun but most people were bored.
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The impression of contradiction supports the idea that usually it is not only the
speaker who should be in the grounding state but some other people as well. This
suggests that unless the context indicates otherwise, the relevant experiencers
include the speaker but also at least some other people who experienced the
object or event in question.
However, the generalisation is defeasible. Suppose that Ana and Craig share
their taste regarding what kind of parties are fun: no alcohol, classical music and
board games to be enjoyed with a small group of close friends. Ana has invited
her best friends who are all enjoying the party, but she has also invited a group
of visiting students who are more numerous than Ana and her friends. Now their
idea of fun is drinking, debauchery and loud dance music and consequently they
find Ana’s party depressing. In such a context (80) makes perfect sense. Ana
is simply talking about what she and Craig take to be fun since they are the
relevant experiencers, and she is ignoring the experiences of the visiting students
even though they constituted a majority at the party.
Even if there is flexibility regarding who the relevant experiencers are, there
is a strong expectation that the speaker is among them. Suppose Ana is talking
to a third person and it is mutual knowledge between them that their tastes on
parties diﬀer. The person asks how the party went. For Ana to say “The party
was fun” leaves the hearer with three salient options regarding the inferences to
make: either Ana had fun and the others didn’t, the others had fun and Ana
didn’t, or the party managed to be a compromise between debauchery and a
calm evening so that it was fun for everyone. However, since the party wasn’t
fun for all, Ana has the choice between making the judgment either based on
her grounding state or that of the others. Now, it would sound insincere if Ana
were to say “The party wasn’t fun” given that she thinks it was an instance of
a prototypically fun party. A more appropriate thing for her to say would be:
(81) The party was fun although most people didn’t think so.
Or, if she wants to take the majority as the relevant experiencers:
(82) Apparently the party wasn’t fun although I was having a great time.
(81) makes it clear that she takes herself to be the relevant experiencer. But
even if she privileges the experiences of the others as in (82), apparently removes
the conflict between her experiential state and judging that the party was not
fun. It thus seems like the speakers are expected to make judgments of taste
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on the grounds on their grounding state and if they are not, they should flag it
somehow as in (82) where Ana adds that she was having fun.
We have seen that typically judgments of taste are not merely expressions
of one’s grounding experiential state and that normally some other people too
are relevant experiencers, for example in judging whether a party is fun. We
mentioned the context and aims of the conversation as features that aﬀect who
the relevant experiencers are. A further feature is the taste of the people who
experienced the object or event. Some people may be excluded as relevant
experiencers if their taste is idiosyncratic –not necessarily objectively idiosyn-
cratic, but relative to the taste of the speaker. That is what happened in Ana
and Craig’s discussion about the party. They could ignore the visiting students’
opinion even though they were present at the party because their taste was
simply too diﬀerent to be relevant for Ana and Craig.
Sometimes a person is considered a relevant experiencer until it is found out
that her taste is idiosyncratic. For example, suppose that the visiting students
who don’t know Craig are asking him what are the fun things to do in the
city they are now living in. Craig recommends visiting churches, museums and
parks, so the students conclude that there is nothing fun to do in the city. But
once they learn of Craig’s radically diﬀerent taste they will simply ignore his
advice.
The cases can get complicated if the knowledge of each others’ tastes is
asymmetrical. For example, if Craig doesn’t know that the others are ignoring
his views on fun he may aim to make judgments that are a compromise between
his taste and theirs; for example, he might find pubs too noisy and drunken
people frightening but he thinks the others like pubs so he recommends the one
he finds the most calm. So Craig is making his judgment on the grounds of what
he believes of the grounding states of the others, and partly on his grounding
state. But the others have excluded him from the relevant experiencers so they
may make their judgments on the grounds of their grounding states and what
they believe of the states of others, excluding Craig. Thus one conversational
context need not determine a unique set of relevant experiencers.
5.3 When the Speaker Is Not a Relevant Experiencer
In some rare contexts it is irrelevant whether the speaker is in a grounding
experiential state. Suppose that Ana and Craig have to plan activities for
children’s summer camp. In their context the relevant experiencers are children
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generally so the grounds of their judgments are not their own grounding states
but their beliefs about the grounding states of children. Hence in that context
they can make judgments like “Sleeping in a tent is fun.” or “Hot dogs and
chicken nuggets are delicious.” without either of them thereby making any
inferences about each others’ experiential states. But knowledge of the context
is crucial; if someone is eavesdropping without knowing what the discussion is
about they would conclude that Ana and Craig have childish tastes.
Secondly, there are contexts in which the discussion concerns the views of
the majority who may –but need not– be the relevant experiencers. For ex-
ample, magazines and online forums abound in discussions about topics like
which celebrities are the sexiest, the most good-looking or best / worst-dressed.
Suppose that two people are talking about which actress is the most good-
looking. Their conversation may have diﬀerent aims. For one, they might want
to establish who they take to be the most good-looking which can include aim-
ing at a consensus: to find someone which both of them rate high. Or they may
want to find out who is the best-looking for each of them, even if they don’t
agree.
But alternatively, one might embark on a more sociological enterprise of
finding out who the public considers the best-looking actress. For example, we
can imagine movie producers searching for an actress who is generally considered
very good-looking. Suppose that after asking around and reading the relevant
sources they establish that most people prefer the looks of Angelina Jolie. In
their context they can make judgments while ignoring their personal preferences,
and they can say things which would normally sound infelicitous, e.g. “Angelina
Jolie doesn’t appeal to me at all but she is the best looking actress.”
In the case of Craig and the visiting students, the latter ignored Craig’s
judgments of taste once they learnt that his taste is entirely diﬀerent of theirs.
But a speaker may also ignore their own experiential states if they’ve learnt
that their taste is highly idiosyncratic or they simply lack taste. A lack of taste
can be a consequence of a deficiency, for example when a person suﬀering from
total colour blindness responds indiﬀerently to colourful paintings. Alternatively
they may simply lack sensitivity or interest in the particular sense modality and
thereby fail to make any judgments regarding for example the taste of diﬀerent
foods. Many people also have an idiosyncratic taste. Such agents will learn
quite quickly that their experiential states do not correlate with those of others
and consequently it makes sense for them not to rely on their own senses in
making judgments of taste.
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5.4 Ideal Experiencers
Finally, there are cases where one may be hesitant to make a judgment of taste
on the grounds of one’s own experiential state if one’s taste is less cultivated
than the taste of another. For example, a novice wine taster in a class with
experts may realise that she simply fails to perceive much when tasting wine,
and hence her experiential states aren’t worth trusting yet. To her it makes
more sense to listen to the judgments of the experts and then try to experience
what they said about the qualities of the wine. A conversation between an
expert and a novice is another case where the speaker may not be a relevant
experiencer, when the speaker is the novice.
It is often said that matters of personal taste are essentially and irreducibly
personal or “subjective”, by which the theorist usually means the combination
of two facts: taste experiences are private, and they vary more than for example
our visual perceptions of physical objects. And not only do the experiences vary,
as we saw in section (1.3.1), it is commonly held that there are many equally
valid ways to experience objects of taste. Let me repeat Wright’s statement of
the Intuition of No Fault:
[The disagreement over the deliciousness of rhubarb] is, we feel—or
is likely to be—a disagreement which there is no point in trying to
settle, because it concerns no real matter of fact but is merely an
expression of diﬀerent, permissibly idiosyncratic tastes. Nobody’s
wrong. (Wright, 2006, 38).
Prima facie there seems to be a conflict with the Intuition of No Fault, i.e.
that people are infallible regarding how they experience taste qualities, and
the idea that some people are better experiencers than others. Let us call an
ideal experiencer a person with a “good taste”, i.e. a connoisseur of wines, a
great chef, a perfume maker, or any other expert on matters of personal taste.
The apparent conflict results because if everyone is correct when they make
a judgment of taste, then what sense is there in saying that someone is an
expert? Our question hence is, is there a way to reconcile the existence of ideal
experiencers with the Intuition of No Fault, or need we reject the notion of ideal
experiencers with respect to matters of personal taste?
Let us look at a classic statement about what makes one an ideal experiencer:
a true judge in the finer arts is observed, even during the most
polished ages, to be so rare a character: strong sense, united to
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delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison,
and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable
character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be
found, is the true standard of taste and beauty. (Hume, 1998, 147)
It should be emphasised that the existence of ideal experiencers doesn’t require
that they fully agree with each others. As Hume (1998) emphasised, even the
“true judges” may not agree in their judgments as a consequence of their diﬀering
temperaments, ages, views on morality and the influences of the era in which
they live.
An ideal experiencer is described in ordinary language as one who has a good
taste. As was mentioned in the previous section, what causes someone to lack
taste include physical deficiencies in the relevant sense modality, lack of interest
or insensibility. An ideal experiencer in contrast has keen sense modalities,
interest and sensibility regarding the relevant topic. The idea of a better or
worse taste correlates with the idea that the taste in question can be developed
and cultivated. Knowledge plays an obvious role too; for example, evaluation of
food tastes depend on one’s expectations and beliefs about what one is eating.
For example, Yeomans et al. (2008) showed that people’s evaluations of a cold
salmon dish varied depending on whether it was presented as mousse or as
ice-cream.
Past experiences and habituation clearly make a diﬀerence in every matter
of taste. It was already mentioned that people’s taste in food, although partly
dependent on their genes, is largely a matter of habituation. One of Foot’s
(2002b) examples of a matter of personal taste was the looks of people and how
there can be extreme variation between eras and cultures about what kind of
traits make people good-looking. Now, it is questionable whether anyone could
entirely overcome one’s parochialism regarding matters of taste and succeed in
having equal amounts of experience of say, foods of various cultures or exposure
to diﬀerent-looking people. However, it seems clear that an ideal experiencer
should have a lot of experience and consequently habituated in various flavours /
sounds / looks which allows them to compare more things. Habituation applies
both to flavours as such and beliefs: one comes to prefer flavours with exposure
to them, and if one gets used to the idea that e.g. maggots are food, one gets
rid of a disgust towards them.
The expectation that there can be ideal experiencers is reflected in debates
on taste; some people are treated as authorities whose views others defer to.
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There might also be critical and analytic literature on the topic and perhaps
recognised experts in the public. However, whether the opinion of an ideal
experiencer matters depends on the usual aims of the conversations about the
topic. For example, most discussions about what is fun are practical, aiming
to establish what should be done next or in the future. So even if there were
experts in fun, given that one may not share the taste of the expert one might
be better oﬀ just doing what one finds fun.
Now, despite of the widespread view that tastes can’t be disputed and that
everyone is right in matters of taste, most people do seem to acknowledge the ex-
istence of ideal experiencers in food, wine, coﬀee, tea, cocktails, style in clothes,
interior design etc., music, movies, comedy and humour and even what is fun.
Considering these topics we also see that drawing a line between matters of
“personal” taste and matters aesthetic is easier said than done. The challenge
that a theory of personal taste faces is to reconcile the idea that there can be
better and worse tastes with the basic intuition that there is something infallible
in one’s experiences of taste. The topic will be discussed in more detail in Ch.
13: An Error Theory for Discourses About Taste.
5.5 Summary of Chapter 5
In this section I’ve shown that the felicity of judgments of taste depends on
the aims and participants to the conversations, as well as on the tastes of the
participants. These features determine what I called the relevant experiencers.
I suggested that a minimal requirement for a judgment of taste is normally that
the relevant experiencer has been in the grounding experiential state. Hence, if
the relevant experiencer includes others than the speaker, she must have beliefs
(or perhaps even knowledge) about the experiential states of others.
However, the relevant experiencer depends on the features of the context,
including the tastes of the participants and the aims of the conversation. What
I haven’t taken a stance on or talked about is whether these considerations
about the grounds of judgments of taste are reflected in the contents or truth-
conditions of judgments of taste. We have merely pointed out that the conver-
sational context influences the felicity of judgments, and the relevant feature of
the context is whose grounding experiential state matters.
Now, there are two lines of explanation for how the relevant experiencer
influences judgments’ felicity. First is a semantic explanation: take the relev-
ant experiencer to be an element of the lexical semantics of predicates of taste.
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Hence our judgments of felicity would match judgments about truth and falsity:
the speaker says something infelicitous when she has misunderstood or ignored
the relevant experiencers in the context, and consequently she also says some-
thing false. We will discuss a contextualist account along these lines in Chapter
8: Flexible Contextualism.
The second explanation is pragmatic: the semantics does not reflect the
role of relevant experiencers which means that the felicity judgments do not
relate to the truth-values of the judgment. In other words, a judgment might
in principle be true albeit infelicitous, or felicitous but false. We will consider
pragmatic explanations in Chapters 6: Two Contextualist Approaches and 8:
Flexible Contextualism.
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Part II
Contextualism
6 Two Contextualist Approaches
In ch. 3: Gradability and Perspective Dependence we saw in which respects
predicates of taste are context-sensitive merely in virtue of being open scale
gradable adjectives. Moreover, Barker showed that indeterminacy of the stand-
ard in a context leads to one kind of faultless disagreements. However, we saw
that the context sensitivity that is due to the variability of a comparison class
and a standard is not enough to account for disagreements of taste, nor can
it account for our intuitions that there can be many relevant perspectives and
that each speaker may be infallible in making judgments of taste.
In this part we look at contextualist accounts of predicates of taste which
hold that in addition to the above-mentioned context sensitivity, predicates of
taste refer to a perspective which is determined by the context. Contextualism
is a rather standard view of the semantics of many expressions, even if the way
context aﬀects content hasn’t been fully worked out. In Ch. 1: Judgments of
Personal Taste we already briefly encountered a contextualist account which
I called simple subjectivism. However, the recently defended contextualist ac-
counts are all forms of “sophisticated subjectivism” in that whose perspective
matters for a judgment of taste may vary.
In the previous chapter we discussed how experience matters as the grounds
for judgments of taste, and how a judgment may be infelicitous if it is made
on the grounds of an irrelevant experiencer. The first section of this chapter
shows how the data about relevant experiencers can be used to motivate con-
textualism. The following sections introduce two rather diﬀerent approaches to
contextualism. What I call semantics-based contextualism takes predicates of
taste to be lexically context-sensitive, and it is by far the most popular contex-
tualist approach. The alternative, pragmatics-based contextualism in contrast
holds that predicates of taste are not lexically perspective-dependent, but that
based on pragmatic mechanisms the truth-conditions of judgments of taste come
to refer to a perspective.
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6.1 Contextualism and Relevant Experiencers
In chapter 1: Judgments of Personal Taste we discussed simple subjectivism, the
view which identified the semantic content of judgments of taste with judgments
about experiential states so that e.g. “Surfing is fun” means roughly “I enjoy
surfing” (or to account for temporary lack of enjoyment due to e.g. bad mood,
“I normally enjoy surfing”). We saw that the view is implausible because of the
entirely diﬀerent pragmatics of the two kinds of judgments. Judgments of taste
can be disagreed or agreed with and judged true or false independently of what
the hearer believes of the speaker. In contrast, judgments about experiential
states explicitly concern the speaker, so the hearer may agree or disagree only
if they believe that the speaker misunderstand their own state.
We’ve seen that experiential states play a crucial role as the grounds for
judgments of taste. Moreover, our discussion of relevant experiencers showed
that whose experiential state is relevant may vary from one context to another.
These features point to an improved version of subjectivism which we may call
sophisticated subjectivism. The view shares the essence of simple subjectivism,
namely that the truth of judgments of taste depends also on the responses of
people and not only on the properties of objects. But it is sophisticated in that
it allows for more variation in whose experiences the judgment is about.
The variation in perspectives prima facie solves the problems faced by simple
subjectivism, namely the major pragmatic diﬀerences between judgments of
taste and judgments about experiential states. Most importantly it seems to
be able to explain why people disagree over taste. If the relevant perspective
includes all the speakers in the context then prima facie it looks like they can
disagree over the truth of a judgment of taste as well as judge it as true or
false. The views which defend sophisticated subjectivism by taking the judg-
ment’s content to refer to variable perspectives are contextualist since they
model the role of the perspective as additional context sensitivity of predicates
of taste. Contextualism for predicates of taste has been defended by Cappelen
and Hawthorne (2009), Glanzberg (2007) and Sundell (2011).13 To distinguish
between contextualist versions of simple and sophisticated subjectivism, let us
call the latter flexible contextualism.
As we saw in chapter 5: The Grounds of Judgments of Taste, the felicity
of judgments of taste may depend on the conversational context including the
13Foot (2002a; 2002c) defends a form of “proto contextualism”: the view seems to be a form
of sophisticated subjectivism but she doesn’t say anything about how the semantics works.
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tastes of the participants. The context determines whose taste matters, i.e.
who are the relevant experiencers. Now, flexible contextualism is in principle
in an excellent position to account for the role of relevant experiencers. Indeed,
one could use the linguistic data about how experiencers influence felicity as an
argument in favour of contextualism. One has simply to take relevant exper-
iencers to be a part of the content of judgments of taste. Hence, the context
determines whose experiences are relevant and the judgment refers to those ex-
periencers. For example, “The party was fun” might have as its semantic content
that the party was fun for the speaker, the speaker and the hearer, most of the
participants to the party and so on –whoever the context deems relevant.
In the previous chapter we listed examples where the felicity of a judgment of
taste depends on who are the relevant experiencers. Since flexible contextualism
takes the judgment to be about the relevant experiencers, it would explain the
infelicities we encountered either as a correlating with the falsehood of the judg-
ments, or as resulting from the pragmatic oddity or irrelevance of the judgment.
The explanation depends on the theory’s metasemantics, which is how Kaplan
(1989a) calls the study of how meanings are determined. There are two com-
mon metasemantic views for how the values of context-sensitive expressions are
determined. (i) The intentions of the speaker determine the contextual values
(within reason), or (ii) “the context” determines them. We return to metase-
mantics issues in more detail later, but let me sketch how the two approaches
to how context determines meaning could explain the infelicitous judgments of
taste.
If one holds that the speaker’s intentions determine the contextual values,
one can say that an infelicitous judgment of taste results from the speaker having
misunderstood the point of the conversation. In other words a person may say
something true (for example that the party was fun for her), but the hearer is
expecting a judgment about how the party was for the majority of the people.
The second metasemantic view holds that the values of the covert context-
sensitive elements of predicates of taste are determined “by the context” –a
common way to call the complicated rule-based mechanism which takes as input
features such as the topic and aim of the conversation, the intentions of the
speakers, the salient linguistic and extralinguistic phenomena taking place and
so on. According to this approach the infelicitous judgments of taste are a
consequence of a mismatch between which experiencers are determined to be
relevant by the context and which experiencers the speaker considers relevant.
Since the speaker’s intentions do not decide who the relevant experiencer is, if
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she gets it wrong her judgement is false, and infelicitous if the hearers know its
falsehood. For example, suppose the conversation is about how the party was
for the majority of the people. Let’s say it was boring; however, the speaker
thinks the topic is how the party was for her, and she says “The party was
fun”. Since the context has determined the majority, not her, as the relevant
experiencer, the judgment is false, and infelicitous in that we know it wasn’t
fun for the majority.
Let us now go through some of our earlier examples and see how a gen-
eric flexible contextualist account can explain them. First, we mentioned that
normally it’s not ok to make a judgment of taste merely on the basis of one’s
own experiential state if other experiencers are relevant too, especially if one’s
experiences are not representative of the experiences of others. We pointed out
that (83) is pretty weird in a context where someone asks how the party was:
(83) The party was great fun but most people were bored.
The contextualist could explain the oddity by saying that the judgment is false
since the truth of “the party was fun” in the particular context depends on others
besides just the speaker.
We saw further variability in relevant experiencers when e.g. the speaker
knows that her taste diﬀers from that of the majority but (a) she is the relevant
experiencer and (b) the hearer shares her taste. In such a case (83) is fine.
The case could be nicely explained as resulting from the experiencer class being
limited to the participants to the conversation.
Flexible contextualism is thus prima facie promising. By taking people as
making judgments about shared experiential states it might avoid the problems
that simple subjectivism had in accounting for how judgments of taste are used.
Moreover, we have seen that people are sensitive to experiences of others besides
themselves, and whose experiences are relevant in the context matter to the
judgment’s felicity. Flexible contextualist can take the felicity data and show
that it correlates with either the truth-values or relevance of the content of
judgments of taste.
6.2 Semantics-Based Contextualism
Which expressions have context-sensitive semantic values is controversial. By
far our discussion of context sensitivity has been limited to views which take
expressions to be lexically context-sensitive. Let us call that semantics-based
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context sensitivity. We have already seen in broad outline how semantics-based
context sensitivity works. The lexical semantics of a particular expression spe-
cify a rule for how the expression’s semantic value depends on the context.
Based on knowledge of language and of the relevant contextual information the
hearer is able to retrieve the content.
The existence of semantics-based context sensitivity is accepted by all main-
stream theories, even if there is disagreement over which particular expressions
are context-sensitive. The controversial issue is whether there are other kinds
of context sensitivity. Below we will discuss views which hold that there is
also pragmatics-based context-sensitivity. In general there are two opposing
viewpoints to where the line between semantics and pragmatics goes, and the
question of the limits of context sensitivity is one of the core issues in the de-
bates.14 There are several large issues involved in the debates between the two
approaches to context sensitivity which we cannot discuss in the current con-
text.15 Instead we will explore both kinds of contextualist accounts only as
applied to predicates of taste.
Traditional semantics-based views that are represented by e.g. Grice (1989)
hold that there is a unique proposition expressed (or the “literal meaning” of
a sentence, or the “what is said” by a sentence) in a context which belongs
entirely within the domain of semantics. Pragmatics is concerned with “speaker
meaning”, i.e. what the speaker communicates by the proposition expressed via
e.g. implicatures. Hence the truth-conditional content of utterances is a matter
of semantics only.
Indexical contextualism or indexicalism, defended especially by Stanley (2000;
2007) is a recently influential approach to drawing the semantics / pragmatics
divide squarely within the traditionalist approach. It holds that every context-
sensitive expression excluding indexicals and demonstratives contain a covert
variable whose value must be saturated based on the context. The account
has been popular since it predicts that context-sensitive expressions should get
readings where the covert variable is bound by an operator. If the hypothesis is
correct, it would provide a very straightforward way of distinguishing between
context-sensitive and context-insensitive expressions. The view has been influ-
ential in the literature on predicates of taste as well so we will discuss bound
readings of taste predicates and whether they support indexicalism in section
14See e.g. Huang (2007) for an overview of the diﬀerent ways how theorists have tried to
distinguish semantics from pragmatics.
15For recent surveys of the issues see e.g. Recanati (2010); Szabo (2005).
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7.2 below.
Let us now return to the metasemantic question of what exactly determines
the semantic values of lexically context-sensitive expressions. Before we said
that the lexical semantics determines a rule; the question of metasemantics of
context sensitivity could be seen as the question of the nature of those rules.
For example, here requires that one looks at the place of the utterance. But the
limits of here are not determined by the place: it can mean an area ranging from
a barely visible spot (“Here is the hole made with the pin”) to the entire planet or
further (e.g. imagine a person in the future who has to move to another planet
saying “Things are so well here”). What determines the content of here could be
e.g. only the intentions of the speaker, only the salient features of the linguistic
and extra-linguistic context or various combinations (including intentions and
beliefs of other participants to the conversation).
Kaplan (1989b) distinguished between “pure” indexicals which were supposed
to get their semantic value automatically based on the context without any
mediation by e.g. the speaker’s belief or intentions, and demonstratives. He took
pure indexicals to include I, now, here and today. Demonstratives, e.g. this,
that, he, she are supposed to be more dependent on the speaker’s intentions
about their referents. A lot of cases has since been presented to argue that
even the pure indexicals don’t work so automatically (for a recent defence that
no indexical is automatic, see Mount (2008)). Whether or not that’s the case,
what seems right is that lexically context-sensitive expressions can be positioned
on a scale with indexicals being near-automatic and expressions like gradable
adjectives allowing for a lot of input from the context. That even pure indexicals
aren’t entirely pure supports the view discussed in the section below which holds
that almost any expression allows for pragmatic enrichment.
Diﬀerences in the metasemantics of context-sensitivity can make for quite
radical diﬀerences in the predictions of a contextualist account, and we will see
examples of two possible metasemantics in the next chapter when we discuss
Glanzberg’s semantics-based contextualism for predicates of taste.
6.3 Pragmatics-Based Contextualism
The approach that we will call pragmatics-based contextualism holds that the
semantic values of most expressions can be sensitive to the context without their
lexical semantics being context-sensitive. In other words, the “what is said” /
truth-conditions of an utterance typically result from an interaction between
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the linguistically encoded content and what the speaker intends to say by that
content. Recanati (2004) labels truth-conditional pragmatics those approaches
to semantics / pragmatics division which hold that the truth-conditions of ut-
terances depend not only on the semantic content + the input from the context,
but also from various pragmatic features of the conversation.
Pragmatics-based views have been advocated by e.g. Bach (1987); Carston
(2002); Recanati (2004, 2010); Sperber and Wilson (1986), and despite of their
diﬀerences they share a common spirit. Recanati’s account is close enough in
broad outlines with the relevance theorists Carston, Sperber and Wilson, so
in what follows we will focus on their views. We will discuss Bach’s “radical
invariantist” theory of predicates of taste in section 10.3 when we compare it
with Lasersohn’s (2005) relativist account.
Recanati (2010) takes the core diﬀerence between semantics and pragmatics-
based views to be the role of pragmatic competence, i.e. a hearer’s ability to
understand what a speaker means by their utterance. The semantics-based
conception holds that all that is required to get to the content is semantic
competence, i.e. knowledge of the truth-conditions of expressions and rules
of their composition. If the utterance contains context-sensitive expressions
the hearer must also have knowledge of the relevant aspects of the context.
But pragmatic competence is not required to interpret the content and it’s
only needed for communication in the broader sense, for example in order to
understand implicatures.
Regarding context sensitivity, pragmatics-based views typically accept that
there are expressions which are lexically context-sensitive. But they argue that
additionally interpretation requires pragmatic processes known as free enrich-
ment, the umbrella term for various specific processes. In getting to the right
content the hearers must use their pragmatic competence to freely enrich the
literal or core meaning provided by the sentence in the context. Hence the
expressions and their mode of composition doesn’t restrict the possible truth-
conditions in the context as much as in the semantics-based account.
6.3.1 Meaning Determination vs. Interpretation
Some authors have emphasised the distinction between meaning determination
(i.e. the metasemantic question) and interpretation of meaning, and blame the
pragmatics-based theorists of confusing the two (see e.g. Devitt (1981; 2013)).
The diﬀerence is certainly important and the relevance theorists do write as
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if they were only concerned with the interpretation of utterances. After all,
their aim is to provide an empirically testable, cognitive psychological theory
of communication (Wilson and Sperber, 2004). From that point of view what
Devitt calls the question of “metaphysics of meaning” may seem somewhat ir-
relevant since the focus is typically on the pragmatic, inferential processes that
take place in the hearer.
However, the defenders of pragmatics-based context sensitivity do have an
answer to the meaning determination question too. First, along with the tra-
ditional view they hold that there is a level of linguistically encoded meaning
that the lexical semantics of expressions together with their rules of composi-
tion determine. But that’s typically not yet the truth-conditional level. The
truth-conditions get determined based on linguistically encoded meaning and
the intentions of the speaker, within reasonable limits of what can be under-
stood by the hearer. So in the truth-conditional pragmatics framework the
Gricean notion of “what is said” has been expanded to also include the Gricean
notion of speaker-meaning.16
Whereas semantics-based approaches typically talk about content and truth-
conditions, truth-conditional pragmatists generally emphasise the pragmatic
processes that take place in the idealised hearer when she interprets what has
been said. Sometimes the emphasis on the processes causes sliding between the
notions of meaning determination and interpretation. Here is an example: “Ac-
cording to TCP [truth-conditional pragmatics], what is saidint [what has intuit-
ively been said] may be aﬀected by top-down pragmatic processes.” (Recanati,
2010, 13). That is somewhat confusing given that what is said is determined by
the linguistic content together with the speaker’s intentions, and the top-down
pragmatic processes take place in the hearer. The idea is not that of content
relativism where the content of the utterance is determined by how the hearer
understands it (for a defence of content relativism, see Cappelen (2008)).
One way to understand the sliding between the two notions is that when
communication is successful it doesn’t matter whether we look at communication
from the point of view of the speaker or the hearer: the hearer grasps what is
said by freely enriching the linguistically encoded content. If we wanted to we
could distinguish two notions: what is saidspeaker and what is saidhearer. In the
16Recanati’s approach in his Perspectival Thought (2007) is much more in the semantics
tradition in that its discussion is focused on content and truth-conditions, and it’s not en-
tirely clear in what way the notions of content presented there relate to his truth-conditional
pragmatics framework.
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good cases these two match. In the bad cases the speaker calls the shots, but
only to the extent that what she intended to say could have been grasped by
an ideal hearer in the context. In what follows I will talk of free enrichment in
an unorthodox manner as if it was a process that determines content since our
focus is content determination, not interpretation.
6.3.2 Pragmatics-Based Contextualism for Predicates of Taste
Let us now look at the broad outlines of pragmatics-based contextualism for
predicates of taste. In Ch. 5 we noticed that the relevant experiencers in a
context influence at least the felicity of judgments of taste, but we have remained
neutral on whether they also matter to the truth-conditions. A pragmatics-
based contextualist would naturally hold that relevant experiencers matter for
the truth-conditions –as would the semantics-based contextualist. But that’s
not because the utterance mandates the saturation of a covert perspective for
the taste predicate; instead, it’s because the context makes it clear to the hearer
that the speaker intended a particular perspective.
A pragmatics-based contextualist about predicates of taste would thus hold
that there’s nothing in the lexical semantics of taste predicates that requires a
perspective. However, a particular perspective can be an unarticulated constitu-
ent of a judgment of taste: an element of the content expressed that is due to
free enrichment of the sentence uttered.17 The enriched content (or explicature
in the relevance theoretic terminology) thus refers to a certain perspective. The
hearer can figure out who are the intended relevant experiencers by reading
the intentions of the speaker together with their knowledge about the aims of
the conversation, the tastes of the speakers and other salient people (including
possible ideal experiencers). Let us look at an example:
(84) Alex has a good-looking partner.
Normally the default reading is that at least the speaker finds the partner good-
looking. But if the conversation has some specific aim, for example to find a
good-looking person to host a show, then the speaker might intend the relevant
experiencer to be an average audience member. As long as the hearer is following
the conversation they are able to understand which perspective the speaker
17Unarticulated constituent has become a generic term for truth-conditional content that’s
not contributed by the sentence used or its logical form but by pragmatic mechanisms. The
term was originally introduced by Perry (1986); for a more recent update on types of unartic-
ulated constituents see Korta and Perry (2011).
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intends. The proposition expressed in the context is thus true iﬀ the relevant
experiencer(s) would find Alex’s partner good-looking.
One interesting consequence of the pragmatics-based approach is that the
reference to a perspective depends on the intentions of the speaker. If a speaker
doesn’t intend a perspective at all it is not an unarticulated constituent of a judg-
ment.18 Now, in our discussion of taste objectivism I argued that an object can
have a taste quality like deliciousness only relative to some experiencer(s). So
what happens if the speaker doesn’t intend one? There are several possible an-
swers which we will explore later. But it is worth pointing out that pragmatics-
based contextualism leaves room also for non-perspectival judgments, whereas
the semantics-based contextualism doesn’t, given that the context-sensitivity is
lexically encoded and hence the predicate must be saturated on pain of infelicity.
The rest of this chapter and the next will focus on semantics-based ac-
counts for taste predicates since they have dominated both the pro- and anti-
contextualist literature on the topic. Once the problems of the semantics-based
approach have become clear we will return to the pragmatics-based approach
to see whether it can avoid those problems.
6.4 Summary of Chapter 6
In the previous chapters it was often pointed out that the grounds of a judgment
of taste is the experiential state of someone. The role of experience was further
reflected in the role that relevant experiencers played. Depending on the aims
of the conversation the relevant experiencer may vary, and in some rare cases it
need not even include the speaker.
Contextualist accounts of predicates of taste hold that the context (one
way or another) selects a perspective which is part of the content of judg-
ments of taste. In this chapter we’ve seen the broad outlines of semantics-
and pragmatics-based contextualism. The aim was to highlight the diﬀerences
of the views in what they take to be the sources of context-sensitivity, and to
raise the importance of metasemantic questions that will be discussed later when
we look at the views in more detail.
18Here the terminology of unarticulated constituents is a bit murky. Perry (1986) also
talked of constituents that enter a proposition without being represented at all (and hence,
not intended at least in one sense), but he didn’t call them unarticulated constituents. But
some authors simply take them to be a diﬀerent type of unarticulated constituent; see e.g.
Clapp (2010).
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7 Arguments for Semantics-Based Contextualism
As was mentioned, most contextualist accounts for predicates of taste are forms
of semantics-based contextualism. In the literature there are several arguments
that aim to show that certain constructions support semantics-based context
sensitivity of predicates of taste. One of them we have already discussed and
rejected in Ch. 4, namely Sæbø’s (2009) claim that find and other subjective
attitude verbs select for lexically perspective-dependent predicates, and since
find embeds predicates of taste, they have a covert argument for a perspective.
Since Sæbø’s defence of semantics-based contextualism builds on his account of
find which we’ve shown to be incorrect we won’t discuss it further.
This chapter discusses other linguistic data that has been oﬀered in support
of semantics-based contextualism for predicates of taste. The first section looks
at to / for x phrases, focusing on Schaﬀer’s (2011) arguments that aim to show
that the phrases make explicit an argument for a perspective that is normally
covert. I conclude that Schaﬀer’s arguments don’t support the claim.
The rest of the chapter discusses certain readings of judgments of taste which
are claimed to result from a quantifier binding a covert perspective variable.
I argue that the readings can result either from binding or from pragmatic
enrichment. I use various tests to evaluate whether the readings are due to
binding, and conclude that they result from pragmatics.
7.1 To / For x Phrases
To / for x phrases show similar felicity behaviour to find. Schaﬀer (2011) who
defends indexicalism for predicates of taste claims that they make explicit a
perspective argument that’s normally covert. Here are his examples:
(85) Liquorice is tasty to me.
(86) Liquorice is tasty to everyone. (Schaﬀer, 2011, 179)
When there is no to / for x phrase the covert perspective argument is supposed
to be saturated by the context. However, Richard (2008) gives the following
counterexamples to the view that to / for x are specific to predicates of taste:
(87) Protest marching is unpatriotic to Howard.
(88) It’s a chair to Carolyn.
(89) They are red to Park. (Richard, 2008, 141)
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Moreover, to / for x phrases don’t behave like arguments. For example, Schaﬀer
compares the behaviour of adjuncts and arguments in order to show that to /
for x are arguments, and he claims that one can recognise an argument by
the infelicity that results when an adjunct is placed between an expression and
its argument. I’m not taking a stance on whether Schaﬀer is right about his
examples of arguments, but he claims that e.g. of history is an argument of
student which he takes to be a relational noun.
However, predicates and their arguments are generally not separable from
each others in the way that to / for x is. Compare the following:
(90) To me the dance show was terrible.
(91) *Of history John is a student.
(92) *Of Mary Susan is a sister .
Generally for / to x can always be placed in front of the clause. Such flexibility is
certainly more typical to adjuncts (e.g. temporal expressions such as tomorrow,
yesterday, locational expressions like In London, near the hotel etc.)
Another test that Schaﬀer (2011) uses are sluicing constructions, i.e. sen-
tences where a wh-expression introduces an ellipsis that elides the preceding
clause. Here is an example where the latter sentence makes explicit the ellipsis:
(93) (a) Mary is in love, but with who?
(b) Mary is in love, but with who [is Mary in love]?
Schaﬀer states that sluicing constructions can be used to detect covert argu-
ments. Below is Schaﬀer’s example with eat, followed by an example with the
intransitive dine which comes out infelicitous:
(94) Pam ate, but what?
(95) ∗Pam dined, but what? (Schaﬀer, 2011, 199-200)
Schaﬀer argues that predicates of taste allow for sluicing which supports the
view that they have covert arguments. Here are his examples:
(96) The stinky cheese is tasty, but to whom?
(97) The paper clips are fun, but for whom? (Schaﬀer, 2011, 200)
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First, I find the examples somewhat infelicitous.19 However, even if one finds
the examples ok the test does not work in revealing covert arguments. Schaﬀer
mentions that sluicing can also be used with optional adjuncts, as below:
(100) Pam ate, but when?
(101) Pam ate, but where?
(102) Pam ate, but why? (Schaﬀer, 2011, 201)
Schaﬀer doesn’t take that fact to interfere with testing for covert arguments of
taste predicates since he takes himself to have shown that to / for x are not
adjuncts. However, we already saw reasons to think that to / for x are not
arguments. Moreover, it looks like the sluicing test cannot be used to uncover
arguments even by Schaﬀer’s own lights. Here are some examples:
(103) ??She is a student, but of what?
(104) ??Mike is a father, but of who?
(105) ??Karen turned to the left, but of what?
(106) ??Alex is an enemy, but of who?
Again I find these examples somewhat infelicitous. However, if one disagrees
and finds both the examples above and the sluicing examples with predicates
of taste felicitous, the fact remains that they may be felicitous due to sluicing
of the optional adjunct to / for x. Therefore we may conclude that for / to x
phrases are not evidence in favour of the view that predicates of taste have a
covert argument for a perspective. More work needs to be done to determine
whether the phrases are adjuncts or arguments.
7.2 Bound Readings As Evidence for Semantics-Based Con-
textualism
One often repeated argument for indexicalism about predicates of taste is the
existence of so-called bound readings of predicates of taste, i.e. readings where
19They are also somewhat infelicitous in Finnish and French, just to mention some cross-
linguistic data:
(98) ??Homejuusto on hyvää, mutta kenelle?
(99) ??Fromage bleu est bon, mais pour qui?
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the semantic value of a taste predicate depends on a higher operator. Here is
an example:
(107) Everyone did something fun.
(107) has a reading which means that each person did something that was fun for
that person. Many authors have argued that the existence of bound readings
favours indexicalist accounts while posing a challenge for relativism (see e.g.
Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009); Glanzberg (2007); Schaﬀer (2011)).
However, the alleged bound readings can have two possible sources: se-
mantics and pragmatics. What hasn’t been suﬃciently taken into account in
the literature is that apparent bound readings only support indexicalism if they
really are a result of binding, not of purely pragmatic processes. In this section
we use linguistic tests to figure out what is the origin of the readings. The
data strongly suggest that they are not of semantic but of pragmatic origins.
The result undermines a common argument for indexicalism and shows that the
alleged bound readings do not favour semantics-based contextualism.
7.2.1 Indexicalism
Recently one of the most debated issues in philosophy of language has been the
extent of context-sensitivity in language. Minimalism holds that pretty much
only indexicals and demonstratives are context-sensitive, and contextualism in
the context of those debates means a view which accepts that there are many
more context-sensitive expressions. One of the core issues between minimalism
vs. contextualism is naturally how to draw the line between context-sensitive
and context-insensitive expressions.
Stanley (2000; 2002; 2005b; 2007) is well known for defending indexicalism
which holds that any context-sensitive expression besides indexicals, demon-
stratives and pronouns comes with a covert variable in the logical form (LF) of
the sentence. According to Stanley we ought to posit context sensitivity only
when we have intuitions about contextual variation in an expression, and there
exists syntactic evidence for a covert variable.
Stanley’s (2000) Binding Argument aims to bridge the gap between syntax
and semantics; it states that if a sentence allows for so-called bound readings,
then some relevant expression in the sentence contains a covert variable which is
in eﬀect bound. The argument builds on data originally suggested by Mitchell
(1986) and Partee (1989) who pointed out that several expressions behave like
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pronouns in allowing both for a bound and a free reading. On a free reading
the expression gets its value from some salient aspect of the context. Below is
an example of a free and a bound reading of local:
(108) John visited a local bar. (Mitchell, 1986)
(109) Every sports fan in the country was at a local bar watching the playoﬀs.
(Partee, 1989)
(108) can only get a free reading of local, which may mean local to the speaker or
local to John. In the second example the natural reading is the bound one: every
sports fan is at their local bar. Normally a quantified sentence like (109) also
allows for a free reading where the bar is for example local to the speaker, but in
this case it is pragmatically ruled out unless the country in question is tiny. One
possible explanation for the bound reading in (109) is to posit a covert variable
which gets bound by the quantifier expression. Partee (1989) ultimately rejected
the explanation which Stanley (2000) adopts. A terminological note: from now
on I’ll call readings like the relevant one of (109) bound readings although of
course what will be at issue is whether such readings result from binding or not.
The Binding Argument aims to show that bound readings are evidence for
covert variables in the LF. Below is an example of a bound reading from Stanley
(2002), where (111) gives what Stanley takes to be the quasi-syntactic structure
of the sentence and which makes explicit the way the desired reading of three
Frenchmen depends on the quantifier expression in most of his classes.
(110) In most of his classes, John fails exactly three Frenchmen.
(111) In most of his classes x, John fails exactly three Frenchmen in x.
Recanati (2004) has argued that rather than the bound reading resulting from
binding an antecedently existing variable, it is possible that the quantifier con-
tributes the variable. Sennett (2008) points out that the Binding Argument
needs to suppose something like his Semantic Innocence Assumption:
Semantic Innocence Assumption (SI): The variables (in sentences
like (4) [Everywhere Bianca goes, it rains.]) are contributed by the
subordinate clause and the structure of the subordinate clause is
unchanged by adjoining a quantifier phrase to it. (Sennett, 2008,
143).
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Together with the above-mentioned assumptions the Binding Argument provides
the conclusion that bound readings are evidence for covert variables. Now, in-
dexicalism and its underlying assumptions are controversial but for our limited
purposes we do not need to evaluate the view’s strengths and weaknesses.20 If
indexicalism predicts the correct linguistic data it deservers further investiga-
tion, but if it doesn’t –as will be argued below– we may leave such concerns
aside.
7.2.2 Bound Readings of Predicates of Taste
The indexicalist account of predicates of taste holds that they come with a
covert variable for a perspective. Hence the presence of the variable should
make bound readings possible. Let us look at some candidate examples:
(112) All the girls had a good-looking boyfriend.
(113) Every student got a fun assignment.
(114) Each writer wrote an entertaining story.
Indexicalism predicts that in these examples there are two alternative readings.
First, there should be the free reading where the relevant perspective depends
on the context. Second, there should be the bound reading where what counts
as good-looking / fun / entertaining depends on the perspective of each of the
girls / students / writers. For example, the bound reading of (114) can be
paraphrased as:
(115) Each writer wrote a story that was entertaining for themselves / for
that writer.
As was mentioned, many contextualists have emphasised the existence of such
readings. However, they have all defended either indexicalism or at least semantics-
based contextualism. But bound readings only support those views if one can
show that they result from semantics, not pragmatics.21 Let us next look at
how pragmatics-based views could explain bound readings.
20For discussion, see e.g. Cappelen and Hawthorne (2007); Cohen and Rickless (2007);
Elbourne (2008); Recanati (2004); Sennett (2008). For a framework which dispenses with
variables altogether, see Jacobson (1999).
21Moreover, indexicalism is supported only if the reading is best explained as resulting from
the binding of a hidden variable associated with the predicate. For an alternative semantic
explanation of binding, see Cappelen and Hawthorne (2007).
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7.2.3 Pragmatics-Based “Bound” Readings
In section 6.3 we saw how truth-conditional pragmatics explain context sensitiv-
ity that’s not due to the lexical semantics of an expression. The same pragmatic
processes can explain the bound readings too.22 Suppose that a chef is describ-
ing how an important dinner in his restaurant went:
(116) The customers were very happy. Everyone had a delicious dinner.
Here we can hear the reading that each person had a dinner that they them-
selves considered delicious. The pragmatic account says that there is no bind-
ing involved, and the “bound” reading is merely a consequence of the usual free
enrichment based on interpreting the intentions of the speaker and on other
contextual clues. The reading that is most relevant in the context is that each
guest at the restaurant had a dinner that was delicious to them.
Now suppose that the next day a group of adolescents on a class trip eat at
the restaurant. They don’t like the fancy food and complain to their teachers
that that they’d rather eat fast food. The chef is upset and says:
(117) Everyone had a delicious dinner but they complain! What ungrateful
brats, I hope they choke on their factory farmed burgers.
Here the context makes it clear that the relevant reading is one where the teen-
ager customers are not among the relevant experiencers who get to determine
what counts as delicious. Hence the pragmatics-based account can in principle
predict the same interpretations as the semantics-based account without posit-
ing a covert argument for predicates of taste.
In the previous chapter we contrasted semantics- and pragmatics-based con-
textualist accounts of predicates of taste. However, it’s important to distin-
guish between pragmatics-based contextualism for predicates of taste and a
pragmatics-based explanation of bound readings. One can adopt the latter
without being a contextualist about taste predicates at all as long as one has
no objections to truth-conditional pragmatics. For example, Pearson (2013)
defends a view according to which predicates of taste express a kind of generic
reading (e.g. delicious to one) which the speaker makes on the basis of her own
experiences. Pearson-style view would be entirely compatible with a pragmatic
explanation of bound readings where the context makes it clear that the default
reading is not the relevant one.
22Note that Recanati, one of the main defenders of truth-conditional pragmatics, has an-
other explanation for bound readings. See p. 7.2.1 above.
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7.2.4 How to Distinguish Semantics- and Pragmatics-Based Read-
ings
As the literature on the semantics / pragmatics distinction has made clear it
can be notoriously hard to decide whether a certain interpretation of an ut-
terance is a consequence of context-based saturation of hidden variables or of
free enrichment. Without any constraints on the examples it’s possible that the
semantics provides only the free reading which is then pragmatically enriched to
what looks like a bound reading. This is especially true of the examples oﬀered
in the literature where the author always states the desired reading. As is well-
known, the eﬀects of contexts on the possible interpretations can be enormous
(for great examples, see Searle (1978)). Therefore stating which readings the
sentence is supposed to have can make a huge diﬀerence to whether they can
be heard or not.
Now, free enrichment is based only on contextual clues and hence, pragmatics-
based bound readings are available exclusively when the context requires such
a reading for what is said to be relevant. But if the bound reading is available
as a matter of semantics, there is always a choice between the free and the
bound reading. Here as well the contextual clues (linguistic or extralinguistic)
will determine the appropriate reading, but even if the context rules out one of
the readings as inappropriate we can still hear it. Here are some examples:
(118) Alex told Bob he wanted to date his mother.
Here his mother could be bound either by Alex or Bob, but in any ordinary
context we expect it to be bound by Bob. However, we can hear both readings.
We saw another example before:
(109) Every sports fan in the country was at a local bar watching the playoﬀs.
The free reading –all the sports fan were in one bar– is ruled out by the context
due to its absurdity (supposing the speaker is not in a tiny country). But we
can still hear it, we just happen to know it’s not the intended one.
In contrast, readings that are based on pragmatics are available only when
the context prompts them. For example, we’ve seen that the semantics of grad-
able adjectives requires a unique comparison class: “They’re all tall” normally
cannot be true in a context where the heights of the people vary from 100cm to
215cm, even if one is tall for a 10-year old, another for a basketball player, third
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for a jockey and so on. However, if the context makes it clear enough what is
intended, normally unavailable readings can be heard thanks to pragmatic free
enrichment.
For example, suppose that researchers are studying couples where one part-
ner is much larger than the other in order to see whether the smaller partner
will eventually become larger due to the sharing of eating habits. Each subject
comes with a partner who is much larger than they are, but there are huge
size diﬀerences between each “large” person. One researcher checks whether the
subjects are ready and reports:
(119) Everyone has a large partner.
In this case we understand the utterance as “Each subject has a partner that’s
large compared to them”. But there clearly isn’t a covert perspective variable
in large that’s bound by the quantifier, and the reading is possible only given
the special context.
The lesson from the considerations about the mandatory nature of saturation
is this. To be sure that we are testing for bound readings that are due to covert
variables we should use examples that exclude the default reading. A reading
where the variable is bound by the quantifier ought to be available as a matter
of semantics if there is indeed a covert variable. However, if the sentence sounds
infelicitous, that means that the semantics does not make available a bound
reading. The infelicity results from the ruling out of the default reading, and
of the absence of a context that would provide a plausible pragmatics-based
interpretation.
7.2.5 The Tests
We have seen that the indexicalist versions of contextualism for predicates of
taste account for their perspective dependence by positing a covert variable.
Here are some examples from the literature where one is supposed to hear a
bound reading. Below each I have given a quasi-syntactic structure which shows
how the hidden variable associated with the predicate is supposed to depend on
the quantifier:
(120) Everyone had a fun vacation. (Glanzberg, 2007)
(121) Every x had a vacation that was fun for x.
(122) Everyone ordered something tasty. (Richard, 2008)
97
(123) Every x ordered something that was tasty for x.
To find out whether the apparent bound reading is a product of semantics, what
we need is an example where the default reading is not available. If the result
is an infelicitous sentence that shows that semantics does not provide a bound
reading. Now, there is something like a consensus that the default reading of a
judgment of taste depends on the speaker. In the indexicalist framework that
means that by default the value of the perspective variable is bound by the
speaker. Speaker-dependence gets support by the oddity of examples like the
ones below:
(124) This pizza is tasty but I don’t find it tasty.
(125) The dinner we had was delicious but not for me.
These examples are not necessarily infelicitous since the speaker could have
non-gustatory reasons for disliking tasty pizza or delicious dinner (e.g. moral
reasons, a diet or dirty plates). However, they do sound strange and make one
wonder of whose taste the speaker is talking about.
(I) Excluding the Default Reading
The method to test the origins of bound readings should thus exclude the
speaker-centered reading, leaving the bound reading as the natural interpreta-
tion. We do this by giving a quantified sentence which potentially allows for a
bound and a speaker-centered reading, and then adding a sentence which makes
the speaker-centered reading impossible. The hearer is forced to give up the
speaker-centered default interpretation and if possible, give another interpreta-
tion to the sentence, in these cases the bound reading.
Our method for excluding the speaker-centered reading is to add to / for
me, which according to indexicalists makes the perspective variable explicit.
Here are some examples:
(126) Everyone cooked something tasty. But what they cooked wasn’t tasty to
me.
(127) Most national dishes are delicious. But to me only the French ones are
delicious.
(128) Some guests had cute partners. But I found none of them cute.
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Now, these sentences sound truly odd but they should be perfectly fine if the
bound readings were a genuine semantically provided alternative reading.23
It is worth pointing out that Glanzberg (2007) and Schaﬀer (2011) defend
what we’ve called flexible contextualism which holds that the perspective may
be that of some other individual(s) than the speaker. Since our test leaves open
the possibility of other free variable interpretations besides the speaker-centered
one, they also work to evaluate the plausibility of flexible contextualism. If the
example sentences sound even slightly infelicitous, this sheds serious doubt on
the claim that semantically we have a wide variety of options for the value of
the perspective argument.
We can also test the existence of bound readings without excluding the
speaker-centered reading. A predicate of taste where the covert perspective
variable isn’t made overt by e.g. to me / to John etc. will get a contextually
assigned value. Hence the following should be perfectly ok:
(129) Everyone met a pretty girl. But they weren’t pretty.
(130) Each diner had a delicious pizza. But they weren’t delicious.
(131) Every professor had a good-looking date. But they weren’t
good-looking.
Now, these sentences sound radically infelicitous. But there is no reason for
that according to indexicalism, since the first sentence of each pair is supposed
to get a reading where the variable is bound by the quantifier, and the second
a reading where the variable is bound by some contextually salient perspective,
as made explicit below:
(132) Every professor x had a date that was good-looking according to x. But
they weren’t good-looking according to me / us / etc.
These cases are even stronger evidence against a covert variable since they leave
more flexibility for the reading that’s not bound by the quantifier. Hence the
results don’t depend on the correctness of the view that the default perspective
is the speaker’s. Nevertheless they are compatible with that view as well.
(II) The Negation Test
23It might be worth noting that some people who read the examples reported that the they
only make sense if one takes the first occurrence of the taste predicate as if appearing inside
quotation marks; the unreflected adding of quotation marks might explain why the examples
sound ok to some.
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Marti (2006) came up with the Negation Test to check the availability of bound
readings. The test relies on the fact that with standard context-sensitive ex-
pressions one can negate, aﬃrm or otherwise comment on the inexplicit but
contextually provided parts of the content. Hence the test hypothesis is that
if a sentence has a certain contextually provided reading, that reading can be
negated. If the negation sounds infelicitous it shows that the alleged reading
wasn’t available.
To illustrate how the test works let me first give examples containing bona
fide context-sensitive expressions: tall, a gradable adjective and quantifier ex-
pressions. In the first case Alex is contemplating his chances of being elected to
the faculty basketball team.
(133) a) Alex: I won’t be elected for the team, I’m too short.
b) Bernice: No, you’re not, even if you’re too short for NBA.
Here Bernice correctly interprets Alex as referring to the standards of tallness
for basketball players in the faculty team. Similar examples can be given of
quantifier domain restriction. In the next case Alex and Bernice are about to
celebrate Alex’s being elected to the basketball team.
(134) a) Alex: Everyone will join us later.
b) Bernice: Not everyone; Peter can’t come since he’s sick, but everyone
from the team is coming.
Here Alex intended to restrict everyone to everyone in the faculty, which consists
of diﬀerent individuals than the team. Finally, an example with a bound reading:
(135) a) Alex: Everyone bought their wine from a local shop.
b) Bernice: No, they didn’t; John bought his from our local shop.
Bernice’s answer in (135) would not be felicitous if the only available reading of
Alex’s utterance was the unbound shop local to us.
Now, here are some examples with predicates of taste:
(136) a) Anastasia: Everyone was listening to boring music.
b) Bob: ??No they weren’t; although to me the music was boring.
Here Bob is supposed to have negated the bound reading “Everyone was listening
to music that was boring to them”, but his comment sounds plain infelicitous.
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(137) a) Agatha: Poor children! Each had a disgusting sandwich for lunch.
b) Boris: ??No, they didn’t; but the sandwiches were disgusting to me.
Here Boris is trying to negate the bound reading “Each child had a sandwich
that was disgusting to him / her”, but again it’s purely infelicitous. These cases
are thus quite unacceptable, and the contrast with the above felicitous cases
is remarkable (note that in (137b) the only acceptable interpretation seems to
be No, they didn’t have a sandwich).24 Hence we can take the results of the
Negation Test as particularly clear evidence against the claim that there are
bound readings that result from binding the perspective variable.
7.2.6 Binding and Attitude Reports
A case that I haven’t yet discussed is attitude reports. Perhaps attitude reports
are evidence of binding the perspective variable? Here are some examples:25
(139) Everyone thought their meal was tasty.
(140) Everyone said they had a fun vacation.
(141) John thinks roller coasters are fun.
(142) Some people find liquorice tasty.
Certainly with these there is no problem in adding a sentence that rules out the
speaker-centered interpretation:
(143) John thinks roller coasters are fun, but they are not.
(144) John thinks roller coasters are fun, but to me they are not.
But there’s no reason to think any binding is going on in the attitude reports.
They are reports of a doxastic state of the agent which can be false. That is
24I have tested the sentences with many people who agree with the felicity judgments stated
here. However, an anonymous referee gave me a following example which s/he took to be a
positive result for indexicalism from the Negation Test:
the Smiths go out for ice cream. Ma only likes chocolate, Pa only likes vanilla,
Suzy only likes rum raisin, and Billy only likes mint chip. But today there is
only chocolate. Ma orders everyone chocolate.
(138) a) Ma: Everyone got something tasty
b) Suzy: No we didn’t; but we all got something tasty to you.
To me Suzy’s utterance sounds absolutely infelicitous so I consider the example as another
piece of evidence against the indexicalist.
25The examples were given by an anonymous referee who claimed that they are clear cases
of bound readings.
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the natural interpretation of the two sentences above: the speaker is reporting
John’s thought and adding that he is wrong. We can give parallel cases where
there’s obviously no binding involved:
(145) Every student thought Geneva is the capital of Switzerland, but it’s not.
However, we haven’t shown there is no binding in the taste cases. The index-
icalist could insist that there is and say that we have the burden of proof to
show that there isn’t. However, claiming that there is binding will lead them to
serious trouble. The following is clearly infelicitous:
(146) #John knows that roller coasters are fun, but they’re not.
The indexicalist cannot explain the infelicity. Let me go through their options.
If there is binding of fun by John, the truth-conditions of the first clause should
be as follows:
(147) John knows that roller coasters are fun for him.
Now, regarding the second clause but they’re not, the indexicalist seems to have
a choice. First option is that there is an ellipsis to the entire previous clause so
we get the following truth-conditions:
(148) John knows that rollers coasters are fun for him, but they are not fun
for him.
Given that knows is factive the sentence is contradictory which is good news
for the indexicalist: it would explain the infelicity of (146). But unfortunately
they cannot adopt the explanation since then the non-factive attitude reports
would be infelicitous as well. But as we’ve seen, they are not:
(149) John thinks roller coasters are fun, but they are not.
(150) John finds roller coaster fun but they are not.
(151) John said roller coasters are fun but they are not.26
The indexicalist is hence forced to accept the other option regarding the second
clause, namely that the elided fun is free and it gets a contextually assigned
value. For example:
26One option is to claim that the latter clause indeed elides the perspective of the first one,
but the speaker is pointing out that John is mistaken about his own taste. However, the
option is quite unacceptable since it goes totally against our intuitions about what the reports
say.
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(152) John knows that roller coasters are fun for him but they are not fun for
me.
But under that interpretation there is no explanation for the infelicity of (146).
After all, the above sentence is perfectly felicitous, and it’s supposed to make
explicit a salient reading of (146).
Let me summarise the argument. The indexicalist says that attitude reports
are examples of bound readings of taste predicates which pass our tests. Hence
they claim that the predicate of taste is bound by the matrix subject in attitude
reports. When we add a clause which negates the predication, the indexicalist
must give an account of what is the value of the perspective variable in the
negated clause. If they opt for ellipsis of the perspective in the first clause they
incorrectly predict that non-factive attitude reports like (149) are infelicitous. If
they say that the perspective is provided by the context, they incorrectly predict
that factive attitude reports like (146) are felicitous. Hence positing binding in
the attitude reports systematically leads to bad predictions.
7.3 Summary of Chapter 7
The aim of this chapter was to review some linguistic data that has been
claimed to support semantics-based contextualism for predicates of taste. First
we looked at to / for x phrases which Schaﬀer (2011) claims make explicit a
perspective argument that is normally covert. We saw that there is no good
evidence to think so.
The rest of the chapter discussed certain readings that many have claimed
to result from a quantifier binding a covert perspective variable. I argued that
readings that appear to be due to binding of a variable can result from pragmatic
enrichment of the sentence uttered. The bound readings of judgments of taste
support indexicalism for predicates of taste only if there is evidence that the
readings result from semantics.
I’ve presented tests which rely on the fact that in uncontroversial cases of
syntactic / semantic binding we can hear the alternative readings even when
some of them are excluded as irrelevant given the context. By the same token,
with quantified sentences containing predicates of taste we should hear the read-
ings bound by the quantifier and bound by some salient perspective. However,
our tests show that ruling out the default reading where the relevant experiencer
is the speaker systematically results in infelicity rather than forcing us to hear
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the bound reading. The tests thus give very strong evidence against the view
that predicates of taste have a covert perspective variable.
Moreover, the results clash with the predictions of flexible contextualism
which holds that there are many choices for the perspective. If many alternative
perspectives were available our test sentences should receive felicitous interpret-
ations, but as we have seen they sound systematically odd. The next chapter
will look in more detail a particular flexible contextualist account.
104
8 Flexible Contextualism
In this chapter we discuss Michael Glanzberg’s (2007) flexible contextualism
which posits an experiencer class to account for the variation in perspectives.
The experiencer class is part of the lexical semantics of predicates of taste and
its value is determined by the context. The value of the experiencer class is
supposed to be flexible, ranging from just one individual to a group or anything
in between. One can see the appeal of the view in light of our previous dis-
cussions of how the choice of a relevant experiencer may influence the felicity
of judgments of taste. In a contextualist view like Glanzberg’s the relevant ex-
periencer can be identified with the experiencer class, and the truth-conditions
of judgments of taste would thus match the contextual variation in relevant
experiencers.
Despite of its initial appeal I will argue that flexible contextualism faces
very serious problems. I show that in ordinary cases where the participants to
a conversation have even slightly diﬀerent tastes Glanzberg’s account predicts
two kinds of undesirable results:
(i) Once the context-sensitive elements get their values, the truth-conditions
in a context can be highly unintuitive to the speakers. That causes them to
make mistaken truth-value judgments about their own and others’ judgments
of taste.
(ii) The compositional semantics might not be able to deliver a semantic
value for a predicate of taste and hence some judgments of taste do not express
propositions at all.
In subsection 8.4 I summarise other problems that critics of contextualism
have presented. The final section returns to pragmatics-based contextualism
to evaluate whether it can avoid the problems that semantics-based flexible
contextualism faces.
8.1 Glanzberg’s Account
Glanzberg (2007) takes as his starting point the semantics of gradable adjectives
by Kennedy (1999; 2007; 2013) and Kennedy and McNally (2005) which we
discussed in chapter (3): Gradability and Perspective Dependence. We saw
there that even if gradability causes indeterminacy over the standard for the
application of an adjective, the resulting “faultless disagreements” are not the
faultless disagreements that the theorist of taste is concerned with. The main
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problem was that without a perspective a judgment of taste doesn’t get the kind
of truth-conditions that can do justice to our intuitions about them. Consider
for example the following judgments:
(153) Hagfish are large creatures.
(154) Hagfish are disgusting creatures.
The dimension of largeness (large in e.g. weight, height, or volume) together
with a comparison class will provide the ordering of the relevant objects, and the
context will set the standard which determines whether (153) is true. Hagfish
may be large if they are compared to most fish but small if they are compared
to mammals. Likewise, whether hagfish is disgusting will depend on what it is
being compared to. However, even after the comparison class is determined we
still need a perspective to decide the ordering and the standard of disgustingness.
Glanzberg modifies the theory of Kennedy and McNally by adding an extra
argument for an experiencer class to the semantics of predicates of taste. Hence,
the context determines an experiencer class which together with the comparison
class (and possibly a dimension) orders the objects on a scale. And finally, the
context determines a standard, aka a threshold for whether an object has the
property in question or not. Glanzberg holds that the choice of the experiencer
class is highly flexible so that it can consist of for example just the speaker, all
the participants to the conversation or just the addressee. Here is how we may
paraphrase the content of a judgment of taste:
(155) Ann: This hagfish pie is delicious.
= The degree of gustatory quality of this hagfish pie is higher than the
standard of gustatory quality S, for an experiencer class E.
Suppose that Ann is eating the hagfish pie with Bob. If the experiencer class
includes them both, then it looks like Bob can disagree with Ann’s judgment in
the very classical sense of disagreement as a dispute over the truth of a propos-
ition. The way to ensure that there can be a single proposition under dispute is
to allow for enough flexibility in how the members of the the experiencer class
get chosen, so that no matter what kind of a group is discussing their tastes
may be taken into account.
An important detail of Glanzberg’s account is his commitments regarding
the metasemantics of context-sensitive expressions. In Ch. 6: Two Contextual-
ist Approaches we contrasted two possible metasemantics for context sensitiv-
ity, one based on speaker’s intentions and the other based on the context more
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broadly speaking. Glanzberg is explicitly committed to the latter view which
he calls indirect metasemantics. In other words “the context” resolves the se-
mantic values of the context-sensitive elements based on various features such
as speaker’s intentions, their taste, the aims of the conversation and so on.
Unfortunately Glanzberg doesn’t provide a full account of how the experien-
cer class is determined or about what kind of an operation provides an ordering
of objects on a scale on the basis of the tastes of the class members. Here’s
what he says about that:
I am not stipulating that enjoyment as experienced by E is uniformly
determined by any norm on E. I am not, for instance, insisting that
it be enjoyment by the average member of E. It might be in some
cases, but not others. It thus appears to be up to context to work
out the right scale of enjoyment or of gustatory quality, given E.
(Glanzberg, 2007, 13)
There are a great many options for fixing a scale for an adjective like
fun, once the experiencer class is fixed. Among the more obvious are
those which amalgamate the subjective experiences of enjoyment for
people in the group, e.g., taking the minimum enjoyment value across
the group (fun means fun for everyone), or the maximum value (fun
means fun for someone), or an average (fun means average fun for
the group). Often, predicates of personal taste get a kind of generic
reading (fun means fun for the typical or generic member of the
group). (Glanzberg, 2007, 15-16, footnote 13)
Let us next look at diﬀerent cases in order to see what kind of predictions we
get with Glanzberg’s account.
8.2 Problems for Glanzberg’s View
In this section I show that Glanzberg’s view gets highly unintuitive predictions
when the experiencer class has people whose grounding experiential states diﬀer.
The bad predictions fall in two classes. In some cases the judgments of taste get
highly unintuitive truth-values which cannot be tracked by the participants to
the conversation, causing them to make false truth-value judgments. In other
cases the semantic mechanisms cannot provide values for the context-sensitive
elements and consequently the judgments of taste don’t express propositions.
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The way we proceed is by looking at a particular case and then checking what
results we get with the operations that Glanzberg lists above as determining the
scale for a predicate of taste. Here are the options he mentions:
(1) Amalgamate the subjective experiences of enjoyment for people in the group:
(1a) Take the minimum enjoyment value across the group (fun means fun
for everyone).
(1b) Take the maximum value (fun means fun for someone).
(1c) Take the average value (fun means average fun for the group).
(2) Choose an average experiencer: the predicate of taste gets a generic reading
(fun means fun for the typical or generic member of the group).
8.2.1 Highly Unintuitive Truth-Values
Here is the first case:
The apparently fun festival. A group of friends are at a
music festival. Each of them like most aspects about it, but nobody
likes everything about it. Afterwards they are discussing how the
festival was. For each attribution of fun such as “Watching the bands
was fun” or “Playing music on the camp site was fun” one of them
disagrees and says the thing in question wasn’t fun.
Let’s go through the options of how the scale gets determined. First, let us
suppose that the experiencer class is the group of friends. What the comparison
class is doesn’t really matter but we can stipulate that they are comparing the
activities and events that took place in the festival. Now let’s suppose that the
context amalgamates the experiences of the friends (option 1).
Suppose fun means fun for everyone (1a). In other words, the events at the
festival get ordered on a scale based on how many persons experienced the event
as fun. The standard in the context is set so that only events that everyone
considered fun count as fun. Now, each positive judgment made by the friends
is false since no event was fun for everyone. Only the dissenting persons got
it right in denying that the events in question were fun since no event was fun
for everyone. So here we have a case of highly unintuitive truth-values: each
speaker is speaking sincerely on the basis of their own experiential state but
given the contextual mechanisms almost all of them end up speaking falsely.
Moreover, those who speak the truth (namely the dissenters) wouldn’t know
that they did, any more than the others knew that they spoke falsely.
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Suppose fun means fun for someone (1b). Each positive judgment about the
festival is true. However, the judgments made by the disagreeing friends who
didn’t think that so-and-so was fun are all false: they would be true only if the so-
and-so wouldn’t have been fun for anyone. Again we have plenty of judgments
with highly unintuitive truth-values. Just like all the others, each dissenting
friend made the judgment sincerely on the basis of their own experiential state
so they have no reason to suspect they spoke falsely any more than the others
did.
Suppose fun means average fun for the group (1c). Here we face the question
of how can one calculate the average fun for the group. One plausible way is to
take each individual’s ordering of events according to how much fun they are,
exclude events that are low in fun for enough many and keep ones that are fun
to at least a moderate degree for everyone or most. If the event needs to be
at least slightly fun for everyone, then the problem is the same as with (1a):
given the dissenters, each positive judgment is false. If it’s enough that most
find the event at least moderately fun we have the same problem as with (1b):
the positive judgments are true but the dissenters’ judgments are false.
Finally, there is option (2) where fun means something like fun for the typical
/ average member of the group. One way to find the average member is to take
each member’s judgments that they make merely on the basis of their own
experiential states, and to see which member agrees most with as many other
people’s judgments as possible. We thus get a person who agrees a bit with
many. Alternatively we imagine a hypothetical person whose judgments are a
coherent combination of the judgments that are commonly made by the group
members. Here the problems are the same as with (1c): the persons who diﬀer
from the typical member say falsehoods.
We’ve seen that each mechanism results in highly unintuitive truth-values
for some or all of the judgments of taste in the context. Is there a way around
the problem? Let me go through some options that might seem helpful. First, as
we’ve set up the case, each judgment is agreed on except by a dissenter. Isn’t it
plausible that the context simply excludes the extreme tastes? As we mentioned
in the previous chapter one can be excluded from being a relevant experiencer if
one’s taste is too diﬀerent. Now, suppose that a dissenter is excluded from the
experiencer class. The problem is that they are speaking in the same context
as everyone else so the semantic value of their judgment of taste will depend
on the experiencer class from which they are excluded. Hence in any context
where one happens to be a dissenter one automatically speaks falsehoods.
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Let us next consider the same festival case but with degrees of disagreement.
The case is thus more natural than the previous one since we have persons with
extreme opposite views and then everything in between. For example, some
hated sleeping in a tent, others loved it and the rest fall somewhere in between.
Again (1a) will result in the falsehood of all the positive judgments. The ones
who didn’t enjoy the activity in question get it right –but again, not because
the truth depends on their experiential state but because not everyone had fun.
(1b) will result with true positive judgments and false negative judgments. So
here we have much more falsehoods that in the simpler case since this time there
is more divergence in opinions. And again, not only is there a lot of falsehoods,
the ones speaking falsely won’t be able to know that they speak falsely, any
more than the ones that speak truly will know it.
Here we may add an additional problem related to the contextual mechan-
isms. In chapter 1: Judgments of Personal Taste we introduced the Intuition
of No Fault, and mentioned Foot’s (2002c) objections to it. She held that one
can easily be mistaken in for example thinking that one’s wife is good-looking.
Glanzberg’s flexible contextualism has to give up the intuition of faultlessness
too since as we’ve seen, speakers are easily mistaken and speak falsehoods. Of
course that need not be a problem since the upside of the coin is that speakers
can genuinely disagree. However, the consequence of the contextual mechanisms
by Glanzberg is a problem which we may call the Arbitrariness of truths about
taste.
As we have seen, what determines the truth-conditions in Glanzberg’s ac-
count depends on the tastes of the experiencer class and on how the context
operates on those tastes. But these mechanisms put together the tastes of the
experiencer class blindly, taking into account only numbers: for example, how
many people hold that sleeping in a tent is fun. The consequence is that the
truth-conditions are arbitrary from the point of view of the speakers. For ex-
ample, in cases of type (1a) truth requires that everyone agrees; but as a speaker,
I’m not sensitive to that feature in the sense that if the group had one more
member who would disagree, I would still make the same judgment.
The variation in truth-value is arbitrary because it depends on features that
the speakers and hearers cannot track: the tastes of others. I take this to be one
of the core problems of Glanzberg’s contextualism. The arbitrariness of how the
truth-values of judgments of taste are determined causes those truth-values to be
totally unintuitive to the speakers. An additional problem caused by untrackable
truth-values is that the view predicts that people disagree irrationally. If a
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person who belongs to the experiencer class says not p but you’ve believed
that p until that moment, you should suspect that you’ve made a mistake. So
why would people disagree with someone when the other person’s judgement is
oﬀering them evidence that they might be wrong about the contextual standard?
The above-mentioned problems are serious enough, but there are more. Von
Fintel and Gillies (2011) criticise contextualism about epistemic modals as fol-
lows. A particular problem with the idea that people make utterances without
any idea of their truth-values is that the practice is seriously in conflict with
most existing views on norms of assertion. The same criticism applies equally
to Glanzberg-style contextualism. Which norm (if any) governs assertion is an
open question and we don’t need to presuppose any particular account for our
purposes. However, Unger (1975) and Williamson (2000) have made a plausible
case for the knowledge norm which is the most demanding of the alternatives,
and therefore we may assume that the norm is at least somewhat strong. If
the norm is something like justified belief, then how can the theory explain its
prediction that people make judgments of taste even when the experiencer class
includes people whose tastes are entirely unknown to them? If you roughly un-
derstand how the truth conditions are determined (as contextualism assumes),
then you simply would not assert a judgment of taste in such cases, since you
are nowhere near a justified belief about the matter.
8.2.2 Discussion
First comment that one might make about the above cases is that they pre-
suppose something the contextualist need not accept, namely that people make
judgments of taste merely on the basis of their own tastes. The contextualist
could respond by saying that as we acknowledged when discussing the grounds
of judgments of taste, sometimes the grounds include beliefs about the experi-
ential states of others. When there are other relevant experiencers besides the
speaker, they cannot rely only on their own experiential states. And as we’ve
seen, sometimes the speakers don’t take themselves to be relevant experien-
cers at all if for example the discussion is about other people, there is an ideal
experiencer around or their taste is deficient.
Hence, a contextualist that wants to avoid the problem of unintuitive truth-
values will say that the grounds will match the experiencer class. For example,
if the experiencer class is the speaker the grounds is the speaker’s experiential
state. But if the experiencer class includes all the participants to the conversa-
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tion, then the grounds are the speaker’s beliefs about the experiential states of
everyone in the group. If Brant is speaking with Alice about whether retsina
wines are tasty, he will make his judgment on the basis of his experiences of
retsinas and of his beliefs about Alice’s experiences. Now, if his judgment is
false, that’s a consequence of a false belief about Alice.
There are two things to say in response to the proposal. First, the un-
intuitiveness does not come from a mismatch between the grounds and the
truth-conditions. It comes from how the truth-conditions get calculated by “the
context” which operates on the experiential states of diﬀerent people in ways
that cannot be tracked by the speakers. Why they can’t be tracked is precisely
because they do not depend only on the intentions or beliefs of the speakers.
Thus, given the metasemantics of context sensitivity that Glanzberg adopts,
the grounds cannot match the truth-conditions. At best the speaker can try to
guess how the truth-conditions will be calculated on the basis of the experiencer
class.
Second, the view that the grounds of judgments of taste are always a com-
bination of the speaker’s experiential state and their beliefs about the states of
the others in the experiencer class is implausible. When we discussed who are
the relevant experiencers we saw that in each case the context made it clear:
for example when the aim of the conversation was to plan activities for a chil-
dren’s camp; when someone asks you what things are fun to do in the city; when
someone you know to share your taste asks whether a party was fun; or when
someone you don’t know asks whether a party was fun and you know that you
experienced it diﬀerently from the majority. Each of those cases make manifest
either who the relevant experiencer is, or that there is a choice to be made due
to discrepancies in taste.
Now, the cases we have discussed in this chapter are much more ordinary
discussions about taste where the point seems to be to precisely to assert how
one experiences the relevant object. When you’re speaking with someone about
whether a show was fun you don’t expect them to be making a guess about
whether it was fun for them and you (and all the others). You just want to hear
their opinion. What confirms this intuition is how people talk about taste. If
flexible contextualism were the correct account, we should expect judgments of
taste to be much more hedged and cautious than they are since after all, people
would be trying to guess how others experienced things.
To illustrate, a discussion about taste where the experiencer class includes
the speakers would probably go like this (let’s suppose funny in the context
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means funny for everyone):
(156) Ari: [After seeing a comedy with Beth and Chris] Did you find it funny?
Beth: Yes, how about you?
Ari: No, not really.
Chris: I found it funny.
Beth: I found it funny too. But ok, it wasn’t that funny.
Beth’s odd-sounding conclusion should be entirely natural and true if contextu-
alism were correct. We can construct more strange dialogues by changing the
meaning of funny in the context to e.g. funny for someone, in which case Ari
would have to conclude “Ok, so it was funny”.
Another feature predicted by contextualism which doesn’t correspond to
actual disagreements about taste is people’s retraction behaviour. If discussions
about taste were the kind of cooperative processes as the contextualist claims it
would be quite typical for people to simply retract what they said if it turns out
that others don’t agree, since normally the truth of their judgment essentially
depends on the views of others.
To summarise, if judgments of taste really were so concerned with the tastes
of others,
(a) We would be foolish not to find out about the tastes of others before
making judgments,
(b) Our judgments would systematically take the opinions of others into
account, and
(c) We would retract our judgments once it turns out they didn’t correspond
to the experiential states of the others.
However, in the vast majority of cases we do none of these things, and discussions
like (156) just don’t happen.
8.2.3 No Proposition Expressed by a Judgment of Taste
Let us now consider another case which illustrates the second kind of undesirable
prediction: judgments that fail to express propositions.
Comedies that are neither funny nor not funny . Ann and
Ben have just seen a Clint Eastwood comedy and they are evaluat-
ing whether it was funny in comparison to Eastwood’s two other
comedies; call the comedies A, B and C. Ann judges that A is funny
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while C and B are not whereas Ben judges that C and B are funny
while A is not.
Let’s say that the experiencer class consists of just Ann and Ben. Let us suppose
that if the experiencer class would only consist of Ann, the ordering of the
movies would be <C, B, A> and the standard is set so that only A is funny.
Let’s further suppose that if the experiencer class had only Ben the ordering
would be <A, C, B>, and only B would be funny given his standard. These are
the facts based on which the context should order A, B and C on a scale and
determine a standard.
In this case we needn’t go through the diﬀerent ways in which the context
can amalgamate the tastes of the experiencer class since there simply is no way
to do that. The context is supposed to order the objects on a scale according
to the degree of funniness that they have, and the degree is supposed to be
calculated by amalgamating the tastes of the experiencer class. But if the tastes
are diﬀerent enough as in this case, there is no coherent ordering that can take
the tastes equally into account.
The consequence is that the semantics cannot deliver a scale on which to
map the objects and hence no proposition gets expressed. This has some other
serious consequences. First, the speakers do not say anything truth-evaluable by
their apparently reasonable and coherent utterances. Second, since they don’t
express propositions they can’t be disagreeing either. But worst of all, none
of this is in any way transparent to the speakers. If we imagine how Ann and
Ben’s discussion would go, presumably they would say things like “The first
movie with the ape was the funniest” - “No, the second was better”, without any
idea that there was something wrong with their utterances.
Now, the example I’ve presented is simplified so that we see the structure of
the problematic cases, but we can see that the same structure is present in large
number of ordinary discussions of taste. The feature that causes the problem is
the lack of agreement in the tastes of the experiencers. The same issue will arise
in any case where people’s tastes are diﬀerent enough and there are equal num-
bers of diﬀering tastes so that there’s no way to exclude marginal viewpoints.
And cases of very diﬀerent tastes are entirely ordinary so if contextualism were
correct we should expect there to be a lot of flawed conversations about taste.
The reason why cases of radically diﬀerent tastes produce truth-valueless
utterances have to do with the way the contextual mechanisms are supposed to
determine the scale and the standard. Since in an ordinary context the taste of
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each member of the experiencer class weighs equally, in case they’re too diﬀerent
there are only arbitrary ways to resolve the problem by e.g. randomly excluding
some members. Now, the contextualist has the option of biting the bullet and
accepting that indeed people are quite confused when they talk about taste so
it’s no surprise that sometimes their utterances aren’t truth-evaluable. However,
that’s a radical conclusion that shouldn’t be accepted lightly.
8.3 Possible Solutions?
8.3.1 An Analysis of the Problems
The core problem with flexible contextualism is that in explaining disagreements
it makes the truth-conditions and thereby the truth-values too independent of
the tastes of the speakers. We saw that the problem of simple subjectivism was
that it couldn’t explain disagreements of taste since the semantic content of a
judgment of taste is a report of the speaker’s experiential state. That is not
something that can systematically be a topic of disagreements. Flexible contex-
tualism fixes that problem by making the judgments be reports of experiential
states of an experiencer class.
But now we have somewhat the opposite problem: there might be a content
that could reasonably be disagreed about, but the content is too far removed
from the experiential states of the speakers. Hence they themselves could not
know under which conditions their judgments are true (since they don’t de-
cide how the scale and standard are determined). Thus disagreements of taste
become mysterious since people don’t know the truth-conditions of their judg-
ments. Thus they might actually disagree over the truth of some proposition
p (e.g. “Surströmming is delicious for everyone in the experiencer class E ”)
whose content has been determined by the context. But as has been emphas-
ised they make their judgments on the grounds of their own experiential states,
and would not realise that they are actually claiming something about every-
one in the context. It just isn’t plausible that people’s judgments of taste are
attempts at saying something about the experiential states of others.
In short, any plausible theory about judgments of taste has to maintain a
link between the grounds of judgments and the truth-conditions of judgments
so that the speakers are able to track the truth. For example, if a person judges
on the basis of their own experience but the truth of the judgment depends on
something entirely independent of those grounds, say, the hearer’s experience,
then they are not able to track the truth. We can imagine that to happen with
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e.g. a person who fails to see any colours but who nevertheless tries to make
colour judgments. Their grounds bear no reliable relation to what makes the
judgments true so their judgments are like guesses and their chances of getting
them right are poor. Flexible contextualism claims that ordinary speakers are in
a similar predicament. And the larger the experiencer class is the more diﬃcult
their situation becomes. Hence the theory predicts that speakers very often
speak falsely about matters of taste and if they do speak truly, that is mostly
due to luck.
8.3.2 Indirect Metasemantics
The lack of transparency of the truth-conditions is due to the indirect metase-
mantics that Glanzberg advocates for context-sensitive expressions, i.e. the idea
that it is “the context” that determines their semantic values based on various
features. So the obvious first move to fix the problem is to move to direct
metasemantics, i.e. where the intentions of the speakers determine the values
of the context-sensitive elements, within reasonable limits: the speaker has to
follow the usual Gricean conversational maxims and intend something salient
enough that the hearers can understand.27
However, Glanzberg is explicitly against direct metasemantics which he takes
to be a core feature of semantic relativism, echoing Richard (2004) who claims
that contextualism has to have indirect metasemantics whereas relativism –to
its advantage– has direct metasemantics. I don’t think that’s the case, and as
we will see when discussing relativism, it’s unclear which metasemantics the
relativists besides Richard accept. For the moment let us suppose that the
contextualist could adopt direct metasemantics. Hence, a speaker in a context
should select an experiencer class and based on her beliefs about the tastes of
the people in that class determine the ordering and the standard.
27Unfortunately it’s outside the scope of our concerns to discuss the diﬀerences between
semantic minimalism, i.e. theories which deny that pragmatics has any influence on semantic
content and the non-minimalist approaches (known as “contextualism” in the debates, see e.g.
Borg (2004; 2012) and Cappelen and Lepore (2005)). We will be simply assuming with the
current mainstream “contextualist” theories that the intentions of the speakers may determine
the semantic content of some expressions.
The minimalist wouldn’t accept any accounts that posit direct metasemantics as determ-
ining semantic content. However, they typically hold that what the contextualist takes as
semantic content is rather pragmatic content, i.e. something inferred based on the minimal
semantic content in context. Hence they could mirror the direct metasemantics account by
taking it to describe the pragmatic level of content. In general minimalist and contextualist
accounts can predict pretty much the same data but they would take it to result from very
diﬀerent processes. For an insightful discussion of how to choose between the two approaches
see Unger (1984).
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To illustrate, take the example where the friends are discussing whether the
diﬀerent aspects of the music festival were fun. For each positive judgment
there is one friend who negates the judgment and we get an impression of dis-
agreement. To explain the disagreement the contextualist says that they are
disagreeing over what’s true for the experiencer class. Suppose one of them
says “Sleeping in a tent was fun”. According to the contextualism with direct
metasemantics the speaker judges so based on his evaluation of what amalgam-
ating the tastes of the experiencer class determines as fun. To put it bit more
intuitively, he’s saying something like “We all had fun sleeping in a tent” and to
say that, he’s had to form an idea of the degrees of fun of the festival happenings
according to the group.
There are two very strong reasons against the contextualist account with dir-
ect metasemantics. Speakers don’t seem to have intentions about experiencer
classes and especially not about ways of amalgamating their tastes and determ-
ining an ordering and a standard. Naturally we don’t expect the speakers to
have those intentions as described by the formal account as intentions about
“experiencer classes” etc. Nevertheless they should be representing the kind of
semantic contents that the theory predicts for example by thinking “Given the
average taste of our group of friends, sleeping in a tent was fun”. Now, there
are some cases where the speaker intends to speak in behalf of others as we
saw when discussing the relevant experiencers. However, according to the view
under discussion the experiencer class must be chosen for each use of a predicate
of taste. That clearly doesn’t happen.
Now, if speakers have intentions about something, the standard view takes
those intentions to be transparent to them. I should flag that I will dispute that
view in Ch. 14: Perspectivism. Nevertheless, the method I recommend there
as allowing us to attribute intentions wouldn’t attribute the intentions that
the flexible contextualist needs, so let us therefore focus only on transparent
intentions.
When it comes to determining whether or not an expression’s semantic value
is determined by intentions, the arguments in favour usually refer to what the
speaker had in mind when making the utterance.28 One way to see that speakers
28For a classic example, take Donnellan’s (1966) arguments for distinguishing referential
and attributive uses of definite descriptions. One of his examples is the utterance “Smith’s
murderer is insane”, first made by a speaker who doesn’t know the murderer and who merely
intends to attribute insanity to whoever the murderer is. That is the attributive use. The
second, referential, use of “Smith’s murderer is insane” is made when it’s common ground that
Jones is the murderer, and the intention is to refer specifically to Jones. Donnellan argues
that the diﬀerence is brought out most clearly if it turns out that Smith had no murderer: the
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don’t have the intentions in question is by looking at disagreements of taste. If
speakers needed to determine the context-sensitive values, there would often
be misunderstandings by the hearers of what they had in mind. And those
misunderstandings should be evident to the speakers.
Let me give an example of such a misunderstanding with respect to local, an
arguably intention-sensitive expression. Suppose Bob calls Carla and says “I’m
at the local bar. Join me.” Carla takes Bob to mean local to Bob, and when
she can’t find Bob at his local bar he calls him to ask where he is. Bob realises
her misunderstanding and says “I meant your local bar.” In other words, when
intentions determine a semantic value, the speakers know what they intended
and if they are misunderstood they will recognise it. In contrast, it doesn’t
seem like your average Joe knows which experiencer class and standard they
intended when they make a judgment of taste. Nor can they notice if someone
misinterprets what they had in mind.
Since direct metasemantics doesn’t help, the flexible contextualist is stuck
with predicting that judgments of taste have unintuitive truth-values, they lead
to irrational disagreements and sometimes they express no propositions. One
radical option is to bite the bullet and say that judgments of taste and dis-
agreements about them are often confused and people don’t know what they
are saying or when it’s true. Now, of course that is a possibility, and for ex-
ample error theorists in metaethics are pretty much saying something similar
about moral judgments. But why would you posit something as complicated as
the flexible contextualist semantics when you could get the same predictions by
adopting semantic invariantism coupled with an error theory? We discuss error
theories in Ch. 13: An Error Theory for Discourses About Taste.
8.4 Other Problems for Flexible Contextualism
8.4.1 Disagreement Reports
Mark Richard (2004) presents a problem for contextualism that is based on
reporting judgments that contain allegedly context-sensitive expressions. His
example is a report about judgments of whether a person is rich, but the same
problem applies to contextualist accounts of predicates of taste. Richard points
out that agents from diﬀerent contexts can be reported as disagreeing. That’s
first utterance fails to refer whereas the second still refers to Jones, making the first utterance
false or truth-valueless and the second utterance true (if Jones is insane). He concludes: “In
general, whether or not a definite description is used referentially or attributively is a function
of the speaker’s intentions in a particular case.” (Donnellan, 1966, 297).
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a problem for contextualism since the context-sensitive expressions in the judg-
ments get diﬀerent contents and the judgments are thereby not contradictory.
Let me illustrate:
(157) (a) Arthur (in context 1 which includes Arthur’s friends and Clare):
Borat was really funny.
(b) Bob (in context 2 which includes Bob’s friends and Clare): Borat
wasn’t funny.
(c) Clare (in context 3 which includes Clare’s friends): Arthur and Bob
disagree over whether Borat is funny.
The question Richard asks is what is the disagreement that is reported in cases
like above. Flexible contextualism would say that what counts as funny in
each context above depends on the experiencer class, say, the participants to
the conversation. Therefore Arthur and Bob whose friends we suppose to be
diﬀerent attribute diﬀerent properties to Borat. Hence, they don’t disagree at
least in the sense of expressing contradictory contents.
So one problem is why compatible judgments can be reported as a disagree-
ment. But a further problem is that in the report Clare is using funny herself,
so its semantic value now depends on Clare’s context. Therefore, Clare is saying
that Arthur and Bob disagree over whether Borat is funny given the standards
of funniness of Clare and her friends. That’s clearly absurd.
We can add another issue related to reports not discussed by Richard which
is the discrepancy between the felicity of reports of judgments with bona fide
context-sensitive expressions and predicates of taste. Here is an example with
local :29
(158) (a) Arthur: (with Clare in Manor House): The local wine shop is really
bad.
(b) Bob (with Clare in Summertown): The local wine shop is great.
(c) Clare (with her friends in Dalston): ??Arthur and Bob disagree over
whether the local wine shop is good.
This dialogue illustrates how absurd it is to ignore the eﬀects of the context on
local. First, no English speaker would report Arthur’s and Bob’s utterances out
of their contexts without making explicit where was their locality. Second, no
29The reader can try the same with e.g. indexicals and demonstratives, quantifier domain
restriction and locational expressions like in front, behind, nearby, next door, above etc. None
of these allow the kind of reports that predicates of taste do.
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one would take them as disagreeing. Third, no one would take them as having
said anything about the current context, i.e. Dalston in the above example.
The dialogue above is bizarre; so why isn’t (157) bizarre given that the context-
sensitivity of funny is supposed to be like the context-sensitivity of local?
However, in defence of contextualism we should note that there are cases
where two apparently contradicting judgments of taste are made in diﬀerent
contexts but where it would be infelicitous to report the speakers as disagreeing.
Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009, 109) give examples that aim to show that
apparently contradicting judgments of taste made in diﬀerent contexts don’t
always give an intuition of contradiction. What’s relevant for our purposes is
that when there is no intuition of contradiction, it would be infelicitous to make
a cross-contextual disagreement report. Let me give their cases to illustrate.
In the first case a caterer says “That party is not going to be fun. I have to
cook hors d’oeuvres all night”. In a separate conversation another person says
of the same party “That party is going to be fun. I get to meet lots of school
buddies that I haven’t seen in a long time.” The second examples is of a child
who says “The summer is going to be fun. I get to go to music camp.” The
parent says in a separate conversation “The summer is not going to be fun. I
have to work overtime to pay for my child’s music camp.”
In these cases we don’t get an impression of disagreement nor could we feli-
citously report the speakers as disagreeing. This data is important to take into
account in addition to the data about felicitous cross-contextual disagreement
reports since it shows that some sensitivity to contexts is taking place at least
in some cases. Now, those cases don’t require contextualism to be explained but
they can be used to defend contextualism.
We saw in ch. 5: The Grounds of Judgments of Taste that felicity of judg-
ments of taste in general depend on who the relevant experiencer is. In the
above cases the speakers make it clear with their justifications that they are
the relevant experiencers. Hence one can either take the cases as evidence for
contextualism together with the relevant experiencer data, or treat both as in-
dependent of truth-values and having to do with pragmatics only.
8.4.2 Says That Reports
If one wants to report an utterance that contains indexicals or demonstratives
in a context where the expression would get a diﬀerent semantic value, one has
to replace it with an expressions that refers to the correct referent. For example,
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the following is clearly unacceptable:
(159) (a) Alice (in context 1 with her family and Clare): I’m hungry.
(b) Clare (in context 2 with her family): Alice said I’m hungry.
Since indexicals and demonstratives behave so with says that reports, sev-
eral philosophers have argued that a felicitous cross-contextual says that re-
port where the embedded content remains unchanged shows that the reported
content is contextually invariant (see e.g. Cappelen and Lepore (2005)). Now,
judgments of taste allow for cross-contextual says that reports like the following:
(160) (a) Alice (in context 1 with her family and Clare): Souley Vegan’s food
is delicious.
(b) Clare (in context 2 with her family): Alice said that Souley Vegan’s
food is delicious.
Clare’s report is perfectly felicitous and natural, despite of her reporting Alice’s
utterance in a diﬀerent context. Thus the acceptability of judgments of taste
in cross-contextual says that reports might be taken as evidence against their
context sensitivity.
Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) defend contextualism of predicates of taste
against the claim that only context-insensitive expressions allow cross-contextual
says that reports. They define Easiness as follows: “Let us say that a sentence
S exhibits Easiness if true disquotational says-that reports for S are easy to
achieve across a wide range of environments.” (Cappelen and Hawthorne, 2009,
34). They also claim that Easiness obtains for e.g. left and nearby, and they
argue that since those expressions are obviously context-sensitive it would be
crazy to think that Easiness matches with context insensitivity.
However, left and nearby (or any similar locational expressions for that mat-
ter) are intuitively not easy to report disquotationally. Here is an example:
(161) (a) Arthur: (with Clare in Manor House): The restaurants nearby are
popular.
(b) Clare (with her friends in Dalston): ??Arthur said that the
restaurants nearby are popular.
A competent speaker would never make such a report unless the context in
(161b) was such that the location under discussion was Manor House, not Dal-
ston.
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Sentences containing left or nearby can be truthfully reported only if the
context where the report is made provides the same semantic values as the
original context, either because it’s relevant features are the same or if the
original context is more salient than the current context. In any other case the
speaker has to make the relevant adjustments to speak truly, e.g. “Arthur said
the restaurants near Manor House are popular.” Hence left and nearby are not
easy to report cross-contextually, and the same can be said of ready and to have
enough, Cappelen and Hawthorne’s other examples of alleged Easiness.
Cappelen and Hawthorne further mention some gradable adjectives as al-
lowing for easy reporting. However, we should note that if one ignores the
comparison class when reporting judgments with gradable adjectives the report
is infelicitous or false. Here is an example:
(162) (a) Arthur (while talking to Clare about a 5cm long spider found at his
English home): This kind of spiders are huge.
(b) Bob (talking to Clare about the same kind of spider 5cm spider at
the spider section of a zoo that’s full of much bigger spiders): This kind
of spiders are pretty small.
(c) Clare (to Bob at the zoo): ?? Arthur thinks they’re huge.
Maybe the reports isn’t as obviously bad as in (161), but it certainly sounds
like it’s doing injustice to what Arthur thinks. Note that this kind of infelicity
is common to all gradable adjectives, including predicates of taste. Since it’s
extremely plausible that gradable adjectives have context-sensitive comparison
classes, in this respect the says that data gives us results that support the view
that context-sensitive expressions can be reported only when they get the same
semantic value in the reporting context.
In short, there is some plausibility to the claim that cross-contextual says
that reports are not ok with context-sensitive expressions. At least the contex-
tualist about predicates of taste will have to give a story to explain the diﬀerent
linguistic behaviours of predicates of taste and the expressions that are com-
monly accepted to be context-sensitive. What the data does show is that if
the expressions that allow cross-contextual reports are context-sensitive, their
context-sensitivity is not so transparent to the speakers as in the case of e.g.
indexicals and demonstratives.
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8.4.3 Retractions
One linguistic datum that has played an important part in the anti-contextualist
literature are retractions of one’s previous utterances (MacFarlane, 2005a). Mac-
Farlane’s original criticism targets epistemic contextualism but the same prob-
lem arises for judgments of taste. Here is an example of a retraction of a past
judgment of taste:
(163) (a) Anna (time t1 ): Hiking is fun.
(b) Anna (time t1 + 1 year): I was wrong when I said hiking is fun. It’s
actually boring.
Suppose Anna at t1 utters the proposition which expresses roughly the same as
At t1 hiking is normally fun for Anna. But only roughly; let me make a couple
of remarks about our paraphrase. First, we are not supposing that Hiking is
normally fun for Anna means exactly the same as what the contextualist takes
(163a) to express. Rather, we are using it as a shorthand for the proposition
that refers to experiences of Anna.
Secondly, I’ve added normally since as was mentioned earlier the analysis
would probably want to refer to the normal experiences of the agent / group,
thereby allowing for temporary defects in them. There might seem to be a
clash in saying At t1 normally since the time refers to an instant and normality
requires that we look at extended times. What I intend to mean by it is that
around t1 Anna enjoys hiking if things are as usual. So, strictly speaking a
more accurate contextualist paraphrase is something like At t1, Anna normally
enjoys hiking, but we will be using phrases of the form x is F for P because
they are simpler.
The problem with contextualism and retractions goes as follows. According
to contextualism, utterances like (163a) are typically true if the relevant per-
spective is that of the speaker. They know their own experiential states so if
the grounds includes nothing else and they are in a normal state, then they
speak the truth. Now, when a speaker takes back what they said they seem
to deny the truth of the proposition they uttered previously. Hence, in (163b)
Anna seems to be saying At t1 I was wrong when I said hiking was fun. But
according to contextualism Anna’s utterance (163a) was, is, and will be true: it
expresses an eternal proposition whose truth-value is fixed. So why would Anna
be retracting a true utterance and say that she was wrong when she wasn’t?
Thus, contextualists have to explain why speakers would retract perfectly
correct and true judgments they’ve made earlier. But additionally, they have to
123
explain the diﬀerences between the expressions that are widely considered to be
context-sensitive and predicates of taste. MacFarlane (2005a) points out that
knowledge claims can be easily retracted afterwards in contrast to utterances
containing indexicals or gradable adjectives. Judgments of taste can likewise be
easily retracted later.
As far as I know, no contemporary defender of contextualism for taste pre-
dicates has an explanation for why people retract their past judgments of taste.
One could try to argue that when people say they were wrong or said something
false they are only speaking loosely. Foot (2002c) states the loose talk view in
her discussion about judgments of taste, morality and aesthetics:
’Disagree’ is (to use an expression of Miss Anscombe’s applied
by her in a diﬀerent context) ’a light word’. If you find something
pleasant and I do not, or you find some food delicious and I do not,
we can say ’how we disagree’. My suspicion is that the existing use
of ’true’ and ’false’, and the choice of an objective form of expression
(’it is right’), does have a role but a rather disreputable role. When
we say that something ’just is’ right or wrong we want to give the
impression of some kind of fact or authority standing behind our
words, though by hypothesis both are here ruled out, maintaining
the trappings of objectivity though the substance is not there. Per-
haps there is not, in the language already, a subjective form of words
which will say just what we want, but we do not have to keep the
language as it is. (Foot, 2002c, 9).
The view could also help with the problem of disagreement reports discussed
above: even if speakers aren’t disagreeing in the true sense of the word it’s ok
to say loosely that they are. However, the loose talk explanation falls short
of explaining many of the problems. First, it cannot explain the impression of
disagreement we get with apparently contradictory judgments of taste. And as
we saw in the cases of Cappelen and Hawthorne, the impression correlates with
the felicity of reporting the speakers as disagreeing.
Second, it cannot account for the discrepancy between the bona fide context-
sensitive expressions and predicates of taste. If disagree, true and false are
capable of such light uses, then why aren’t they used over the board with all
context-sensitive and subjective expressions? After all, we have seen that there
is a diﬀerence between the behaviours of predicates of taste (as well as moral and
aesthetic expressions) and other context-sensitive expressions when it comes to
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reports and retractions.
A more plausible explanation posits some “semantic blindness”. Such a view
would hold that predicates of taste are context-sensitive but not as transparently
as the ordinary ones. Hence, when a person retracts their past judgment of taste
they are making a mistake: the judgment was true, but the speaker now thinks
it’s false because she is unable to take the perspective of her past self. In
evaluating the past judgment she uses the same sentence in the current context
which results in a false proposition. Since the context-sensitivity in question isn’t
entirely transparent, the speaker doesn’t realise that the contextually saturated
content isn’t the same as in the past content.
DeRose (2006) has tended towards accepting some semantic blindness about
know (while insisting that invariantism must do the same given people’s pro-
contextualist intuitions). Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009, 120-1, footnote 30)
admit that it’s not easy to decide between an error theory and a contextual-
ist account which posits some semantic blindness. We’ll discuss the semantic
blindness strategies in more detail in Ch. 14: Perspectivism.
However, one consideration in favour of contextualism should be mentioned.
Just like disagreement reports are not systematically felicitous with apparently
contradicting judgments of taste, one isn’t always forced to retract one’s previous
judgment of taste even if one’s taste has changed. Here is an example:
(164) (a) Anna (t1): Hiking is so much fun!
A year later, Anna has changed her mind:
(165) (a) Anna: Hiking is pretty boring.
(b) Bob: But last year when we went hiking you said it was fun!
(c) Anna: Well, I was diﬀerent then. Hiking used to be fun but since
then I discovered surfing and now I find hiking boring.
Even if Bob were to insist “So you were wrong last year?”, Anna can say “I
wasn’t wrong, it’s simply that my taste has changed.” This kind of exchanges
favour contextualism or other perspective-dependent views that take the relev-
ant experiencer to be the speaker. To conclude, the perfect theory must be able
to explain both retractions and cases where one does not retract.
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8.5 Can Pragmatics-Based Flexible Contextualism Do Bet-
ter?
This chapter has looked at a semantics-based flexible contextualism where the
context sensitivity is due to the lexical semantics of predicates of taste. But
one could advocate flexible contextualism where the context sensitivity is based
on the intentions of the speakers instead. We outlined a pragmatics-based con-
textualist account earlier in section 6.3. Would it make a diﬀerence to the
predictions of flexible contextualism if it was a pragmatics-based account? The
answer is that mostly it wouldn’t.
First, a pragmatics-based flexible contextualist would be like semantics-
based contextualism with direct metasemantics, i.e. according to both views
it is the intentions of the speaker that determine the relevant experiencer class
in judgments of taste. Hence the same criticism can be made towards the prag-
matist: people typically don’t have intentions regarding experiencer classes.
Moreover, the problems of reports and retractions are likewise shared by the
pragmatics-based account. Indeed the same problems are even more pressing
for an account which expects the speakers to have intended a certain experien-
cer class. Such a view is not consistent with any amount of semantic blindness
regarding speakers and their knowledge of what they’ve said.
However, a pragmatics-based account has one distinctive advantage. We’ve
seen that predicates of taste cannot be lexically context-sensitive since it isn’t
compatible with all the data. But since our discussion of relevant experiencers
we have emphasised that there is some amount of flexibility in whose experiences
count, and it depends on the speaker’s intentions whether the relevant experien-
cer includes others than the speaker. Moreover, we emphasised that not every
apparently contradictory judgment of taste gives an impression of disagreement,
and speakers don’t always retract their earlier judgments of taste. All that is
evidence that sometimes speakers do intend a perspective and that hearers are
able to interpret certain judgments as referring to a perspective.
Let us call such uses subjectivist uses of predicates of taste. Subjectivist
uses are ones where a speaker intends the judgment to refer to a certain salient
perspective. These are like the cases by Cappelen and Hawthorne which give no
sense of disagreement, and in which a speaker would not retrospectively retract
their judgment. Moreover, the hearers who correctly interpret subjectivist uses
will not report them cross-contextually without making explicit the intended
perspective. Furthermore, if a hearer misunderstands the speaker’s intentions,
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the speaker will not enter a disagreement but will state something like “I meant
[predicate of taste] to me”.
What I will argue is that the data mentioned above is explained by subject-
ivist uses, and hence a pragmatics-based flexible contextualism is right about
them. But those uses are only a minority of uses. Let us call the rest objectivist
uses of predicates of taste. These are the ones where speakers don’t intend a
perspective, they disagree with each others, feel compelled to retract their past
judgments, and freely report judgments of taste cross-contextually. Now, many
would surely question the existence of the diﬀerent kinds of uses. I won’t argue
for it now, but the need for the distinction will become stronger once we see
the problems of other perspective-dependent accounts in accounting for all the
data. I return to the two uses in Ch. 13: An Error Theory for Discourses About
Taste.
8.6 Summary of Chapter 8
Flexible contextualism is motivated by the desire to explain at least partially
all three of the prominent intuitions about judgments of taste. The Intuition
of Many Relevant Perspectives is explained by positing an experiencer class,
the Intuition of No Fault is explained by the cases where the experiencer class
includes only the speaker, and the Intuition of Disagreement is explained by
taking the speakers to disagree over the truth of a judgment that is about an
experiencer class that contains many people.
The aim of this chapter was to argue that flexible contextualism like Glan-
zberg’s account ends up with serious problems. The view holds that the content
of a predicate of taste is determined by “the context”, a mechanism which takes
various features and outputs the ordering of the objects and the standard. I’ve
argued that speakers are unable to track how the truth-conditions of their judg-
ments get determined, and hence the judgments will have truth-values that are
highly unintuitive to everyone in the conversation. Moreover, people won’t know
what the truth-conditions of their judgments are or whether they or the others
spoke the truth. Therefore, the view doesn’t in the end respect the Intuition of
No Fault.
The second major problem are cases where a judgment of taste doesn’t
express a proposition since the tastes of the participants are so diﬀerent that
the contextual mechanisms cannot deliver an ordering. And again, it is in
no way transparent to the speakers that there is anything wrong with their
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discourse. I argued that the problems cannot be avoided in a view which takes
the truth-conditions to depend on features that are unknown to the speakers
(i.e. the tastes of others), in ways that are unknown to the speakers (i.e. the
mechanisms of “the context”).
I considered further whether it would be helpful to adopt “direct” metase-
mantics instead, i.e. metasemantics for context-sensitive expressions where the
speakers’ intentions determine the value. I argued that it’s totally implausible
given our lack of intentions about experiencer classes. Finally, I summarised
three problems for contextualism from the recent literature. First is that judg-
ments of taste made in diﬀerent contexts can be reported as a disagreement,
even if according to contextualism there isn’t a unique content over which the
disagreement could be about. Second problem is that judgments of taste allow
disquotational says that reports across contexts, whereas other expressions that
are generally considered context-sensitive don’t. Third, unlike with other ut-
terances containing context-sensitive expressions, it’s normal to retract a past
judgment of taste once the relevant contextual parameter (i.e. one’s taste) has
changed.
Contextualists don’t have plausible answers to any of the problems discussed
in this chapter, so I conclude that its current forms are not successful. Finally
I considered whether pragmatics-based contextualism can do better. Mostly it
faces the same problems as semantics-based contextualism. However, I argued
that pragmatics-based contextualism is a plausible view if one distinguishes
between uses where the speaker explicitly intends to talk about their own taste
(“subjectivist uses”). But those are a minority of uses. The true challenge are
the uses which create problems for contextualism, namely where the speakers
feel they are disagreeing, they report judgments of taste across contexts and they
retract their past judgments. Let us next look at whether semantic relativist
accounts can do better than contextualism.
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Part III
Semantic Relativism
9 Moderate Relativism
In this part we discuss two recent and controversial semantic accounts of pre-
dicates of taste. The first is moderate relativism, also known as non-indexical
relativism or genuine relativism. The second one is radical relativism which also
goes by the names relativism, assessment-relativism or assessment sensitivity.30
Both frameworks usually build on David Kaplan’s (1989b) “double-indexing” se-
mantics which distinguish between propositional content and the circumstance
of evaluation which determines the truth of the proposition. Some authors
prefer to use David Lewis’s (1980) framework which talks of an index instead
of a circumstance of evaluation but we will describe the views within Kaplan’s
framework.
Several defenders of truth-relativism have given as their main motivation
the need to provide non-traditional semantics to predicates of taste. That is
the primary motivation for Peter Lasersohn (2005) as well as for Max Kölbel
(2003; 2009), and an important motivation for Mark Richard (2004; 2008). John
MacFarlane (2007; 2014) also takes taste predicates as a case in favour of his
view, among a couple of other expressions.31 Our focus will be on how the
views fare in their explanations of the data about predicates of taste so we will
not attempt a general assessment of the need for semantic relativism. However,
given that many of the views we discuss put heavy weight on their alleged ability
to provide the best semantics for taste predicates, their failure in that task will
take away a large part of the motivation for relativism.
In the first chapter of this part we will focus on moderate relativism and
30Here is some background behind the diﬀerent labels: non-indexical relativism and genuine
relativism, names used by e.g. Kölbel (2003) contrast with indexical relativism, a name for
contextualism by Wright (Wright, 1994). The labels Moderate and radical relativism draw
a parallel between the two views which take truth to depend on parameters additional to a
possible world. I prefer the latter labels since we are mainly interested in contrasting forms
of relativism with contextualism. Sometimes moderate relativism gets called non-indexical
contextualism after MacFarlane (2009) who draws a parallel with indexical contextualism
because both views hold that the truth of an utterance is determined by the context of
utterance. However, it is not clear whether every moderate relativist view is committed to
that; the issue will be discussed in Ch. 10: A Closer Look at Relativist Accounts.
31François Recanati (2007; 2008) also oﬀers a moderate relativist account of predicates of
taste but his motivations for his branch of relativism are independent of the success of that
particular case.
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on whether the basic idea of distributing elements from the content to the cir-
cumstance of evaluation is helpful in explaining disagreements of taste. I first
introduce the basic Kaplanian framework and the modifications the relativists
have made to it. We then look at the motivation for moderate relativism, fo-
cusing on an argument against speaker-centered contextualism by Kölbel and
Lasersohn. One of the issues that have been widely discussed in the literature
on relativism is “faultless disagreements” and what they are supposed to be.
We look at Kölbel’s original definition and his later pronouncements about it
as well as the arguments that aim to show that faultless disagreements are not
disagreements at all. The final section discusses whether contents that cannot
be true when evaluated relative to the same circumstance of evaluation give an
impression of disagreement when their circumstances of evaluation are diﬀerent.
9.1 Moderate Relativism in a Nutshell
Let me first summarise Kaplan’s (1989b) semantics which we will use in our
characterisation of what makes a semantics relativist. Kaplan distinguishes
between a content which is what gets evaluated for truth, and a circumstance
of evaluation which is the actual or possible world which makes the content
true or false. The content is determined by the characters of the expressions in
the sentence, together with the context of utterance in case of context-sensitive
expressions. In the relevant literature content is often called a proposition; how-
ever, since the notion of proposition used by the relativists is not the traditional
one, I mostly use the term content to avoid confusion.
The circumstance of evaluation is roughly a situation (actual or merely pos-
sible) which determines which truth value the content that is expressed gets.
Hence, truth depends on the content expressed and on the circumstance of eval-
uation. In more formal terms, a character is a function that given a context
returns a content, and content is a function that given a circumstance of eval-
uation returns a truth-value. Which circumstance of evaluation is the relevant
one for a particular utterance is fixed by the context of utterance according to
Kaplan.
What makes a semantic framework relativist in the sense we are interested in
is the idea that contents are true or false relative to something more than just a
world of evaluation, i.e. the circumstance of evaluation contains other paramet-
ers than just the world (Kölbel, 2009). For example, one can think of tenses as
provided by the circumstance of evaluation rather than them being an element
130
of the content (Kaplan, 1989b). Other parameters that have been defended in-
clude locations to account for how utterances which do not explicitly mention
a location can be true (Recanati, 2007), epistemic standards (Egan et al., 2005;
Stephenson, 2007a), standards of taste (Lasersohn (2005); Stephenson (2007a);
Kölbel (2003)) and moral standards (Brogaard (2012); Kölbel (2004)).
9.1.1 Duality and Distribution
To clarify the basic idea, let me follow Recanati’s (2007) presentation of semantic
relativism as endorsing two core tenets:
Duality. To get a truth-value, we need a circumstance of evaluation
as well as a content to evaluate.
Distribution. The determinants of truth-value distribute over the
two basic components truth-evaluation involves: content and cir-
cumstance. That is, a determinant of truth-value, e.g. a time, is
either given as an ingredient of content or as an aspect of the cir-
cumstance of evaluation. (Recanati, 2007, 33-34)
The consequence of distribution is that the more parameters the relativist adds,
the more incomplete the contents to be evaluated are. The tradition that dates
back to Frege takes contents as having a truth value absolutely, but the Ka-
planian semantics takes contents to get a truth value only relative to a world.
Relativists move even further away from the Fregean tradition by taking con-
tents to be true or false only relative to for example a time, world and agent.
This clearly has consequences for the roles that contents can play, for ex-
ample whether such incomplete contents can be the contents of thoughts. We
will return to that question in Ch. 11: Relativism and Contents of Thoughts.
For the moment it is good to keep in mind that by content (or proposition) we
only mean the content of an utterance, and remain noncommittal about what
other roles it may have.
9.1.2 Relativist Contents: Lekta and Austinian Propositions
Given the relativist’s nonstandard notion of content / proposition, we will ad-
opt another useful piece of terminology from Recanati (2007). He distinguishes
between two notions of content: lekton (lekta in plural) and Austinian proposi-
tion. We will discuss later whether the distinction applies to thought contents,
131
but for now let us focus on language. Lekton is the explicit content of an utter-
ance, sometimes called the “thin” content, which is what is evaluated for truth
relative to a circumstance of evaluation. Austinian propositions consist of the
lekton expressed together with a circumstance of evaluation. In other words,
they correspond to the Fregean notion of proposition or Thought which have a
fixed truth value.
For the sake of illustration, suppose that circumstances of evaluation only
have parameters for a world and a time, i.e., the truth of a lekton is relative to
a world and a time. Suppose Andi says to Bob “Our hippopotamus is crossing
the road” in Gower Street. Lekta correspond to utterance contents rather than
sentence contents meaning that lekta are not context-sensitive. Hence, Andi
expresses the lekta <A hippopotamus that belongs to Andi and Bob is crossing
Gower Street>.
Now, what determines the values of the parameters at the circumstance of
evaluation depends on the particular relativist account. In Recanati’s account
it’s mainly dependent on the intentions of the speaker. Andi intends his utter-
ance to be about the situation he is speaking in, and hence the relevant time is
the time of utterance and the world the actual world. Thus, the Austinian pro-
position expressed by his utterance is <A hippopotamus that belongs to Andi
and Bob is crossing Gower Street at 4pm, 8th December 2013 at the actual
world>. If that’s indeed the case then what Andi said is true.
Now, it depends on the theorists’s commitments whether one treats certain
elements required for resolving the truth of an utterance as belonging to the
lekton or the circumstance of evaluation. Hence relativists and contextualists
typically agree on the truth-conditions of particular utterances but disagree
over whether a certain element of the truth-conditions is part of the content
/ lekton. As we will see, a large part of the motivation for relativism is that
distributing an element from the content to the circumstance is supposed to
allow for an explanation of the problematic linguistic data like disagreements
and retractions.
As was mentioned, relativism about taste predicates is the most popular
case for relativism in the recent literature. The starting point is the same as
with contextualism, namely the need to explain how the truth of judgments of
taste depend on a perspective. Relativism holds that the truth of a judgment of
taste depends on a perspective without it being an element of the lekton. The
core semantic idea is that the circumstance of evaluation contains an additional
perspective parameter which needs a value for a judgment of taste to get a truth
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value. Hence, the content of an utterance (the lekton) will be true depending
on the world of evaluation and a perspective. But which perspective?
Whether or not an utterance determines a unique perspective and hence
expresses an Austinian proposition depends on the theory. Recanati and Richard
(2004; 2008) hold that the context of utterance determines the values of all
parameters at the circumstance of evaluation. But as we will see, Lasersohn
and Kölbel hold that when it comes to the perspective parameter, there is
no unique relevant perspective relative to which the utterance gets evaluated.
Therefore a judgment of taste doesn’t express a unique Austinian proposition
either. What that means exactly will become clearer when we get to the details
of their views.
To illustrate the relativist framework in practice, suppose someone utters
Tofutti is better than cream cheese.32 The utterance does not have a truth
value until we fix the values of a circumstance of evaluation, i.e. choose a
perspective and a possible world. Hence the very same content / lekton can
be true at a circumstance of evaluation that consists of say, the actual world
and my perspective but false at the actual world and your perspective. As with
diﬀerent forms of contextualism, the crucial question is whose perspective a
judgment of taste refers to. Likewise, with relativism the main question is what
(if any) determines at which perspective the judgment is evaluated. Diﬀerent
theories diﬀer in that respect, and it’s the issue that also largely determines the
linguistic predictions the views in question get. We will return to the question
after discussing what motivates the move to relativism about taste predicates
in the first place.
9.2 Motivation for Moderate Relativism for Taste Predic-
ates
Lasersohn (2005) and Kölbel (2003; 2004; 2009) both take relativism to oﬀer
the best explanation for the three intuitions about judgments of taste. Both
point out the implausibility of perspective-independent accounts for predicates
of taste as well as the problems of speaker-centered contextualism. The key
assumption behind the anti-contextualist and pro-relativist arguments concerns
disagreements. Kölbel’s and Lasersohn’s arguments presuppose that there is
disagreement (Lasersohn) or an impression of disagreement (Kölbel) if and only
32Tofutti is a tofu-based imitation cream cheese which is advertised with the slogan Better
than cream cheese.
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if one speaker expresses a content and another one contradicts that content (or
expresses a content which entails a contradicting content).33 We discuss what
is meant by “an impression of disagreement” below.
In the previous chapters we have seen that at least without some special story
simple subjectivism in the form of speaker-centered contextualism is unable to
explain why there seem to be disagreements of taste. By far we have remained
largely neutral on the question of what is needed for there to be disagreement
or what creates an impression of disagreement, but the assumptions made by
relativists require that we begin to investigate the issues more carefully.
9.2.1 The Argument from Disagreement Against Speaker-Centered
Contextualism
Below I have tried to spell out the relativist argument against speaker-centered
contextualism in a nutshell. The argument shows how both Lasersohn and
Kölbel have motivated relativism:
Argument against speaker-centered contextualism
(1) Whether judgments of taste are true or false depends on the speaker’s
perspective.
(2) If predicates of taste are context-sensitive, then the speaker’s perspective
is an implicit element of the content expressed by a judgment of taste.
(3) There is an impression of disagreement iﬀ one expresses a content and
another expresses a content which contradicts it.34
(4) There are impressions of disagreements about taste.
(5) Predicates of taste are context-sensitive. (Assumption)
(6) The speaker’s perspective is an implicit element of the proposition ex-
pressed by a judgment of taste. (By 2,5)
(7) There are no impressions of disagreements of taste. (By 3,6)35
33There are some complications with the idea that any two contradictory (or contradiction
entailing) contents give an impression of disagreement since there might be say, a massively
complicated argument and only a logical genius could see the contradiction. However, let us
ignore such problems and focus on simple utterances like judgments of taste where such issues
are likely not to arise.
34Or, as mentioned above, expresses a content which entails a contradicting content. For
simplicity I will omit mentioning that from now on.
35To illustrate, when Mary utters This sauerkraut is delicious, by (6) she expresses the
proposition sauerkraut is delicious for Mary. If Peter answers “No, this sauerkraut is totally
not delicious” he expresses the proposition No, this sauerkraut is totally not delicious for
Peter, and hence by (3) there is no appearance of disagreement.
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(8) There are impressions of disagreements of taste. (4)
——————————————————————————————–
(C) It’s not the case that predicates of taste are context-sensitive. (By 2-8)
This argument points out the so-called “Lost Disagreement” problem, and has
been used as one of the main arguments against contextualism about predic-
ates of taste. The argument is worth making clear since it shows the crucial
assumption (premise three) in the debates, and why relativism seems to oﬀer an
easy way out of the problem of disagreements of taste. As was mentioned, the
third premise gets diﬀerent formulations, but in our discussion we will follow
the weaker formulation by Kölbel (2009) which only talks about impressions of
disagreement rather than disagreement.
The positive case for relativism is an inference to the best explanation which
tries to show how the truth of judgments of taste can depend on a perspective
without the perspective being an element of the content expressed. The sug-
gestion is that the perspective is a parameter of the circumstance of evaluation.
Hence, a judgment of taste gets evaluated relative to a perspective which allows
for subjectivism of judgments of taste, including speaker-centering (premise 1).
But given premise (3) (or rather, its modified version) about the relation of
contradicting contents and appearances of disagreement, relativism gets to say
that there are appearances of disagreements about taste (premise 4).
Here are instances of the argument from the literature. As was mentioned
above, Lasersohn would construe the argument as speaking of disagreements
rather than impressions of disagreements:
It seems intuitively like sentences containing predicates of per-
sonal taste could be true relative to one person but false relative to
another, but if we analyse them in this [contextualist] way, it appears
to force us into claiming that they express diﬀerent contents for dif-
ferent speakers, and then we no longer seem to be able to explain
accurately which sentences contradict each other and which don’t.
(Lasersohn, 2005, 649-650; emphasis added)
To really disagree with John, Mary would have to negate a sen-
tence that expresses the same content as his utterance, not one that
expresses the same character (Lasersohn, 2005, 647; emphasis ad-
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ded)36
Lasersohn points out in the first quote that if we understand “true relative to
one person but false relative to another” in the usual contextualist way, then
the resulting contents aren’t in contradiction. The second quote illustrates his
view that disagreement requires the expression of contradicting contents.
Kölbel (2003) criticises contextualist approaches to disagreements of taste
as follows:
Indexical relativists [i.e. contextualists], by contrast, say that
they [disagreements of taste] are not really disagreements, at least
not in the sense required by clause (b) [sic] [A believes (judges) that
p and B believes (judges) that not-p] of my definition of ’faultless
disagreement’. (Kölbel, 2003, 62)37
In a later paper Kölbel (2009) claims that he didn’t intend to say that relativism
can predict disagreements either, merely appearances of disagreement. That will
be discussed in the section below.
9.2.2 Impressions of Disagreement
Unsurprisingly, the third premise which is repeated below has been the one
under attack:
(3) There is an impression of disagreement iﬀ one expresses a
content and another expresses a content which contradicts it.
The first suspicion concerns the if and only if formulation. It seems evident that
if two people express contradictory contents there is an impression of disagree-
ment. Such cases are pretty much the prototype for our concept of disagreement.
But aren’t there other cases where we get an impression of disagreement and no
contradictory contents have been expressed? Practical disagreements are cases
where there is an impression of disagreement but it need not be that contra-
dicting contents have been expressed. For example:
36Lasersohn adds that “one may express disagreement with a previous utterance by asserting
any sentence which contradicts it (or perhaps, any sentence which contradicts the result of
adding it to the common ground), and not just by asserting the negation of its content.”
(Lasersohn, 2005, 647, fn 2)
37Kölbel must mean his clause (a), not (b); here are the two clauses that define faultless
disagreement: “(a) A believes (judges) that p and B believes (judges) that not-p
(b) Neither A nor B has made a mistake (is at fault).” (Kölbel, 2003, 53-54)
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(166) a) Arnold: Close the window!
b) Billy: No, you close the window!
Imperatives are normally not considered truth-evaluable so talk of contradiction
of contents isn’t even applicable here. But one does get an impression of dis-
agreement from the dialogue. There are many other examples of disagreement-
like dialogues that don’t concern contents but e.g. the expressions used, the
way the contents have been expressed (e.g. how they are pronounced) and so
on, and which nevertheless give an impression of disagreement (Sundell, 2011).
Now, it’s not surprising that a popular contextualist strategy in explain-
ing disagreements of taste has been to argue that many exchanges can give an
impression of a disagreement without being disagreements over the truth of a
content. E.g. Sundell’s (2011) defence of group contextualism relies on refuting
the relativist’s strict notion of disagreement, in which case the anti-contextualist
argument doesn’t go through. Given even the uncontroversial cases of impres-
sions of disagreement without contradicting contents (like that of imperatives),
it’s clear that the above kind of relativist arguments have been too quick to
dismiss contextualism. In short, the third premiss is not acceptable as such and
hence the argument against contextualism does not work.
However, even if there are other kinds of disagreements or apparent disagree-
ments, it’s not so easy to show that disagreements of taste are like them. If re-
lativism can show that disagreements of taste do involve contradictory contents
they are certainly in a better position than the speaker-centered contextualist.
In what follows, let us accept the following modified premise about impressions
of disagreement:
Impression of disagreement*: If one expresses a content and another ex-
presses a content which contradicts it, then there is an impression of disagree-
ment.
The modified premise allows that impressions of disagreement can come about
other ways as well. Let me make some clarifications regarding the above clause.
By there being an impression of disagreement we simply mean that one who
witnesses an exchange or hears separate utterances would tend to judge (form
a belief) that the agents or their utterances disagree. The one here is intended
generically so that even if some particular witness wouldn’t get an impression
of disagreement in that case, generally one would. Given our formulation, we
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the theorists also count as hearers and hence we may simply consult our own
impressions of disagreement.
The second clarification is about the notions of content and contradiction.
In a non-relativist semantics two contents contradict iﬀ it is impossible for them
to be true at the same world. As we’ve seen, the relativist notion of content
(lekton) is thinner since it distributes elements of content to the circumstance
of evaluation, in this case in the form of a parameter for a perspective. So we
suppose lekta are normally without a perspective. Consequently, in a relativist
framework one needs to add a perspective to the definition of contradiction: two
contents contradict iﬀ it is impossible for them to be true at the same world
and the same perspective.
Given the relativist’s modified definitions of content and contradiction we
can see that in a standard disagreement of taste the speakers contradict, as
illustrated below:
(167) a) Arnold: Functionalist architecture is boring.
b) Billy: It’s not boring. It’s beautiful in its simplicity.
Given that the relevant perspective is not part of the lekton, what Arnold ex-
presses is Functionalist architecture is boring. Billy denies that by saying Func-
tionalist architecture is not boring. The lekta expressed by Arnold and Billy do
indeed contradict since both cannot be true at the same perspective.
However, the important question is whether the thesis about the impressions
of disagreement make sense given the non-standard notion of contradiction that
the relativists use. As was mentioned in a traditional semantics the thesis
makes perfect sense because the expression of contradicting classical contents
is a prototypical disagreement. And naturally a prototypical disagreement also
gives the impression of a disagreement. So as regards the traditional picture,
disagreements and impressions of disagreement go hand in hand.
Let us next take a closer look at the claim that relativism can explain dis-
agreements of taste, and ask why clashing lekta would give an impression of
disagreement.
9.3 Are “Faultless Disagreements” Disagreements?
9.3.1 “Faultless Disagreements”
In Ch. 1: Judgments of Personal Taste we discussed the three key intuitions that
have guided the project of providing the semantics and pragmatics of predicates
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of taste. The No Fault intuition has been emphasised primarily by semantic
relativists. Here is a quote from Kölbel where he defines the famous notion of
“faultless disagreements”:
A faultless disagreement is a situation where there is a thinker A,
a thinker B, and a proposition (content of judgement) p, such that:
(a) A believes (judges) that p and B believes (judges) that not-p
(b) Neither A nor B has made a mistake (is at fault).
I believe that most people have a healthy pre-theoretical intuitions
that there can be and are faultless disagreements in this sense. (Köl-
bel, 2003, 53-54)
Hence, faultless disagreements are cases where (a) the people’s belief contents
contradict, but (b) neither is mistaken. Whether there are faultless disagree-
ments has been intensively discussed in the literature on semantic relativism.
Given the label faultless disagreement it is not surprising that the critics have
taken Kölbel to be committed to faultless disagreements being disagreements in
some intuitive sense. Moreover, the existence of disagreements of taste is one of
the core assumptions behind the problem of taste which undoubtedly also ex-
plains why commentators have supposed that the relativists are trying to show
how there can be disagreements about taste.
Many critics have argued that the relativist framework cannot say that dis-
agreements of taste are really disagreements; at best they are misunderstand-
ings. For example, MacFarlane (2007) argues that moderate relativists cannot
explain disagreements about taste because what counts as disagreement ought
to depend on one’s view on contents. Since the moderate relativist’s contents
require perspectives for their truth, there is genuine disagreement only when
one agent accepts a content, another rejects the same content, and we hold all
the parameters of evaluation fixed. Hence, in the taste case MacFarlane holds
there can be genuine disagreement only if the content is evaluated relative to the
same perspective and the speakers disagree on its truth. Above we saw that the
relativist notion of contradiction needs to take perspectives into account, and
MacFarlane argues that the same holds for the relativist notion of disagreement.
9.3.2 The Principle of Semantic Competence
The problem in taking faultless disagreements to be disagreements is the fol-
lowing. According to relativists, speakers are aware that predicates of taste
139
are perspective-dependent, and hence that the truth of judgments of taste de-
pends on a perspective. Stojanovic (2007) calls the general principle according
to which speakers master the truth-conditions of their utterances the Semantic
Competence assumption:
Semantic Competence (SC): Speakers of English are semantically
competent with predicates of taste: they master their meaning and
truth conditions. (Stojanovic, 2007, 696).
The principle has been implicitly accepted by all the recent theorists of predic-
ates of taste. In Ch. 8: Flexible Contextualism I briefly mentioned that one
way out of the problems that the contextualists have is to accept that there is
some “semantic blindness”; in eﬀect that means giving up Semantic Competence.
Currently no one has endorsed giving up the principle but we will discuss the
option in the Ch. 14: Perspectivism.
The relativists are equally committed to the principle of Semantic Compet-
ence as the contextualists are, and we should emphasise that being semantic-
ally competent is a matter of knowing truth-conditions, not merely the content
(whichever notion of content one uses).38 To put the point in terms of Recanati’s
terminology, Semantic Competence implies that a speaker who makes a judg-
ment of taste knows which lekton they’ve expressed, and under what conditions
it is true, i.e. which Austinian proposition (if any) gets expressed by the lekton
in the context.
Now, relativists also agree that typically the relevant perspective is the
speaker’s (see e.g. Lasersohn (2005, 670)). Given Semantic Competence, in
an ordinary disagreement of taste it should be transparent to the speakers that
the perspective that’s relevant to the truth of their utterances is the speaker’s
perspective.39 Since the truth-conditions –the Austinian proposition– contain
the relevant perspective, from the point of view of the speakers the situation
is exactly alike to the contextualist account of disagreements of taste. In other
words, the speakers ought to know that both are judging based on their own
tastes, and both judgments are also made true by their own tastes. Hence they
38Note that Stojanovic’s formulation talks of mastery rather than of knowledge. I don’t
think anything hinges on talking about knowledge instead, and I’m sure the relevant authors
would accept the principle even if it was stated with knowledge rather than mastery. It’s
simply easier to talk of knowing the content of an utterance than of “mastering the content”,
whatever that would mean.
39The picture is slightly more complex than this due to the variability in possible perspect-
ives. However, the cases most discussed by the relativists and used in favour of their view
contain utterances whose truth depends on the speaker. How the perspective is determined
will be discussed later in detail.
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should take the other one to have spoken the truth from their perspective. Con-
sequently, critics like MacFarlane (2007), Recanati (2007) and Stojanovic (2007)
have argued that intuitively there isn’t any “real” or “genuine” disagreement, at
best a misunderstanding over the relevant perspective.
Recanati (2007) illustrates the problem with an analogous case where two
clashing lekta are expressed but where the Austinian propositions do not con-
tradict. The analogy is of judgments of taste and of utterances which are about
a location that is not mentioned explicitly. Recanati himself holds that location-
unspecific judgments have the same relativist semantics as judgments of taste
so that if a lekton contains no location then the location is part of the Austinian
proposition which determines the truth of the judgment. For example, suppose
that I’m in London, I tell you by the phone “it’s raining” and no other loca-
tion has been made salient. Now, you’re in Los Angeles and say “It’s sunny”.
Two clashing lekta have been expressed (It’s raining and It’s sunny). But we
wouldn’t judge there to be disagreement, and we both understand that the truth
of our utterances depend on our respective locations.
The cases of judgments of taste and locations are analogous even if one does
not take locations to be an element of the circumstances of evaluation since
in both cases it should be obvious (either due to pragmatics or to semantic
competence) what the relevant truth-conditions are. In other words, even if the
lekton contains no location or a perspective, the Austinian proposition does, and
the latter are equally transparent to competent speakers as the lekta. However,
there is a radical disanalogy with the behaviour of the two utterances since in
our phone conversation you would never disagree with my utterance about rain
even if you were in a sunny place. But people do disagree with judgments of
taste.
There are numerous versions of the criticism in the literature (see e.g. Sto-
janovic (2007); Recanati (2007); Iacona (2008)). However, as was mentioned
earlier Kölbel has later emphasised that he had coined the term faultless dis-
agreement without intending to imply that faultless disagreements are either
disagreements or faultless in any “pre-theoretical” sense:
The basic evidence [for relativism of predicates of taste] consists
in cases that might be called cases of “faultless disagreement”. How-
ever, the basic evidence is not meant to consist in the purported
fact that these cases do indeed involve both faultlessness and dis-
agreement in some pre-theoretical sense. Rather, the evidence at
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best consists in the fact that there appears to be faultless disagree-
ment. [...] I take it that the existence of cases of apparent faultless
disagreement like the one described [...] is uncontroversial. (Kölbel,
2009, 389)
So much for the healthiness of the pre-theoretical intuition that there are fault-
less disagreements, we might say. However, when we evaluate Kölbel’s account
we will be focusing on whether it can account for apparent disagreements of
taste.
The terminology of faultless disagreements is Kölbel’s, but Lasersohn (2005)
advanced the very same lines of thought against contextualism and for relativism
by claiming that it can explain disagreements of taste. But he didn’t rely on an
intuitive notion of disagreement either:
What I would like to suggest is that we refine the notion of dis-
agreement so that two people can overtly disagree – we might even
go so far as to say they contradict each other – even if both their
utterances are true. [...] All we have to do is assign words like fun
and tasty the same content relative to diﬀerent individuals, but con-
textually relativize the assignment of truth values to contents, so
that the same content may be assigned diﬀerent truth values relat-
ive to diﬀerent individuals. This will allow for the possibility that
two utterances express identical semantic content, but with one of
them true and the other one false. (Lasersohn, 2005, 662, emphasis
added)
He concludes the discussion on relativist disagreement as follows:
The fact remains that in this analysis there is no matter of fact
on which disagreements of taste turn. Such disagreements are in
some sense “without substance.” More, no doubt, should be said to
clarify and justify the notion of “substanceless” disagreement, but
this too will be left to further investigation. (Lasersohn, 2005, 684).
So we may suppose that Lasersohn’s “substanceless disagreements” didn’t aim
to be “genuine” disagreements either.
However, before we conclude with the critics that moderate relativism can-
not say that there are disagreements of taste it should be emphasised that the
critics assume that disagreement requires a classical, eternal proposition (an
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Austinian proposition) whose truth is under issue. But that claim is questioned
by emotivists and expressivists, and more recently also by contextualists (Sun-
dell, 2011). These alternative views on disagreement will be discussed in Ch.
12: Normative Disagreement. For the moment, let us leave open the question
of what constitutes a disagreement and remain at the level of impressions of
disagreement.
9.4 Contradictory Lekta and Impressions of Disagreement
Let us step back from the particular relativist accounts and consider more gener-
ally the idea that an impression of disagreement is due to the fact that speakers
express lekta that cannot be true at the same perspective. The Kölbel - Laser-
sohn style relativist assumes that the formal diﬀerence of locating an element of
the truth-conditions as a parameter of the circumstance of evaluation instead of
the content makes for a diﬀerence in linguistic communication. The diﬀerence
is supposed to be that since only the content (and not the values of the para-
meters) is linguistically communicated, an utterance and its negation causes an
impression of disagreement between the speakers.
Now why should that be the case? Both content (or proposition) and cir-
cumstance of evaluation are purely technical terms and we are yet to be shown
the link between the formal structure and language use. However, we do know
that the relativist is committed to the circumstance-dependence of some other
expressions than taste predicates. Thus, given that the distinction between
content and parameters of evaluation is supposed to be responsible for the im-
pression of disagreement, we can look at the other cases of parameter-relativity
and see whether the disagreement phenomenon is present in them.
Many people have thought that times are best understood not as part of
the content but as a parameter of evaluation (see e.g. Prior (1957);Kaplan
(1989b)). Kaplan’s view is that an utterance which makes no mention of a
time gets evaluated relative to the time determined by the context of utterance.
Temporal expressions are operators that “shift” the value of the time parameter
at the circumstance of evaluation. For example, in Tomorrow the prophet speaks
the relativist about times takes tomorrow to shift the time parameter so that
we need to look at whether the embedded clause The prophet speaks is true on
the day after the day of utterance. If it is true, then the whole sentence is true
at the time of utterance.
Now, if one is a relativist about times, one certainly has to hold that the
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utterance context determines the value of the time parameter. Normally it’s
the time of utterance, sometimes some other salient time. The importance of
pragmatics in interpreting tenses is shown by languages like Finnish which have
no future tense or other expression that’s systematically used to mark the time
(such as the English modal will); sentences about the present and the future
are often identical so the hearer must figure out from the context which time
the speaker intends to talk about. Let us now look at three variations of a case
where a person hears two contradictory tenseless lekta, i.e. two contents which
cannot be true at the same time.
Scenario 1. Alex, Berit and Carlo are flatmates who are invited to the pub
on Saturday, but they haven’t decided whether they are going. Alex is talking
on the phone about his trip to Oslo next week. His friend on the phone asks
whether he wants some advice about good bars to which he responds “We’re
not going out”. Carlo hears Alex’s utterance and takes him to mean that he’s
decided that they’ll all stay home that evening. After a while Berit shows up
and says to the others “Get ready, we’re going out”. Carlo has an impression of
disagreement from Alex and Berit’s utterances since he interprets them both to
be about that Saturday night.
Scenario 2. Imagine the same setup. Things are as before but this time
Alex’s phone conversation can be heard via the phone’s loudspeaker. In this
scenario when Berit shows up and says “Get ready, we’re going out”, Carlo
doesn’t get the impression that Alex and Berit are disagreeing since he interprets
Alex’s utterance as being about next week and Berit’s about that evening.
Scenario 3. Imagine the same setup again, except that Alex is not talking
on the phone. Instead he lies on the sofa and says to Carlo “We’re not going
out, I want to stay home”. Berit shows up and says “Get ready, we’re going
out”. This time Carlo does get an impression of disagreement from Alex’s and
Berit’s utterances since he interprets them both as being about that Saturday
night.
Now, we emphasised before that the relevant understanding of there is an
impression of disagreement was one in which it thus appears to a generic hearer
including us. The genericity condition is supposed to rule out ignorant or other-
wise confused hearers. In the first case we don’t get an impression of disagree-
ment from the utterances of Alex and Berit. Carlo does, but only because he’s
confused of what Alex was talking about.
We can also look at a case of world-relative utterances though it’s bound to
be highly artificial. Imagine two possible worlds which are identical except that
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in first world it’s snowing where Carlo is on 6th December and in the second
world it isn’t. In the first world Carlo says “It’s snowing”, in the second world
Carlo says “It’s not snowing”. Do we get an impression of disagreement from
the utterances of Carlo and his counterpart? I would say no, though I wouldn’t
put much weight on intuitions about such cases.
Based on these examples it seems that generally speaking impressions of
disagreement correlate with lekta that contradict only when one also evaluates
them relative to the same parameter. Thereby impressions of disagreement cor-
relate with what intuitively seems to be a requirement for disagreement over the
truth of a proposition. As MacFarlane (2007) put it, there is genuine disagree-
ment only when one agent accepts a content, another rejects the same content,
and we hold all the parameters of evaluation fixed. Therefore, the relativist
cannot explain impressions of disagreement by saying that whenever there are
two contradicting lekta there is an impression of disagreement. Something else
is needed besides. Let us next look at the particular relativist theories and
whether they oﬀer an account of why the relativist framework would be better
suited to explain impressions of disagreement.
9.5 Summary of Chapter 9
We have now seen in broad outline the idea behind moderate relativism and how
it’s supposed to be in a better position to explain disagreements of taste. The
basic idea was that since certain contents (like judgments of taste) are true only
relative to extra parameters such as a perspective, there can be contradictory
but true judgments when they are evaluated relative to diﬀerent perspectives.
However, there is a gap in their argument in moving from contradictory con-
tents to disagreements. Ordinarily there is disagreement when two contradictory
contents have been expressed. But in the relativist framework contradictions
hold between two contents that cannot be true at the same circumstance of eval-
uation. In a disagreement of taste the judgments are not evaluated relative to
the same circumstance of evaluation. Therefore, even if the contents contradict,
intuitively there is no disagreement. Several philosophers have criticised the
idea of “faultless disagreements” by making the above point. Kölbel’s answer
was to say that he didn’t mean that faultless disagreements are disagreements,
just that they appear to be disagreements. Likewise, Lasersohn held that his
theory predicts “substanceless disagreements” which supposedly diﬀer quite a
lot from ordinary disagreements.
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In the last section we looked at other possible parameters of evaluation,
namely tenses and possible worlds. The idea was to see whether we get an
impression of disagreement when there are contradictory judgments whose cir-
cumstances of evaluation nevertheless diﬀer. The conclusion was that at least
in those cases we don’t, and hence their behaviour is not analogous to judg-
ments of taste. Therefore we still lack any reason to believe that the moderate
relativist framework as such would help to account for disagreements or for why
there appear to be disagreements of taste. Let us next look at the particular
relativist accounts in detail.
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10 A Closer Look at Relativist Accounts
This chapter investigates in more detail the relativist accounts by Kölbel, Laser-
sohn and MacFarlane. We begin with Kölbel’s account and return first to how
he thinks disagreements of taste are faultless. We then look at what he says
about the question of whose perspective determines the truth of a judgment of
taste. Evans (1985) famously criticised temporal logic, and his criticism applies
to contemporary relativists too. We discuss Evans’ problem and Kölbel’s answer
to it.
Next we look at Lasersohn’s relativism. The most radical feature of Laser-
sohn’s account is that a particular judgment of taste cannot get a fixed truth-
value; it is incomplete since the semantics does not determine a perspective.
Even if a hearer adopts a particular perspective in evaluating an utterance it
makes no diﬀerence to the truth-value which remains undetermined. Laser-
sohn’s calls that feature of his view the subjective assignment of truth-values.
The semantics does not assign truth-values to particular judgments of taste,
and that leads to there being no “objective” assignment of truth-values.
However, Lasersohn holds that people normally evaluate the truth of judg-
ments of taste from their own perspective and sometimes take up a diﬀerent
perspective. It’s not clear what he means by that, so I compare his view
to Bach’s radical invariantism. Bach likewise holds that a judgment of taste
doesn’t express a truth-evaluable content. But he supplements the picture with
strong pragmatics so that in conversation people are supposed to enrich the
propositional radicals with a perspective.
Finally we discuss MacFarlane’s radical relativism. We focus especially on
the question of the communicative norms that MacFarlane defends, and on the
question of the use of assessment-sensitive utterances.
10.1 Kölbel’s Relativism
10.1.1 The Normative Role of Perspectives
Let us first discuss the two core roles of perspectives in Kölbel’s view: their
normative role in governing beliefs and utterances, and their semantic role in the
truth-conditions of judgments of taste. Kölbel defines a perspective as follows:
Let’s call the point of evaluation appropriate for a person that
person’s ’perspective’ (where a perspective is a function that assigns
truth-values to propositions). (Kölbel, 2003, 70).
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He also provides a norm of belief for perspectival contents which we will call the
Relativist Truth Norm of Belief (Kölbel, 2004, 309):
Relativist Truth Norm of Belief : It is a mistake to believe a
content that is not true from one’s own perspective.
Hence when it comes to judgments of taste, one is faultless as long as one
only believes those judgments of taste that are made true by one’s perspective.
(Note that we are not including as judgments of taste judgments like “For Peter
blueberries are disgusting”, only “bare” judgments of taste where no perspective
is made explicit.) Kölbel (2004, 309) further adopts a belief norm of assertion:
Belief Norm of Assertion: Assert a content only if you believe
it.
The truth norm for belief and the belief norm of assertion together imply that
if someone asserts something that is false at their perspective, then they have
committed a mistake because they violated the belief norm. Hence the predic-
tions of the two norms seem prima facie indistinguishable from having a truth
norm for both belief and assertion.
Now, we saw that Kölbel defined faultless disagreements as cases where (a)
the speakers’ belief / utterance contents contradict, but (b) neither is mistaken.
Since judgments of taste don’t include perspectives, ordinary disagreements of
taste are faultless and “disagreements” in the sense Kölbel defines.
10.1.2 Whose Perspective Matters for Truth
The next question is how does a perspective get selected as the one that determ-
ines the truth of some judgment of taste? It is diﬃcult to find a clear answer
by Kölbel. As we saw, Kaplan held that the values of the parameters at the cir-
cumstance of evaluation are determined by the context of utterance; MacFarlane
(2009) calls such a view non-indexical contextualism. Lopez de Sa (2007) raises
the question of whether Kölbel’s view is non-indexical contextualism or radical
relativism (i.e. assessment-sensitivity which will be discussed in section 10.5),
to which Kölbel (2007) answers the following: “I would say that the best way to
fit genuine relativism [i.e. Kölbel’s position] into the Kaplan–Lewis framework
is by adopting the position called non-indexical contextualism in his [Lopez de
Sa’s] taxonomy.” (Kölbel, 2007, 284).
However, in elaborating his answer Kölbel says nothing about what determ-
ines the truth-values of utterances. Kölbel (2009) in contrast seems to favour the
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non-Kaplanian view that there’s no unique relevant perspective that determines
the truth of an utterance. Kölbel states that the relativist about predicates of
taste cannot follow Kaplan in saying that the context of utterance determines
whose perspective determines truth since there are essential diﬀerences between
the world and perspective parameters:
First, while it is clear that it is the world of utterance that is
relevant for evaluating the correctness of a declarative utterance ex-
pressing a contingent proposition, it is not at all clear which standard
of taste is to be used in evaluating an utterance expressing a pro-
position concerning a matter of taste. If we assume that at any time
everyone possesses a standard of taste, we could, for example, say
that the correctness of an utterance goes with the truth of the ex-
pressed proposition at the circumstance of evaluation consisting of
the world of utterance and the utterer’s standard of taste. But there
clearly are alternative ways of evaluating the correctness of such an
utterance. We could evaluate it in terms of truth on the evaluator’s
standard of taste, or on some fixed standard of taste, such as that
of Ferran Adrià or Delia Smith. It seems to be a distinctive feature
of this area of discourse that none of the standards is privileged. [...]
None of these ways of evaluating the utterance seems to be clearly
privileged, in the way the actual world is privileged in the evaluation
of contingent utterances. (Kölbel, 2009, 386-7; emphasis added)
Let me clarify the terminology a bit. Kölbel talks of evaluating the correctness
of utterances but the topic he discusses in the passage is what determines their
truth. In the paper cited Kölbel seems to hold that the semantics does not
determine a unique perspective relative to which an utterance is either true or
false. How are we to understand what that means? Here’s one way to try to
make sense of it.
Normal assertions are about the actual world simply because that’s the world
in which all of us are. Hence there’s no question about which world determines
the truth. However, perspectives are not shared. So while I’m making a judg-
ment that’s true at my perspective, your perspective might diﬀer in relevant
respects and make the same judgment false. We disagree simply because things
are not the same way at our perspectives. And since our perspectives are equally
valid, we cannot privilege one of them in evaluating truth. But note that the
consequence of such a view is that relatively true judgments do not get a truth
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value.
Now, it’s quite strange to argue that people make truth-valueless judgments
since they know that no one’s perspective is to be privileged. Kölbel quite clearly
endorses the view that speakers know that judgments of taste are only relatively
true. So given our usual understanding of communication as cooperation, we
would think that (a) speakers would get to determine the perspective that’s
relevant in determining the truth of what they say, and that (b) even if the
semantics left open which perspective is relevant, given cooperativeness, hearers
would charitably interpret judgments relative to the perspective of the speakers.
Moreover, Kölbel suggests that the phrase to / for x is an operator that
selects a perspective:
English seems to contain a construction that might intuitively
be interpreted in this way [as an operator that shifts a parameter],
namely the “For S, p”-construction, as in “For Anna, whale meat is
tasty.”, or “Whale meat is tasty for Anna.”. (Kölbel, 2009, 385)
Hence a judgment of taste together with a to / for x phrase does express an
Austinian proposition. Since Kölbel holds that our language does have a way
to fix a perspective, why would we make non-perspectival judgments given that
we speak from our own perspective, and given that non-perspectival judgments
are prone to cause disagreements?
10.1.3 Evans’ Problem
Not only is it strange to claim that speakers systematically and competently
make truth-valueless judgments of taste. One can also question whether it
makes any sense to utter sentences with contents that don’t get a determinate
truth value. That criticism is known as Evans’ problem and it’s based on the
influential but diﬃcult paper by Evans (1985) where he criticises temporal logic.
Evans’ argument is highly complex and consists of many parts so I’ll only focus
on the part that’s relevant here.
Evans takes as a premise that any successful semantics must explain the
link between truth in semantics and the truth (correctness in his words) of
utterances. The latter includes the abilities of the language users to evaluate
the correctness of the utterances of others. The reason why those abilities are
included is the Fregean idea that a theory of reference must also serve as the
theory of sense, so that knowledge of the theory of reference suﬃces for language
users to speak and to understand the language.
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Suppose, as is held by the temporalist, that contents are true relative to some
times and false relative to others. Evans points out that the theory is lacking
an account of the relation between the correctness of utterances and truth at
a time. He concludes that temporalism cannot make sense of the correctness
of utterances without relying on the classical notion of eternal truths. That’s
because a rule of correctness which ties it to truth-at-a-time would result in an
utterance which can change from correct to incorrect, and Evans argues that
that’s not coherent.
The reasons he gives are that (1) the word correct is used of actions, in
this case utterances, to evaluate them once and for all. Why Evans thinks
so is not clear but one reason is that given that actions are tied to time, it
seems natural that their correctness properties depend on the time when they
take place. The idea that they come to change their properties from correct to
incorrect retrospectively is pretty radical (but perhaps not incoherent; we’ll see
that MacFarlane defends such a view).
The second argument is that (2) even if we can make sense of correctness
that varies with times the theory can’t serve as the theory of sense since a
speaker wouldn’t know how to use sentences or how to interpret the utterances
of others. This is the reason behind Evans’ conclusion that the temporalist must
ultimately reintroduce eternal evaluation of correctness to the picture:
One who utters the sentence type ’It is raining’ rules out dry
weather only at the time of utterance; he does not rule out later
dryness, and hence there can be no argument from the later state
of the weather to a re-appraisal of his utterance. Utterances have
to be evaluated by what they rule out, and so diﬀerent utterances
of the same tensed sentence made at diﬀerent times may have to be
evaluated (once and for all) diﬀerently. They cannot therefore all be
assigned the same semantic value. (Evans, 1985, 350)
Hence Evans concludes that even if the temporalist view of contents as tense-
less is coherent, utterances of them would have to be evaluated for correctness
relative to a specific time. Therefore, (to put the conclusion in Recanati’s ter-
minology) the temporalist would have to rely on eternal Austinian propositions
in the truth-conditions of utterances anyway. Let us next look at why Evans’
problem is a problem for contemporary relativists too. Our focus will be on
Evans’ second argument.
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10.1.4 Evans’ Problem and Perspectiveless Lekta
Evans’ criticism applies to perspectiveless contents as well. Let me quote Köl-
bel’s (2004) statement of Evans’ problem as applied to them:
The diﬃculty Evans sees is this: we must, in making and in-
terpreting assertions, be able to make sense of the idea that the
assertion is correct, so that we can aim to assert correctly (as speak-
ers) or expect an assertion to be correct (as audience). However,
if it is relative to perspectives whether the content expressed by
an assertoric utterance is true, then there seems to be no sense in
which the utterance can be correct or incorrect. The only way it
could would be either in relation to some particular perspective or
in relation to some, most or all perspectives. But if we were aiming
for correctness in relation to some specific perspective p1, perhaps
because it is related in some way to the context of utterance, then
correctness would no longer be relative to perspectives because an ut-
terance would be absolutely correct just if it is correct in relation to
p1. [...] Thus, the idea of contents of assertion that have relative
correctness (or truth) conditions is incoherent. (Kölbel, 2004, 308;
emphasis added)
Kölbel’s argument against Evans is that he’s wrong in claiming that every ut-
terance needs to have absolute correctness as its aim. He asks “Why should it
not be coherent for me to aim at truth in relation to my perspective and for you
to aim at truth in relation to your perspective?” (Kölbel, 2004, 309). Kölbel
then explains how perspectiveless language works by providing the norms for
belief and assertion we’ve seen earlier.40
Now, there’s an issue regarding the focus of Evans’ argument and Kölbel’s
answer. Evans talks of correctness of utterances by which he means the truth
of sentences in context. Whereas the theories of reference in Evans’ time tradi-
tionally only talked of sentences, since ordinary language has context sensitivity
we need to bring in the notion of utterances. Therefore, what Evans asks of
temporal logic is how the notion of a sentence that’s true at a time and false at
others relates to the truth of an utterance of a tenseless sentence.
The answer Kölbel gives is about norms of belief and assertion. But those
are communicative norms that relate to pragmatic felicity and infelicity and
40I focus on Kölbel (2004) but he makes pretty much the same points regarding communic-
ative norms in his (2009).
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the success of communication in general. Felicity doesn’t correlate systematic-
ally with the truth of utterances. We can easily think of cases where someone
utters a true sentence but violates e.g. the Gricean maxim of relevance, result-
ing in a judgment which is true but infelicitous. But Evans’ challenge to the
perspectivalist is what are the truth-conditions of utterances of perspectiveless
lekta? Or, if one dislikes the word utterance, what are the truth-conditions of
a lekton-in-context? It’s not an answer to say “You can felicitously use them
only if the lekton is true at your perspective”. So if Kölbel only intended to talk
about communicative norms he hasn’t answered Evans’ challenge.
However, let us suppose instead that Kölbel intends to provide truth-conditions
of utterances with his norms. He states that the norm of assertion together
with the norm of belief requires that the content is true at the perspective of the
speaker. But note that that is an instance of a norm with absolute correctness as
its aim. Hence he ends up doing what Evans said the temporalist must do: bring
in the absolutely true Austinian propositions at the level of truth-conditions of
utterances.
What we have are thus two possible interpretations of Kölbel’s account of
norms that he provides as a response to Evans’ challenge. The first interpreta-
tion is that the norms express truth-conditions of utterances. In that case Köl-
bel ends up re-introducing absolutely true Austinian propositions at the level of
truth-conditions of utterances, as Evans said the temporalist must do. If that
interpretation is correct it also answers our question about whose perspective
is relevant for truth: Kölbel’s view is a form of “non-indexical contextualism”
where the relevant perspective that enters the Austinian proposition is always
the speaker’s.
The second interpretation is that Kölbel is merely providing communicative
norms and remains silent regarding truth-conditions of utterances. This inter-
pretation is more plausible given the norms he gives and his later denials that
the relevant perspective is that of the speaker. We will pursue this interpret-
ation further. I will argue that something similar to Evans’ problem can be
raised regarding the norms of assertion as well. Either the norms reintroduce
absolute correctness which shows that from the point of view of communication
the distinction between lekta and Austinian propositions make no diﬀerence; or
the norms themselves are intended to be perspective-dependent in which case
they cannot do the work that communicative norms are supposed to do.
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10.1.5 Normative Competence
First, let us consider the possibility that Kölbel didn’t intend to state a norm
for absolute correctness. After all, here’s what he says: “Evans’ mistake was to
assume that every utterance needs to have the same absolute correctness as its
aim.” (Kölbel, 2004, 308). Let me repeat Kölbel’s norms:
Relativist Truth Norm of Belief : It is a mistake to believe a
content that is not true from one’s own perspective.
Belief Norm of Assertion: Assert a content only if you believe
it.
Suppose that Kölbel intended his norm of assertion to only have perspectival
correctness as its aim. As was mentioned before on page 148, the combination
of the truth norm of belief with the belief norm of assertion amounts to the
same as the truth norm of assertion. We can express the unique resulting norm
as follows:
Perspectival Norm of Assertion: An assertion of a perspectiveless
content is correct at a perspective iﬀ it is true at that perspective.
The thing to note about the above norm is that it states what is correct at a
perspective. The problem with positing perspectival norms is that they can-
not play the role of governing communication which requires shared rules, rules
that apply across perspectives. If correctness varies from a perspective to an-
other, how can we aim to assert correctly or to interpret whether others asserted
correctly? In making an utterance we have to know whether we communicate
successfully. But if we can’t know when we are successful since success varies
from a perspective to another, the norm is clearly not helpful for communication.
So this interpretation cannot help the relativist. Let us therefore suppose as
seems more plausible that the norms express absolute correctness. Let me next
argue that given uncontroversial assumptions about our implicit knowledge of
communicative norms, Kölbel’s relativism is unable to explain why the existence
of perspectiveless contents would make any diﬀerence to communication.
Norms that govern communication are implicitly known to speakers. Lan-
guage users follow the norms and are able to evaluate whether the norms have
been followed by others, even if they could not make explicit their knowledge
of the norms. The norms make sure that information is shared eﬃciently, and
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as Grice (1989) has shown they also make possible implicatures via the flouting
of the norms. Hence, people are sensitive to the norms that govern conversa-
tions and they can track their violations eﬃciently. Let us formulate a principle
similar to Stojanovic’s Semantic Competence principle on page 140:
Normative Competence: Speakers are competent with the norms
that govern belief and communication; they have implicit knowledge
of the norms which allows them to intentionally flout the norms and
track whether others are following the norms.
Given normative competence, people know that normally when one makes a
judgment of taste she speaks the truth from her perspective. The normality
condition is meant to exclude obvious lies, cases where a speaker is mistaken
about their own taste etc. As mentioned, the combination of Kölbel’s norms
amount to the same as having a truth norm of assertion, i.e. that one must:
assert p only if p is true in one’s perspective (and this time we are considering
the absolute version of it). Let us look at a dialogue in order to see how the
norms work in practice. Suppose the following exchange is taking place:
(168) (a) Anouk: Moon boots look ridiculous.
(b) Bill: You’re wrong, they look cool.
Let us assume that both are saying what is true in their perspective: given
Anouk’s taste moon boots look ridiculous, given Bill’s taste they do not. Both
are acting according to the communicative norms, i.e. they believe what is true
for them and they assert what they believe. As we’ve emphasised, people usually
know their tastes, especially when it comes to matters that don’t require much
reflection like whether moon booths look ridiculous or not.
Given these assumptions Anouk has no reason to suspect that Bill is speak-
ing falsely from his perspective, and likewise for Bill regarding Anouk. As Köl-
bel himself said about faultlessness, both speakers follow the norms and hence
neither is mistaken. Now, an assertion is correct if and only if it conforms to
the norm of assertion. Thus, according to the relativist when hearers evaluate
the correctness of others’ assertions they must evaluate whether the assertion
was true at the speaker’s perspective (or, so as not to cut corners, whether the
speaker believes what is true for them and asserts what they believe).
So what goes on in the mind of Bill in the above dialogue? He knows that
Anouk is speaking the truth from her perspective so her assertion is correct
and felicitous. But since there’s no rule for whose perspective is relevant for
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the truth of the utterance, Bill supposedly evaluates the lekton Anouk uttered
relative to his own perspective. Since the lekton Moon boots look ridiculous is
false at Bill’s perspective, he contradicts Anouk. So far so good.
But that way of understanding what goes on in the dialogue is puzzling
for several reasons. First, how can Bill felicitously say that Anouk is wrong,
given that it’s common knowledge that the disagreement is faultless? Anouk is
faultless in two relevant respects: she believes what is true at her perspective and
she asserts what she believes. The likely answer that the relativist would give
is that from Bill’s perspective Anouk is wrong since she believes what is false
at Bill’s perspective. But that answer is really not satisfactory. The relativist
is committed to the principle of Semantic Competence so speakers know very
well that the truth of perspectival matters is relative. Furthermore, there is no
privileged perspective in a context so a hearer like Bill has no reason to evaluate
a lekton relative to his own perspective rather than that of the speaker. Since
Bill knows the lekton is true at Anouk’s perspective, why doesn’t he simply
acknowledge that?
Second, a charitable interpreter ought to interpret so as to maximise truth
and rationality. In a conversation with relatively true contents one can maximise
truth by de-relativising. We know how that can be done: by adding the phrase
to / for x to the lekton (see p. 150 above). So if Bill were charitable, we would
expect him to think “For Anouk moon boots look ridiculous. So she’s spoken
correctly and truthfully. For me moon boots look cool.” The relativist account
cannot explain why in a faultless disagreement one can accuse the other of being
wrong, and why speakers would be so uncharitable as to not acknowledge that
the other has spoken correctly by saying the truth from their perspective.
Finally, Kölbel has no explanation for impressions of disagreement given
Normative Competence. According to the relativist the standard disagreement
of taste is supposed to be a dialogue where two people both believe and utter
something true. We the theorists are supposed to know this too, not only the
speakers. So why do we get a sense of disagreement in the taste case? It can’t
be just that the lekta contradict, since as Evans emphasised, what matters for
using the language is the correctness of utterances.
According to the relativist we also know that those utterances are true from
the perspective of the speaker. Hence given that we are charitable, and prag-
matics ensures that we try to get what the speaker means, there really is no
explanation for why we would insist on irrationally evaluating utterances at our
perspectives and worst still, accusing people of being wrong while knowing full
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well that they’ve both spoken truly and followed the norms of communication.
10.2 Lasersohn’s Relativism
Lasersohn’s (2005) relativism is very similar to Kölbel’s. The diﬀerences are
rather formal and terminological than substantial, and he focuses more on the
formal implementation than the issues surrounding communication. In the fol-
lowing sections we try to understand what Lasersohn’s relativism implies regard-
ing communication since as has been emphasised, the mere story about relativist
contents does not suﬃce to understand how people use relativist language.
Formally Lasersohn defines truth as a relation between a content and a time,
world and a perspective (individual in his terminology regarding the formal sys-
tem, judge when discussing judgments of taste). In Kaplanian terms the circum-
stance of evaluation consists of parameters for a world, time and a perspective.
As in Kölbel’s relativism, we now face the question of what determines the per-
spective for a particular judgment of taste. Lasersohn is well aware that mere
relativised lekta make no diﬀerence for communication if the truth-conditions
of utterances remain as in a contextualist framework:
If we claim that it is always possible to determine on an object-
ive basis who the judge is, we eﬀectively introduce into our system
a level at which truth values are always assigned objectively. For
example, if we claim the judge is always the speaker, an utterance
would presumably count as true simpliciter iﬀ it expresses a content
which is true relative to the speaker – at the level of utterances, the
relativization would be removed and we would have to count speak-
ers as objectively truthful or untruthful in saying things like “Roller
coasters are fun” or “The chili is tasty.” (Lasersohn, 2005, 668-669)
For Lasersohn the essence of relativism is that it’s not only the lekta that don’t
get an absolute truth-value, utterances don’t get them either. Lasersohn treats
contexts not as concrete utterance situations but as formal objects that fix
the values of the parameters of evaluation. To avoid objective assignment of
truth-values he suggests the following: “any concrete situation of utterance will
determine as many diﬀerent contexts in our technical sense as there are individu-
als – one for each potential judge.” (Lasersohn, 2005, 669). In short, the truth
of a judgment of taste depends on a perspective, but for particular utterances
nothing determines the perspective:
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In order to maintain an authentically subjective assignment of
truth values to sentences containing predicates of personal taste, we
must allow that the objective facts of the situation of utterance do
not uniquely determine a judge. (Lasersohn, 2005, 668-669)
Lasersohn thus explicitly endorses the idea that Evans found incoherent, namely
that an utterance is not evaluable as true or false tout court. Hence, a particular
judgment of taste cannot get a fixed truth-value. Now, this raises the very
problem Evans was emphasising, namely that language users must know the
absolute truth-conditions of utterances in order to use them and to understand
others. The point of an utterance is to rule out certain situations; if an utterance
doesn’t get a fixed truth-value at all, not even at the moment of utterance (as
a temporalist who ties correctness to truth would have it), then it’s really hard
to see what is the point of an utterance, or what a speaker intends in making
it.
However, in addition to the formal semantics which leaves the truth-values
of utterances open Lasersohn states the following:
All this having been said, I think we must recognize that when
we do assess an utterance for truth or falsity, we all normally tend
to use ourselves as the judge; or, as I shall put it, we adopt an
autocentric perspective. [...] This is true regardless of whether we
are the speaker, addressee, or a third party: we typically evaluate
our own assertions, and those of others, from our own perspective.
(Lasersohn, 2005, 670; emphasis added)
Now, I’m not sure how we should understand the talk of evaluating assertions
from our own perspective. We should be careful to distinguish between what
determines truth and how we evaluate truth. What determines the truth of a
use of a sentence is a question for semantics. In contrast, how the truth of
that sentence is evaluated by a speaker / hearer is not necessarily a semantic
question if in the theory these two don’t match. Many semantic theories would
hold that those two go essentially together, but they need not.
So the core question is, if one evaluates an utterance from one’s own per-
spective, is that a correct assessment? Or are we somewhat ignorant of the lack
of objectivity involved in matters of taste and hence mistakenly take our own
perspective? The same worries that Evans raised arise equally here as when dis-
cussing Kölbel’s view, especially regarding the truth-conditions of utterances.
158
Evans’ point was that a speaker must be able to aim at uttering the truth. But
if the truth-conditions of the utterance are not fixed then the theory in question
cannot work as a theory that explains how speakers use the language.
In the next section I summarise Bach’s radical invariantism which clearly
separates the determination of truth of semantic contents from the evaluation
of their truths by language users. His account distinguishes between the invari-
ant but non-truth-evaluable contents determined by semantics, and pragmatics
which is about how people interpret and evaluate those contents. One way
to interpret Lasersohn is that his view is similar to Bach’s in the role that is
assigned to pragmatics.
10.3 Lasersohn vs. Bach’s Radical Invariantism
Kent Bach’s (2011) radical invariantism - although explicitly anti-relativist -
seems to share the core features of Lasersohn’s view albeit with major ter-
minological diﬀerences.41 Bach shares the commitment of all the perspective-
dependent theories that the only truths there are about taste are perspective-
dependent truths. Like the relativists (and against contextualists) Bach holds
that the semantic content of a judgment of taste does not refer to a perspective.
The key idea of Bach’s view is that an utterance of a judgment of taste
does not express a truth-evaluable content but merely a “propositional radical”
which is not truth-evaluable because it doesn’t refer to a perspective. So when
people make judgments of taste nothing in the semantics fixes or requires a
perspective, and thereby the content expressed is not truth-evaluable. How-
ever, due to pragmatics communication with propositional radicals succeeds.
Speaker-hearers understand what others intend to express by their judgments,
and they thereby complete the propositional radicals by adding a perspective.
Since there are many possibilities in whose perspective is relevant, sometimes
there are disagreements which are actually misunderstandings regarding the
relevant perspective.
In comparing Lasersohn’s view to Bach’s, let us begin with the termin-
ological diﬀerences. Lasersohn calls the perspectiveless contents propositions
whereas Bach terms them propositional radicals; but both agree that such con-
tents (lekta) are not truth-evaluable. Now, Lasersohn holds that semantics
does not determine a perspective but people evaluate judgments of taste from a
41Bach’s article discusses the semantics of epistemic modals, but he states that he holds the
same view for predicates of taste ((Bach, 2011, 56, footnote 42). In Bach (2009) he presents
an overview of radical invariantism about predicates of taste.
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perspective. A natural way to interpret what Lasersohn means is to give prag-
matics the role of bridging the gap between a non-truth-evaluable lekton and a
truth-evaluable Austinian proposition.
Interestingly, when discussing propositional attitude verbs Lasersohn adds
that when we believe a perspectiveless lekton we typically believe it to be true
from our point of view. Therefore, normally John believes that the Giant Dipper
is fun if and only if he also believes that the Giant Dipper is fun for himself.
But we are not unable to take the perspective of others, so we may also believe
that judgments of taste are true or false relative to someone else. We do this
by believing contents like For Mary the Giant Dipper is fun which are not
perspective-dependent but true or false absolutely. In other words, semantics
does assign a fixed truth-value to judgments of the form For / to x [a judgment
of taste], i.e. where for / to x makes the truth of the embedded clause to depend
on the perspective of x.
Hence Lasersohn has given the tools to complete the picture of how language
users move from the incomplete lekta that are expressed to the truth-evaluable
Austinian propositions. Let me sketch one way to understand what Lasersohn
means when he says that we evaluate judgments of taste from a perspective.
Language users understand that a judgment of taste cannot get a truth-value
unless a perspective is determined. As Lasersohn says: “if we adopt an acentric
perspective, we do not regard sentences like Roller coasters are fun or The chili is
tasty as having definite truth values.” (Lasersohn, 2005, 670). Consequently in
evaluating a judgment of taste we take on a particular point of view, eﬀectively
mentally adding to the content to / for x which fixes the perspective. Hence
what we evaluate is not the judgment of taste but a diﬀerent content: the
judgment of taste plus to / for x, with x determining the relevant perspective.
The resulting completed content is a truth-evaluable Austinian proposition.
Here is an illustration of how that would work in practice. Suppose Mary
says to John Roller coasters are fun. Mary is making the utterance from her
perspective so her mental content is Roller coasters are fun for Mary – which
is truth-evaluable. However, the utterance doesn’t get a truth-value. But being
a competent speaker John knows that, and he therefore adds a perspective to
the content. As we saw, Lasersohn holds that most of the time people evaluate
utterances from their own perspective. So we may suppose that John evaluates
the incomplete content relative to himself, i.e. his thought content is Roller
coasters are fun for John. Depending on his views on roller coasters he may
then answer to Mary for example “Indeed” or “No, they’re horrible”, and if he
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answers in the latter way, a “substanceless disagreement” is taking place.
This is one possible way to fill in the details of Lasersohn’s account and make
sense of what he means by “subjective assignment of truth-values”. It is very
close to Bach’s account despite of the diﬀerences in terminology and the formal
framework they would use. Let us next look at the problems that both views
face.
10.4 Problems for Bach and Lasersohn
The first and major problem of the view under discussion is that judgments of
taste do not semantically express truth-evaluable contents. The standard view
of semantics is that it provides truth-conditions for utterances (or sentences
in contexts if one doesn’t want to talk of utterances), which the view under
discussion does not do. It is outside of our scope to discuss the broader questions
such as the role of semantics. One may reject the Bach-Lasersohn approach
merely because of its unorthodox approach to the aim of semantics. However,
even if one has no scruples with that there are other problems.
10.4.1 The Frege-Geach Problem
Lasersohn (2005) in his overview of possible semantics for predicates of taste
considers expressivism and rejects it on the usual basis that the view faces the
so-called Frege-Geach problem. Let me quote him:
Additionally, sentences like This is fun or This is tasty can ap-
pear embedded under truth-functional connectives and other logical
operators, and participate in the usual logical consequence relations
which such embeddings give rise to. One would like to preserve the
idea that (33) is an ordinary example of Modus Ponens, for example:
(33) If there is a loop, the roller coaster is fun.
There is a loop.
Therefore, the roller coaster is fun.
But it is quite hard to see how to maintain this idea if sentences like
The roller coaster is fun do not have truth values. (Lasersohn, 2005,
657).
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Lasersohn further adds that if such sentences are neither true or false the view
cannot capture the main intuition, namely that in a disagreement of taste the
speakers are contradicting each others. But we have seen that in fact his branch
of relativism faces the very same problems. The sentences of (33) above are
neither true nor false according to Lasersohn’s semantics. Same holds of Bach’s
radical invariantism. Now, this problem is obviously related to the more general
worry that judgments of taste do not express truth-evaluable contents. But I
wanted to emphasise this particular consequence since both Lasersohn and Bach
(2009) consider the Frege-Geach problem a serious issue for expressivism but
not for their own views.
10.4.2 Pragmatic Incompetence
The next worry takes us back to the impressions of disagreement. We have seen
that speakers are supposed to know that judgments of taste cannot be truth-
evaluable unless a perspective is provided. Hence they evaluate judgments of
taste from a perspective, either their own or somebody else’s. Disagreements of
taste are supposed to be a consequence of both the speaker and the hearer con-
sidering the incomplete content from their own perspective, in eﬀect thinking
the complete proposition [[judgment of taste] for me]. But since the perspect-
ive is not made explicit, they may take themselves to be talking of the same
perspective even when they are not.
What is puzzling is the constant mistakes people make when evaluating each
others’ judgments from their own perspective, rather than from the perspective
of the speaker. After all, since they make judgments of taste from their own
perspective they should expect others to do so too and hence evaluate others’
judgments from their perspective. In other words, Bach’s and Lasersohn’s views
face the same problems regarding normative competence as Kölbel’s account,
discussed in section on page 154.
There is also a more specific worry which is a consequence of the view that
pragmatics completes the lekton expressed by a judgment of taste. There are
many expressions which require pragmatics for the completion of an expression,
for example perspectival expressions of location or direction. To understand
where is an object that is to the left / right / above / below etc. one must
choose between several possible interpretations, e.g. to the left of the speaker,
the hearer, some other salient person etc. Indeed, Bach (2009) lists such terms
together with taste predicates as “relative terms” which suggests that he might
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apply radical invariantism to them as well.
The problem that such an account faces is the disanalogous behaviour of
hearers regarding predicates of taste and directional expressions. Let me illus-
trate the point. Suppose Aurora tells Björn that the book he is looking for is
there to the left. Björn needs to figure out whether she meant to the left of
herself, of him, or possibly of some other salient object. How does he do it? He
tries to find out what the speaker (Aurora) intended. Communication is about
getting a message across, so the hearer’s task is to find out which message the
speaker tried to communicate. In a case where there are several possible in-
terpretations due to e.g. context sensitivity or a use of an incomplete sentence
(“Water!”), the hearer needs to find out which complete content the speaker has
in mind.
As was mentioned earlier, what shows that hearers take the speakers to “call
the shots” regarding the interpretation of what they said is that when the hearer
realises that they misunderstood what the speaker meant they typically say for
example “Sorry, I thought you meant...” (unless they couldn’t have understood
what was said given the contextual clues). Since Bach suggests that pragmatics
provides the perspective, when someone hears a judgment of taste they ought
to behave as described above. They should consider what the speaker intended,
and if they realise that their interpretation was not the right one they should
acknowledge it. But that’s not what happens in actual disputes about taste.
Bach’s pragmatic story is implausible since hearers don’t behave as the stand-
ard pragmatics would have them behave. Whether the above criticism applies
to Lasersohn’s account depends on whether our understanding of subjective
assignment of truth-values as pragmatic re-interpretation of contents is correct.
Let me sum up the problems. Despite of the interpretative possibilities
available with judgments of taste, (a) hearers typically do not interpret the
judgment as the speaker intended since according to Bach and Lasersohn the
speaker in most cases intends their own perspective. But, regarding the uses
of predicates of taste, it should be common knowledge that judgments of taste
are made from the speaker’s perspective. If it were common knowledge, hearers
would standardly evaluate the truth of utterances by taking the perspective of
the speaker. But they don’t; instead they evaluate the content from their own
perspective.
Moreover, (b) in a disagreement of taste there is no moment when the hearer
realises that they have misunderstood which perspective the speaker had in
mind. That is shown by the absence of comments like “I’m sorry, I thought you
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were talking about our / my / our community’s taste”, or questions like “Who’s
taste are you talking about?” or “What do you mean?”. (a) and (b) are strong
data against the idea that the incompleteness of judgments of taste is a common
fact known to speakers, and consequently that filling in the perspective is a task
for pragmatics.
A final point against the pragmatic explanation is the following. Suppose
the view is correct and the apparent disagreements of taste are explained by the
confusions in interpreting which perspective is meant. Thus when someone is
about to make a judgment of taste, he knows that if he leaves out the perspective
he will not only say something non-truth-evaluable, but he will most likely also
be misunderstood.
So why does he not make the perspective explicit? Disagreements of taste
take place all the time; if they are known to be mere confusions, why haven’t
people learnt to say whose perspective they are talking about, interpret as ought
to by taking the speaker’s perspective, or at least ask which perspective was
meant? Rather than taking people to be such hopelessly bad language users we
should consider Bach’s and Lasersohn’s accounts to be implausible.
10.5 MacFarlane’s Radical Relativism
10.5.1 Assessment Sensitivity
MacFarlane’s “radical relativism” holds that the truth of assessment-sensitive
utterances depends on particular features of a context of assessment. A context
of assessment is –as the name suggests– a context where someone assesses an
utterance for truth. MacFarlane argues that predicates of taste are assessment-
sensitive, and hence the truth of a judgment of taste depends on the perspective
of a person who assesses the judgment of taste. A speaker is always also an
assessor, so when I say “Fish and chips are not delicious” that’s true as assessed
from my perspective. But when someone else assesses that utterance, it is true
if fish and chips are delicious to them. Assessment-sensitive utterances may
thus vary in truth-value according to the perspective of whoever assesses an
utterance.
Below is an example of how MacFarlane defines truth in terms of both a
context of utterance and a context of assessment with respect to aesthetic judg-
ments:
Aesthetic Relativism: S is true at a context of use CU and context
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of assessment CA iﬀ there is a proposition p such that
(a) S expresses p at CU , and
(b) p is true at the world of CU and the aesthetic standards of the
assessor at CA. (MacFarlane, 2005b, 309)
By replacing “aesthetic standards” with our generic notion of a perspective we
see how the view goes with respect to judgments of personal taste. If we think
of MacFarlane’s view in terms of the terminology of lekta and Austinian pro-
positions, an assessment-sensitive utterance expresses a lekton but does not
determine an Austinian proposition. In other words, an assessment-sensitive
judgment does not get a privileged perspective relative to which it should be
evaluated, and hence it is never absolutely true or false.
MacFarlane’s motivations for radical relativism are broader than Kölbel’s
and Lasersohn’s since he defends the account for a variety of expressions in-
cluding predicates of taste, knowledge attributions, epistemic modals, judg-
ments about the future and moral ought MacFarlane (2003, 2005a); Kolodny
and MacFarlane (2010); MacFarlane (2011, 2014). However, the motivation
for why judgments of taste should be treated as assessment-sensitive is famil-
iar: it’s supposed to allow for an explanation of the perspective-dependence
of the judgments while still making sense of disagreements of taste. Addition-
ally MacFarlane has emphasised the advantage of assessment sensitivity over
non-indexical contextualism in being able to explain why people retract their
judgments (MacFarlane, 2009). Let us begin by looking at his explanation for
the impressions of disagreement we have in a disagreement of taste.
10.5.2 Disagreement and Assessment Sensitivity
As we saw in section 9.3: Are “Faultless Disagreements” Disagreements? Mac-
Farlane doesn’t think that it suﬃces as an explanation of disagreement that
there is a lekton that one person accepts and another rejects; given that in a
moderate relativist framework the truth of the lekta depend on perspectives,
there is disagreement only when the contradicting lekta are intended to be eval-
uated relative to the same perspective. However, our earlier discussion revealed
that even if Kölbel originally had in mind something like non-indexical contex-
tualism, in his later writings he is clearly leaning towards a view where there
is no privileged perspective relative to which an utterance must be evaluated.
And Lasersohn’s account is quite explicit in rejecting the idea of a privileged
perspective too. So after all, neither of them has clearly defended the view that
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mere contradictory lekta cause disagreement.
So what does MacFarlane’s account add to the explanation of disagreement
besides being able to say that the speakers accept contradictory lekta? His the-
ory of assessment-sensitive communication, including disagreements and retrac-
tions, relies heavily on communicative norms (MacFarlane 2005b; 2007; 2014).
MacFarlane argues that we shouldn’t focus on norms of assertion but rather on
what one is committed to doing as a consequence of having made an assertion.
He suggests that the following norms characterise assessment-sensitive commu-
nication (and communication in general; when the assertion in question is not
assessment-sensitive the context of assessment plays no role):
(W*) In asserting that p at C1, one commits oneself to with-
drawing the assertion (in any future context C2) if p is shown to be
untrue relative to context of use C1 and context of assessment C2.
(J*) In asserting that p at C1, one commits oneself to justifying
the assertion when the assertion is appropriately challenged. To
justify the assertion in a context C2 is to provide grounds for the
truth of p relative to context of use C1 and context of assessment
C2.
(R*) In asserting that p at C1, one commits oneself to accepting
responsibility (at any future context C2) if on the basis of this as-
sertion someone else takes p to be true (relative to context of use C1
and context of assessment C2) and it proves to be untrue (relative
to C1 and C2). (MacFarlane, 2005b, 320-1)
Let us think of a concrete case to see what these norms mean in practice.
Suppose Anna, who is at context of utterance CU 1 and context of assessment
CA1 , makes the following assertion:
(169) Anna: Anchovies are disgusting.
Bengt (whose context of assessment is CA2) likes anchovies so he says:
(170) Bengt: No, they’re not, they’re delicious! Every pizzeria has a pizza with
anchovies. Do you think they’d sell them if anchovies were disgusting?
Let’s suppose that Bengt’s argument counts as an appropriate challenge. Given
(J*), Anna must now provide grounds for the truth of her utterance relative to
Bengt’s context of assessment CA2. Therefore she goes on to justify herself:
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(171) Anna: They only serve them because they’re traditional and it costs
nothing to keep anchovies in store in case some lunatic wants them. I
read that from Slate.42
However, that’s not a good argument for Bengt who does like anchovies; after
all, (J*) states that Anna must show her utterance to be true relative to Bengt’s
context of assessment. So Bengt goes on:
(172) Bengt: Well, I happen to be one of those “lunatics” and I tell you
anchovies are delicious. You just have to get used to them.
Anna sees that her justification didn’t work since her utterance is still false as
assessed by Bengt. Given (W*) she must withdraw her assertion:
(173) Anna: Ok then, so anchovies are not disgusting. But I don’t like them.
To illustrate (R*), we can imagine another scenario in which Anna has never
tasted anchovies and Bengt tells her they are delicious. She then tries them and
thinks they’re disgusting. She goes back to Bengt and accuses him of having
spoken falsely. Given assessment sensitivity she is right: Bengt’s assertion is
false relative to her context of assessment. (R*) states that one must take
responsibility if one’s assertion turns out false at some context of assessment.
So Bengt must now do that, for example by saying something like the following:
(174) Bengt: Well, anchovies are delicious to me. I’m sorry you don’t like
them.
These examples show that the norms that MacFarlane suggests seem to be the
kind of norms that people do indeed follow when they make assertions. Here’s
MacFarlane’s description of what goes on in disagreements of taste:
This account captures the distinctive phenomenology of disagree-
ment about matters whose truth is relative. The challenger thinks
(rightly) that he has absolutely compelling grounds for thinking that
the assertion was not accurate. But the original asserter thinks (also
rightly, from her point of view) that the challenger’s grounds do
nothing to call in question the accuracy of the assertion. The as-
serter’s vindication will seem to the challenger not to show that the
42Indeed, Slate has an article on the topic where the journalist writes: “Why does virtu-
ally every pizzeria oﬀer anchovies, even though no one ever orders them? They’re traditional.”
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/explainer/2012/03/why_do_pizzerias_oﬀer_anchovies_.html
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assertion was accurate, and the challenger will continue to press his
claim. (Until the game gets boring.) Thus we have all the normative
trappings of real disagreement, but without the possibility of resolu-
tion except by a relevant change in one or both parties’ contexts of
assessment. (MacFarlane, 2007, 29; emphasis added)
However, it’s important to note that the norms MacFarlane gives are not at all
specific to assessment-sensitive assertions. As mentioned, if an assertion is not
assessment-sensitive, then the mentioning of the context of assessment in the
norms makes no diﬀerence since an assessment-insensitive utterance is either
true or false at all contexts of assessment.
In other words, the fact that the norms match the kind of conversations that
people may have about matters of taste can be due to either:
(1) the assessment sensitivity of judgments of taste, or
(2) that people take judgments of taste to be perspective-independent (at
least sometimes).
At this point it’s worth emphasising the one general feature that relativist ac-
counts share with perspective-independent views. Both hold that the explicit
content of what is said does not refer to a perspective. Additionally relativism
holds that perspectives play a role in determining the truth but as we’ve seen in
connection to Kölbel’s and Lasersohn’s account, it’s unclear why it would make
any diﬀerence that the perspective is a parameter of evaluation rather than part
of the content.
We’ve mentioned that the main argument against perspective-independent
views is that taste objectivism is false. So if one expects the semantics to match
metaphysics, the truth of judgments of taste has to depend on perspectives.
However, (2) does not presuppose the truth of objectivist metaphysics: it only
holds that people take judgments of taste to be perspective-independent. So it
is important to notice that the data that relativism claims to get right and that
contextualism gets wrong is due to relativism mirroring perspective-independent
views in many of its predictions in virtue of its thin notion of content. In
part IV: Alternatives to Contextualism and Relativism we return to perspective-
independent views and their predictions. But before that, let’s see what else
MacFarlane says about communication with assessment-sensitive contents.
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10.5.3 What’s the Point of Assessment Sensitive Assertions?
Returning to our dialogues above we might wonder what’s the point of the
conversations. The norms make good sense when what is under discussion is
something whose truth is not relative. For example, suppose a friend tells me
that the swimming pool is open and I bike there in the rain just to find it
closed. In such a case it would be nice if she could justify her assertion or
to “take responsibility” by e.g. next time checking the opening hours before
speaking in case she didn’t have a good justification for her false utterance.
And normally a speaker who realises their mistake will automatically retract
their judgment or at least the corresponding belief once she learns that it was
false.
As is well known ordinary assertions aim at truth, and the three norms follow
naturally from that. We retract false utterances since we don’t want anyone to
keep believing them; we justify ourselves in case we spoke falsely to show that
we are not irresponsible liars or bad thinkers; and we hold ourselves responsible
if we’ve spoken falsely and someone acts on the falsehood since we’ve made a
mistake in providing misinformation. But none of that is true of assessment-
sensitive utterances. If a judgment of taste is true as assessed by me, then why
on earth would I retract it if it’s false as assessed by you? My truth shouldn’t
be any worse than your truth after all –on the contrary, many have argued that
if relativism is true then we naturally privilege our truths (we’ll discuss this
below in section 11.3).
Moreover, if judgments of taste are relatively true then why would I need
to justify myself to anyone? I believe and speak the truth (to me), and telling
you my justification for those truths, e.g. that anchovies taste good to me or
that I enjoy swimming, won’t make any diﬀerence to whether my judgments of
taste are true to you. And finally, if I speak the truth (to me), it’s pretty crazy
to hold me responsible if my truth isn’t your truth. That’s your problem, not
mine.
Let me quote in length the following passage which –as far as I can tell– is
MacFarlane’s only genuine answer to why relativism would make sense:
Assessment-sensitive expressions are designed, it seems, to foster
controversy, where use-sensitive expressions preclude it. But what
is the point of fostering controversy in “subjective” domains, if there
is no (nonrelative) truth on which both parties can converge? Why
shouldn’t we just talk about our own tastes, rather than ascribing
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subjective properties to the objects? Perhaps the point is to bring
about agreement by leading our interlocutors into relevantly diﬀerent
contexts of assessment. If you say “skiing is fun” and I contradict
you, it is not because I think that the proposition you asserted is
false as assessed by you in your current situation, with the aﬀective
attitudes you now have, but because I hope to change these attitudes.
Perhaps, then, the point of using controversy-inducing assessment-
sensitive vocabulary is to foster coordination of contexts. We have
an interest in sharing standards of taste, senses of humour, and
epistemic states with those around us. [...]
Controversy encourages coordination because, in general, con-
troversy is uncomfortable. But why should controversy feel uncom-
fortable even when the disagreement is entirely due to diﬀerences
in the interlocutors’ respective contexts of assessment? One pos-
sible answer is: it just is. That’s a brute psychological fact about
us. Perhaps, as Allan Gibbard suggests (Gibbard, 1990, p. 217),
there is an evolutionary explanation. Assessment-sensitive expres-
sions exploit this psychological fact about us—our tendency to treat
dispute as a crisis to be resolved—to foster subjective coordination
by provoking controversy.
From lofty philosophical heights, the language games we play
with words like ‘funny’ and ‘likely’ may seem irrational. But that
is no reason to deny that we do play these games, or that they
have a social purpose. If describing our use of these expressions
requires relativizing the accuracy of speech acts and mental states to
contexts of assessment, then this much Relativism is required by our
dispensation to describe the world as it is, not as we think it ought
to be. (MacFarlane, 2007, 30; emphasis added)
The above passage contains several important ideas as to how we should under-
stand the relativist project, at least the one undertaken by MacFarlane. First,
relativism is a descriptive project which aims to correctly describe how we use
judgments of taste, without having a psychological account to oﬀer. Second, the
aim of disagreements of taste is not to point out falsehoods but to change the
attitudes that others have. And third, the kind of conversations that we have
about taste are not that rational from the information-sharing point of view;
rather, they have a social purpose since we want others to share our tastes.
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When we discussed Kölbel’s and Lasersohn’s views we criticised both ac-
counts of failing to explain why hearers who know very well that relativism is
true about taste insist on disagreeing with others just because they say some-
thing false to them, the hearer. A charitable hearer should normally try to
understand what the speaker intends to say, and since they speak the truth
from their point of view (and the hearers know it) there is nothing to disagree
about. Putting together what MacFarlane says in the above quote suggests how
he would respond to the same criticism.
Along with the other relativists he holds that people do know that others
speak truly from their perspectives, but he thinks that the truth is not at issue
in a disagreement of taste. Rather, we simply want to change the attitudes of
others. And even though it may appear somewhat irrational to argue against
someone who speaks truly, it’s eﬀective in making them change their minds
since no one likes controversy. As MacFarlane’s reference to Gibbard suggests,
his explanation of the aim of disagreements of taste is really Gibbard’s view
whose work echoes earlier non-cognitivists Ayer and Stevenson. We delve deeper
into the idea of disagreements of taste as coordination in Ch. 12: Normative
Disagreement. But before that, let me argue in the next chapter that that is
indeed the only way the relativists could explain disagreements.
10.6 Summary of Chapter 10
In this chapter we have looked at the relativist accounts by Kölbel, Lasersohn
and MacFarlane, all of who take predicates of taste to be a major case in favour
of semantic relativism. The core problem I pressed for each of the views is
the lack of explanation for why people would have disagreements of taste while
knowing perfectly well that truth is relative, that others are speaking the truth,
and that there is no privileged perspective. In short, there is a long way to go
from the story of relative contents to providing a plausible account of how to
communicate with such contents.
We began by looking at Kölbel’s account, focusing on whether in his view
utterances of relatively true contents get a fixed truth value, and if they do,
whose perspective determines the truth value. He doesn’t give an answer to
those questions which makes it rather unclear what the predictions of his view
are. I then presented Evans’ challenge and how it applies to perspectiveless
contents. We looked at Kölbel’s answer to Evans that is based on his account of
the norms of belief and assertion for relative contents. Evans’ challenge concerns
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the truth-conditions of utterances, whereas Kölbel’s answer to it only talks of
communicative norms and hence it doesn’t answer the challenge. I then showed
that a problem very similar to Evans’ problem can be raised also regarding relat-
ivist communicative norms. If the norms themselves are perspective-dependent,
they cannot govern communication.
The norms thus must be perspective-independent. But since everyone has
implicit knowledge of the communicative norms, a hearer knows that a speaker
who makes a judgment of taste that is true from the speaker’s perspective is
following the norms. Moreover, they know that relativism is true about taste,
and that there is no privileged perspective. Hence, why would they disagree
when they know that the speaker is speaking the truth?
Lasersohn’s relativism faced the very same problem of not being able to
provide an account of why people would speak the way they do despite of their
knowledge of the truth of relativism. Lasersohn’s account, though semantically
detailed, has no explanation for how people use judgments of taste which do not
get a truth-value. I compared his view to Bach’s radical invariantism due to the
similarities of the accounts. Bach also holds that judgments of taste semantic-
ally don’t express truth-evaluable propositions but mere propositional radicals.
However, pragmatics bridges the gap so that in communicating people are able
to enrich the radical by adding a perspective which results in truth-evaluable
proposition. Some things that Lasersohn say point to the same direction, so
he might also accept a similar pragmatic story to say how people communicate
with the relative contents.
I then presented problems for Bach’s and Lasersohn’s views. Given the lack
of truth-values of judgments of taste, their views face the Frege-Geach prob-
lem with Lasersohn himself considers a suﬃcient reason to reject expressivism.
Moreover, the way that people use judgments of taste simply doesn’t match
with the pragmatic account. There are many other expressions where people
need pragmatics to complete the content, but in no case are they as confused
as they are with judgments of taste which they fail to evaluate relative to the
salient judge etc.
Finally we looked at MacFarlane’s radical relativism. MacFarlane tries to
provide an account of how to use relativist language in communication by giving
norms for what to do if one’s judgment is say, shown to be false in another
context of assessment. Now, the norms match the way people actually use
language, but I argued that that is just because the norms are made for non-
assessment-sensitive assertions. By far we have seen that both contextualist
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and relativist accounts are far from being able to explain our uses of judgments
of taste. Hence, if one gives norms for perspective-independent assertions it is
no wonder that judgments of taste are used following such norms since it looks
likely that people treat them as perspective-independent.
In the last section I pointed out that the norms that MacFarlane gives make
no sense for assessment-sensitive assertions. If truth depends on perspectives
and we know that we would be crazy to retract judgments that are true for
ourselves but false for others. There is no privileged perspective so why would I
give up mine in favour of someone else’s? The same holds for the other norms.
Justification diﬀers from a perspective to a perspective: e.g. if I like anchovies,
that justifies my utterance “Anchovies are tasty”. But that justification is en-
tirely irrelevant to whether “Anchovies are tasty” is true as assessed by you.
I thus conclude that semantic relativists are far from having oﬀered a suc-
cessful explanation of why relativist semantics for predicates of taste would lead
to people speaking about taste the way they do. In the next chapter I make
the case against relativism stronger by arguing that at the level of thought the
framework makes no diﬀerence since given the other commitments by relativists
people must think in terms of Austinian propositions. Therefore the distinc-
tion between lekta and Austinian propositions makes no diﬀerence to linguistic
predictions in the relativist frameworks under discussion.
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11 Relativism and Contents of Thoughts
The previous chapter discussed the relativist accounts of predicates of taste and
argued that none of them can ultimately explain how the relativist framework
is supposed to help in making sense of disagreements of taste. In this chapter
I discuss relativism more generally and focus on what the consequences of the
view are regarding contents of thought.
I first consider MacFarlane’s (2009) claim that Perry’s (1986) distinction
between concerning and being about can be used by the relativists to provide an
account of relativised and non-relativised thoughts, which is supposed to help
to predict the linguistic data. I show that the distinction as defined by Perry
cannot be adopted by relativists given their other commitments. I then show
that Perry’s (1979) earlier criticism of relativism as a solution to the problem of
the essential indexical applies equally to contemporary forms of relativism. The
upshot of the criticism is that at the level of thought people think in terms of
complete, truth-evaluable propositions. The explanation for the linguistic data
thus has to come from somewhere else.
The following section considers the idea that people are naturally egocentric
and therefore from relativism it follows that people take their own perspective
when they evaluate the truth of relative judgments. We discuss the question of
how one should act if one knows relativism to be true. I argue that the relat-
ivist would have to posit psychologically implausible egoism to explain people’s
privileging their own perspective, whereas a rational relativist evaluates the
judgments of others from their perspective. The last section revisits some criti-
cism the relativists have made against contextualists and shows that they apply
equally to relativists themselves.
11.1 Concerning vs. Being About
We’ve seen that MacFarlane (2007) was among the critics of the claim that
“faultless disagreements” are disagreements. His point was that if the truth of
contents depend on a parameter, then there is “genuine” disagreement only if
the contents concern the same circumstance of evaluation. Now, the concerning
vs. being about terminology comes from Perry (1986), and MacFarlane (2007;
2009) finds it useful for the purposes of the relativist. Here’s how he describes
the diﬀerence between the notions with respect to the question of whether a
possible world belongs to the contents of thoughts:
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One might respond to these considerations by bringing the world
of the context of use into the content of Sam’s thought. Intuitively,
though, Sam could have had a thought with the very same content
even if the world had been very diﬀerent. Our ordinary ways of
individuating thought contents do not support making the world of
the context of use part of the content, except in exceptional circum-
stances. Moreover, bringing the world of the context into the content
of Sam’s thought would make this content a necessary truth about
this possible world, rather than a contingent truth about the weather
in Paris. We should not say, then, that Sam’s thought is about the
world of use. It is not about any particular world. Acknowledging
the fact that it depends for its truth on the world of use, we may
adopt John Perry’s terminology and say that it concerns the world
of use (Perry (1986)). (MacFarlane, 2009, 243)
Perry (1986) introduces the being about vs. concerning distinction as a possible
account of cases of “thoughts without representation”. These are cases where the
agent does not represent some element which nevertheless has to be a part of the
truth-conditions of the agent’s thoughts or utterances for them to get a truth-
value. Such cases might motivate a form of relativism where the distinction
between representation and non-representation at the level of thoughts matches
with the content vs. parameters of evaluation distinction.
Let me describe the main case that Perry gives to illustrate thought without
representation. Z-landers are a tribe who don’t represent locations in their
thoughts. They’ve always lived in Z-land which is very small, they never travel
and they don’t know that there are other locations. When it rains they say It’s
raining, but they take rain to be a property, not a relation between events of
rain and a location. What Perry asks is how should we account for the role of
location in the thought and language of Z-landers? One answer he considers is
the following kind of relativism: the thought and utterance contents of Z-landers
don’t refer to locations, but their truth depends on a location parameter. Hence,
the concerning vs. being about distinction is meant to distinguish between
thoughts without and with representation of a certain element, in this case a
location.
However, the contemporary relativists are not defending such a view. The
relativists that we have discussed explicitly state that the speakers know the
relativity of truth and they are able to evaluate truth relative to diﬀerent values
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of the parameters of evaluation. Hence, they do represent the parameters of
evaluation, and therefore according to Perry’s terminology, their thoughts are
about those parameters too. In other words, the distinction cannot be used to
illuminate the contemporary relativist’s views on thoughts.
If one divorces the concerning vs. aboutness distinction from the non-
representation vs. representation distinction, it can only refer to the formal
diﬀerence of locating an element of truth-conditions to the content vs. to the
parameters of the circumstance of evaluation. But we have been given no argu-
ment whatsoever to show that the choice between the relativist framework and
the traditional framework of propositions whose truth depends only on worlds is
anything besides a decision about what is the most convenient way to do formal
semantics. We are still in the dark as to the relevance of the relativist semantics
with respect to language use.
11.2 Perry on Relativism and Contents of Thoughts
In an earlier paper Perry (1979) considers relativism as a solution to the “prob-
lem of the essential indexical”. Given the diﬀerent motivation, the relativism
Perry considers doesn’t posit the concerning / aboutness distinction. Thus the
view is closer to the contemporary forms of relativism.
The problem of the essential indexical is how to account for the diﬀering
cognitive significance of beliefs or utterances which nevertheless are supposed
to express the same proposition. Perry’s classic example is about himself in a
supermarket, following a trail of sugar leaking from the torn bag of a shopper
that Perry is trying to find, until he realises that he himself is the messy shopper.
The contrast is between beliefs like “The shopper with a torn sack is making
a mess” and “I am making a mess”. According to the standard view these
sentences in Perry’s context express the same proposition. But their cognitive
significance diﬀers, as illustrated by Perry’s diﬀerent actions that follow from
each belief content. The same problem holds for beliefs expressed by other
indexicals such as here or now.
One attempt to solve the problem that Perry considers is to relativise pro-
positions to persons. Prior (1968) illustrates how such egocentric logic would go
on the model of temporal logic. Lewis (1979) suggests that rather than think-
ing of propositions as sets of possible worlds we should think of them as sets of
centered worlds: triples consisting of a time, world and an agent. Lewis himself
took the framework to be helpful for precisely the problem that Perry was con-
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cerned of. Recently Lewis’ framework has had a revival along with relativism
in general, and it has been defended by Andy Egan (2010) as a solution to the
problem of predicates of taste among other issues.
How would relativised propositions help with Perry’s problem? The idea is
simple. It takes indexical contents to correspond to lekta that are true or false
only relative to persons. Hence, “I am making a mess” is true relative to Perry
during the famous shopping trip, and it’s false relatively to me now, sitting on
my desk and writing (from now on let’s ignore times for simplicity). In contrast,
the non-indexical proposition “The shopper with a torn sack is making a mess”
expresses an Austinian proposition since it doesn’t contain any agent-sensitive
expressions. In other words, it’s true or false relative to all agents. This allows
one to distinguish between diﬀerent levels of content that correspond to the
diﬀering cognitive significance of Perry’s two beliefs.
However, Perry considers the view and argues that it doesn’t work. Let
me quote Perry on why relativism isn’t helpful regarding the problem of the
essential indexical:
I believed that certain proposition, that I am making a mess was
true –true for me. So belief that this proposition was true for me then
does not diﬀerentiate me from some other shopper, who believes that
I am making a mess was true for John Perry. So this belief cannot
be what explains my stopping and searching my cart for the torn
sack. Once we have adopted these new-fangled propositions, which
are only true at times for persons, we have to admit also that we
believe them as true for persons at times, and not absolutely. And
then our problem returns.
Clearly an important distinction must be made. All believing
is done by persons at times, or so we may suppose. But the time
of belief and the person doing the believing cannot be generally
identified with the person and time relative to which the propositions
believed is held true. You now believe that I am making a mess was
true for me, then, but you certainly do not believe it is true for you
now, unless you are reading this in a supermarket. (Perry, 1993, 44;
emphasis added)
Perry is making a couple of distinct points. First, even if the contents of our
thoughts were agent-neutral propositions, we don’t merely believe those con-
tents. Rather, we believe them to be true relative to some agents, false relative
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to some others. Why? Well, suppose that you are in the supermarket with
Perry. He has just realised it is he who is leaving the trail so he cries out “I
am making the mess!” Suppose you merely believe agent-neutral contents, in
this case “Making a mess!”. Given Perry’s utterance, you now come to believe
“Making a mess” about yourself so you reach for your cart and look for a sugar
bag. That’s clearly a pretty poor theory of indexical language and thought.
To avoid such predictions, the theory has to hold that when you hear Perry’s
utterance you believe that “I am making a mess” is true relative to Perry and
fortunately, false relative to you. But if that’s the case, then when you are
making a mess wouldn’t it be natural that you believe “I am making a mess”
is true relative to you, not just “making a mess”? If you’re able to relativise
agentless propositions when uttered by others, you must be able to do so when
you’re the agent too.
Now, the problem that Perry points out is the core problem I’ve argued that
relativists about predicates of taste face. According to the relativists we don’t
blindly evaluate judgments of taste relative to our perspectives but we are able
to take the perspective of others. Hence, when Bengt tells Anna “Anchovies
are delicious”, she doesn’t merely come to believe “Anchovies are delicious”;
she comes to believe “Anchovies are delicious” is true relative to Bengt. And
knowing her taste, she also believes that “Anchovies are delicious” is false relative
to herself.
What she is thus thinking about it is two distinct thoughts whose truth only
depends on the actual world: “Anchovies are delicious is true relative to Bengt”,
and “Anchovies are delicious is false relative to Anna”. It is these complete
thoughts that guide people’s linguistic and other behaviour, including whether
they disagree or retract. The formal semantic distinction between “content”
and parameters of evaluation are irrelevant to the actual linguistic predictions
of relativism.
Let me summarise the problem. If we evaluate the relativised propositions
(lekta) fluently relative to diﬀerent agents, times, perspectives or other suggested
parameters, then at the level of thought the relativist framework makes no
diﬀerence. That criticism applies not only to moderate relativists but to radical
relativism as well. We are supposed to know the truth of assessment-sensitivity.
Hence, when evaluating each others’ utterances, we evaluate them as e.g. true
as assessed by whoever is the speaker and false as assessed by me. That is what
we believe, not just the lekta.
Let us next consider whether relativists could get the desired predictions by
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arguing that given relativity of truth, people naturally privilege what is true to
them and therefore disagree with others.
11.3 Relativism and Egocentricity
Above we have seen that relativists hold that people are aware of the relativity
of truth. Therefore if relativism is true, speakers know that certain judgments
are merely relatively true. Let us call such language users enlightened relativists.
Enlightened relativists also know that people make judgments from their own
perspectives and hence those judgments are true relative to the speakers.
Now, above we’ve seen that the relativists must hold that at the level of
thought speakers represent the very same content as in a contextualist picture,
namely a fully truth-conditional Austinian proposition. Therefore, the fact that
only a lekton is expressed by an utterance makes no diﬀerence to the predic-
tions regarding the felicitous responses of language users. What matters is their
thought contents. Moreover, I’ve argued that given that we are usually charit-
able interpreters, we have no reason to disagree if someone says something that
is true to them. If truth is relative, why would our truth matter more?
However, several philosophers have argued that if truth is relative then of
course we privilege our truth. This section investigates what follows regarding
actions, including utterances, if relativism is true. More specifically, what we
need to consider is whether an enlightened relativist has reasons to privilege
their own perspective in a situation where judgments are made from diﬀerent,
incompatible perspectives.
We must separate two issues: whether one is justified to act (in non-linguistic
ways) on the basis of one’s own perspective, and whether one is justified in
evaluating the judgments of others relative to one’s own perspective rather than
relative to theirs. For example, if moral relativism is true, then in a case of
conflicting moral frameworks one may be justified in acting as is required by
one’s own moral standards if some action has to be taken. However, I will argue
that in a conversation one is never justified in interpreting others merely from
one’s own perspective, rather than from theirs. Only brute egoism would explain
such behaviour, so my conclusion is that relativism has to posit an unlikely
psychological story about the egoism of speakers in order to make sense of their
predictions.
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11.3.1 How Should One Act if Relativism is True?
Let us first consider moral relativism as most views on what follows regarding
actions if relativism is true come from ethicists. It is well known from ethics
literature that moral relativism does not imply that one should let everyone
act as is right to them. The infamous “tolerant relativism” holds something
like the following: moral judgments are true only relative to the norms of some
community. Hence, since each community acts as is true according to it, it’s
wrong to interfere with what its members are doing (or to put it another way, we
shouldn’t interfere with them). Here the problem is that the statement about
the wrongness of interference or that one morally shouldn’t interfere aims to
state a universal moral truth. Hence the view is inconsistent (Williams, 1972).
Does moral relativism imply that one must act according to the moral truths
of one’s community? For example, suppose you know that moral relativism is
true. In your community killing strangers is wrong but in the neighbouring
community killing strangers is ok. They’re planning to kill innocent passers-by
from some third community (whose moral judgments are unknown to you, in
case one thinks that would matter). Should you prevent the killing because
it’s wrong according to your community? If one thinks that from relativism it
follows that everyone ought to act as is “true to them”, a threat of incoherence
looms as well. The statement that everyone ought to act as the moral rules of
their community state aims to state a universal moral rule, so again we have an
incoherent form of moral relativism (Harman, 1975).
The idea of relative truth is extremely puzzling and there are many view-
points as to what exactly it implies regarding how one ought to think or act.
Scanlon (1998) argues that moral relativism has to be committed to there being
normative principles that an agent can privilege because otherwise relativism
would preclude the possibility of making sensible moral judgments:
Moral Relativism denies that there is a single set of ultimate sub-
stantive moral standards by which all actions are to be judged, but it
nonetheless presupposes a single normative perspective, from which
judgments can be made about which principles (including moral prin-
ciples) people in various situations have reason to regard as author-
itative. Recognizing such a standpoint may seem to represent norm-
ative universalism of a kind that is at odds with the spirit of Relativ-
ism, but this is a mistake. Moral Relativism is, after all, a thesis
about what people do and do not have reason to do. It therefore
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cannot be intelligibly asserted without presupposing the possibility
that such judgments can coherently be made and defended. (Scan-
lon, 1998, 329; emphasis added)
It’s not clear that that has to be the case, though. For example, Harman (1978)
doesn’t defend relativism as an account of how ordinary people speak or think.43
In contrast, he thinks that the truth of relativism is a discovery akin to e.g. the
discovery that mass is relative to a framework. He thus speaks of what is rational
to do if one is an enlightened relativist. Now, contrary to what Scanlon claims
it is an open possibility that a revisionist view would actually recommend a
Stoic silence regarding moral judgments, as well as acting only on non-moral
reasons. Harman does think it’s incoherent to make moral judgments in certain
cases; we’ll see below what he thinks follows from relativism regarding moral
conversations. However, we should be neutral at first regarding whether there
has to be a privileged perspective, and if there is one, which one it is.
Let us first look at some defences of the classic egocentric relativism accord-
ing to which we have reasons to privilege our own standards. James Dreier
(2006) states the following about the consequences of relativism with respect to
morality and taste:
I personally find Vegemite disgusting. Australians eat a lot of
it, produce a lot of it, and apparently find its taste pleasing. Nev-
ertheless, I stand by my own judgment. Vegemite tastes terrible.
Australians eat something with a terrible taste, and apparently they
like it. If pressed, I will say that it tastes good to them, and bad
to me, and that’s all there is to it; there is no further question of
whose taste is correct. A moral relativist must say the same about
the protection of individual rights: it is morally important according
to our moral outlook, unimportant according to others, and no fur-
ther question of which standards are correct. Still, when we actually
make moral judgments, we can quite properly make them from our
own perspective. Riding roughshod over the interests of the minor-
ity is wrong, even over there, and Vegemite is still foul-tasting stuﬀ.
(Dreier, 2006, 255)
When we are trying to make up our minds about what is morally
43Harman’s earliest writings on moral relativism aren’t clear on whether he intended revi-
sionism or not.
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right and wrong, we are trying to decide what people ought to do.
We have no choice but to use some standards or other. And, nat-
urally enough, we use our own. They are our standards! We accept
them. We find them compelling. So when, upon reflection, we judge
that it is morally wrong for the majoritarians to disenfranchise their
political minority, we are already committed to the judgment that
they ought not to do it. (Dreier, 2006, 256)
Dreier thus agrees with Scanlon that we must privilege some standards in order
to act and to make judgments, and therefore the natural choice is to privilege
our own standards. Now, that might be the natural choice. However, it’s not
clear that it’s the rational choice.
The question that is of most interest to us is how one should use and evaluate
merely relatively true judgments if relativism is true. As Dreier himself holds,
moral judgments are about what to do, judgments of taste are not. One cannot
always refrain from acting, and therefore one might have to act based on one’s
own moral standards in a case where many moral communities are relevant. But
since judgments of taste aren’t likewise about what should be done, the same
mandatoriness of choosing one standard over another doesn’t apply. One is in
no way paralysed from acting or thinking if one simply accepts that another
person’s judgment of taste is true relative to them, false relative to one’s self.
Nothing mandates evaluating judgments of taste made by others from one’s own
perspective. To do so is irrational, rude and egoistic.
Harman’s (1975; 1996; 2000) account of how an enlightened relativist ought
to speak seems like the coherent view to hold. Let me first set aside a worry
that a semantic relativist might have in taking Harman as an example of a
relativist. The authors who write about moral relativism typically do not go
into the details of the semantics. Harman’s account can be expressed either as
a form of contextualism or semantic relativism of “non-indexical contextualist”
kind, i.e. where the relevant parameters of the circumstance of evaluation are
determined by the context of utterance.44 However, in its relevant aspects it’s
44Here is Harman’s statement about what he calls the “logical form” of moral judgments:
In order to be somewhat more precise, then, my thesis is this. As used by the
relevant sort of speaker, ‘Ought (A, D, C, M)’ means roughly this: given that A
[the agent] has motivating attitudes M and given C [considerations regarding the
case], D [a type of action] is the course of action for A that is supported by the
best reasons. In judgements using this sense of ‘ought’, C and M are often not
explicitly mentioned but are indicated by the context of utterance. Normally,
when that happens, C will be ‘all things considered’ and M will be attitudes
that are shared by the speaker and audience. (Harman, 2000, 10)
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exactly the kind of view that we are discussing. It takes the truth of moral
judgments to depend on moral frameworks and it discusses how an enlightened
relativist ought to speak.
Harman holds that our moral judgments always implicitly refer to the mor-
ality that we and our interlocutors implicitly agree to live by; let us call that
a community. The making of those judgments presuppose (note, not necessar-
ily semantically) that the person whose actions we are evaluating accepts that
morality. If the person concerned does not accept the moral framework relative
to which we are speaking, we are misusing language (Harman, 1978). Hence
Harman thinks that it doesn’t make sense for a relativist to judge the actions
of those outside of her community as right or wrong.
So a Harmanian relativist who encounters a person from a morally diﬀerent
community would realise that a discussion is impossible unless they explicitly
restrict their conversation so that it concerns only one community. That indeed
seems to be the rational thing to do. If there’s nothing but relative truth
and everyone speaks correctly, then there are no reasons to try to impose one’s
parochial viewpoint to others (we will consider the Gibbardian idea of normative
communication as aiming at coordination in the next chapter). And note that
this is not an incoherent form of relativism since it doesn’t say that it’s a moral
requirement that one lets others believe their own moral truths. Rather, it’s a
requirement of rationality, and moral relativism is not committed to relativism
about rationality. (Of course one could be a relativist about rationality too, but
the views we discuss are not committed to that.)
One can make the same argument from the point of view of language. A
judgment that’s only relatively true requires that it’s evaluated or assessed from
a particular perspective. As Lasersohn (2005) holds, when we evaluate a judg-
ment from an “acentric” perspective the judgment cannot get a truth-value. If a
person knows that all perspectives are equally valid as is held by the relativists
we have discussed, then there’s no reason to privilege any one of them. The fact
that a perspective is one’s own does not give a reason either to privilege it. It
would give a subjective reason if one were ignorant of the existence of other per-
spectives but the forms of relativism we are discussing presuppose that speakers
are enlightened relativists.
Hence, when a moral judgment is made in a conversation where there are
competing, relevant moral frameworks, the judgment should not be evaluated
Kölbel (2004) discusses Harman’s relativism as an example of group contextualism.
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from any particular perspective since there’s no reason to choose one over any
other. Rather, the judgment remains without a truth-value. Therefore, when
one encounters relatively true judgments, for example the judgment “One ought
not kill strangers”, a rational relativist acts diﬀerently depending on whether
the judgment is made within the community or in a a situation where there are
several incompatible moral communities. Within one’s own community, if one
accepts its morality one judges the statement relative to it and acts accordingly.
But in interacting with other communities one has to acknowledge that a merely
relatively true judgment provides no guidance as to what ought to be done.45
Returning to Scanlon’s statement that moral relativism must allow for coher-
ent moral judgments and actions, Harman’s view does so as long as one remains
within one’s own moral community. However, there is nothing unintelligible
about moral relativism which holds that when moral communities must inter-
act, they are outside “the realm of reasons” until they figure out common rules
of conduct. And doing that in eﬀect means creating a new moral community
which makes moral judgments possible. Before that happens it is a plausible
relativist commitment that one doesn’t have reasons to act one way or another.
Now, there might be cases where one has to act in a way that is deemed wrong
by agents from other moral frameworks and the act has negative consequences
to those agents. That might be because self-preservation would mandate it and
it would be impossible to negotiate a new moral framework into being. But even
then the enlightened relativist understands that he has acted wrongly from the
point of view of the others and since their point of view is equally valid, he may
expect trouble. There is no reason to privilege one’s own morality just because
it’s one’s own. This is one way to understand what follows from relativism
which is compatible with Harman’s account.
11.3.2 Enlightened Relativists and Judgments of Taste
Now, let us consider how the view applies to relativism about taste. Harman’s
relativism holds that the truth of moral judgments depends on the moral frame-
work of the speaker’s community (if the speaker accepts its morality). In the case
of relativism about taste, truth depends on the perspective of the speaker. If our
Harman-inspired considerations are correct regarding rational enlightened relat-
ivists we get the following picture of communication about taste. When people
45For a discussion of what can be done when diﬀerent but equally valid normative frame-
works clash, see Gibbard (1990, Ch. 10-11).
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know that they share their tastes they can make judgments of taste without
making the perspective explicit. If they presuppose a shared taste but it turns
out that they don’t agree about the truth of a particular judgment, then they
will correct themselves by either adding a perspective or by choosing a sentence
that expresses their experiential state, e.g. “I like x ”.
When they are in a company of someone who either turns out to have a
diﬀerent taste or is known to have a diﬀerent taste, the relativist will refrain from
making judgments where the perspective isn’t made explicit. With judgments of
taste the situation with many perspectives is much less complicated than with
moral judgments. In the latter case there is need to create a new moral system
that allows speakers to be able to decide on actions. But in the case of taste
there is no equivalent problem since we can always replace judgments of taste
with judgments about our experiential states.
Finally, let me add that from what I’ve argued for it doesn’t follow that a
rational relativist couldn’t be frustrated or annoyed with others whose perspect-
ives don’t agree in the relevant respects. For example, Raz (1994) argues that
we cannot at once take both the detached perspective from which we see other
moral frameworks as equally valid as our own, and the engaged perspective from
which we ordinarily think and act. His example is about valuing a contemplat-
ive and patient life versus valuing decisive action and swiftness. Even if one
accepts and appreciates the other mode of life from the detached perspective,
from one’s engaged perspective one cannot help but to be hostile to the mode of
life incompatible with one’s own. Given that such emotional reactions towards
incompatible perspective are unavoidable, could that justify the egocentricity
that semantic relativists have defended?
No. Feelings of hostility or frustration neither justify nor explain why people
would systematically try to impose their own perspective on others. Similar
conflicts between reason and feelings take place all the time. Suppose you are
calmly working at home when the neighbours start to drill the walls or their
baby begins her ear-splitting screaming. You might get frustrated or angry,
but at the same time you know very well that there is nothing wrong with
their actions. And someone having a diﬀerent taste than you is hardly a reason
for deep frustration. If relativism about taste is true, then it’s possible that
sometimes we act out of frustration or egoistic desires to impose our own taste
and therefore disagree with someone even while knowing that they’ve spoken the
truth. But only supposing that speakers are extreme egoistic brutes could the
relativist explain the fact that disagreements about taste are so commonplace.
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11.4 Revisiting the Relativist Criticism of Contextualism
We’ve encountered a lot of criticism of the diﬀerent contextualist accounts, many
of which were put forward by relativists. However, in light of the fact that at
the level of thought people must be representing the values of the parameters
it turns out that many of the core problems of contextualism are problems for
relativism too.
Let us first return to the question of disagreements of taste to see why radical
relativism is not in any better position to explain them than contextualism, or
than other forms of relativism for that matter. We’ve already seen in connection
with the argument against speaker-centered contextualism that both Kölbel and
Lasersohn hold that it cannot account for disagreements of taste. MacFarlane
agrees with the criticism:
But the contextualist solution has a price. If in saying “apples
are delicious” I am saying that they taste good to me, while in saying
“apples are not delicious” you are denying that they taste good to
you, then we are no more disagreeing with each other than we would
be if I were to say “My name is John” and you were to say “My name
is not John.” Intuitively, though, it does seem that we are disagree-
ing. We certainly take ourselves to be disagreeing. (MacFarlane,
2007, 18)
As we’ve seen, focusing on “what is said” is not helpful when discussing relativ-
ism; what matters is the contents of thoughts. So when I say “Apples are de-
licious” what am I thinking according to the radical relativist? Let us suppose
that radical relativist is true. Then we, the competent users of assessment-
sensitive language know that the truth for me of that utterance depends on my
context of assessment. And when you deny what I said, the truth of that for you
depends on your context of assessment. To repeat MacFarlane’s words again:
“If you say “skiing is fun” and I contradict you, it is not because I think that the
proposition you asserted is false as assessed by you in your current situation”
(MacFarlane, 2007, 30; emphasis added).
In short, you believe “Apples are delicious is true for Sanna, false for me”
(or perhaps, “For Sanna apples are delicious, for me they are not”). You think
I’ve spoken truly for me, falsely for you. Now why would that be any more
genuine disagreement than the disagreement that the contextualist gets? There
is nothing incompatible whatsoever in you believing “Apples are delicious is
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true for Sanna, false for me”, and there is no incompatibility in me believing
“Apples are delicious is true for me” and you believing “Apples are delicious is
not true for me”. Radical relativism isn’t any closer to genuine disagreement
than its contextualist or relativist rivals.
Another problem that contextualism faces is that people treat judgments
of taste as if they expressed perspectiveless contents. We’ve discussed three
consequences of that in Ch. 8: Flexible Contextualism. First, speakers report
judgments of taste across contexts without making the perspective of the past
context explicit. Second, speakers report agents who make apparently conflict-
ing judgments of taste in diﬀerent contexts as disagreeing. And third, speakers
retract their past judgments of taste even though they were true in the original
context of utterance.
Prima facie it might seem that relativism can solve the problems given the
perspectiveless lekta that could serve as the common content in those cases.
However, if we look at the cases from the point of view of thoughts we see that
relativism faces the same problems. For example, retractions are basically just
disagreements with one’s past self. Since at the level of thought one thinks e.g.
“It was true for me 10 years ago that oysters were disgusting”, why would one
now say that one was wrong?
Let us look at another example which contextualism has trouble with. Kölbel
(2009, 391-2) criticises speaker-centered contextualism as follows. Anna and Bob
are (apparently) disagreeing over the tastiness of whale meat:
(175) (a) Anna: Whale meat is tasty.
(b) Bob: Whale meat is not tasty.
Since they are not contradicting each others according to contextualism, Anna
can evaluate Bob’s utterance as true. However, it’s not felicitous for Anna
to say “What Bob said is true”. Since Bob did speak truly, why can’t Anna
acknowledge that?
The argument applies equally against the relativist. Anna knows that Bob is
speaking the truth at his perspective. So why is it not felicitous for Anna to say
either “What Bob said is true” or “What Bob said is true for him”? The problem
is even worse for the relativist since there should be two possible ways to aﬃrm
the truth of perspectiveless utterances: true or true for x. However, neither of
them is a felicitous response for Anna to make in the above disagreement.
Another criticism against contextualism that also applies to relativism comes
from Kölbel’s (2004) defence of moral relativism. In Ch. 1: Judgments of
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Personal Taste we saw that the simple subjectivist has to explain the diﬀerent
behaviours of judgments of taste and judgments about grounding experiential
states. Similarly, Kölbel discusses subjectivism about moral judgments and
points out an important diﬀerence in the following judgments:
(176) Blair ought to go to war.
(177) My moral code requires Blair to go to war.
Kölbel notes that someone who disagrees with the speaker can reject the former
while accepting the latter. However, according to speaker-centered contextu-
alism the two utterances by the same person should express roughly the same
content. Kölbel claims that relativism doesn’t have such problems since the con-
tent of the former does not refer to moral codes even though it’s truth depends
on them.
Again, the problems of relativism become apparent when we look at the
thought contents that a hearer of the two utterances has. Suppose Bob hears
Anna say “Blair ought to go to war”. He comes to believe “Anna’s moral code
requires Blair to go to war ” (or perhaps, “Blair ought to go to war is true from
Anna’s moral perspective”). Later he hears Anna say “My moral code requires
Blair to go to war.” Does Bob come to believe something diﬀerent than before?
No.
So in what sense can the relativist say that a hearer can reject one of the
contents while accepting the other? The claim makes sense only if they stipulate
a sense of acceptance and rejection which have nothing to do with truth. What
Bob may reject is merely the non-truth-evaluable lekton “Blair ought to go to
war”, not the Austinian propositions that consists of the lekton plus Anna’s
moral perspective. The latter content is what Bob actually comes to believe
and he does accept that. So only by using an artificial sense of rejection can the
relativist say that the hearer may reject the utterance.
But to talk of acceptance or rejection of a lekton is like talking of acceptance
or rejection of a sentence. Both notions are equally artificial. So if the relativist
claims to get certain predictions by their notion of lekta, the contextualist can
likewise use sentences as the things that speech acts like reporting or retractions
target. The relativist says that Bob can reject Anna’s utterance of “Blair ought
to go to war” and accept her “My moral code requires Blair to go to war” because
they express diﬀerent lekta. Likewise the speaker-centered contextualist could
say that Bob rejects the sentence used to express the former, and accepts the
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sentence used to express the latter. Of course he believes both contents, but like
the relativist, the contextualist can deny that acceptance and rejection target
fully truth-conditional contents.
11.5 Summary of Chapter 11
The aim of this chapter was to evaluate whether relativism has consequences
on the level of thought. The question is extremely important since predictions
about language use must explain what speakers take themselves to be doing.
A mere formal semantic account predicts nothing without a pragmatic story. I
first showed that Perry’s distinction between thoughts that concern and object
or that are about an object cannot be adopted by the relativists. Perry meant
the distinction to correlate with representation and non-representation of some
truth-conditional element, whereas relativists don’t accept that there are such
non-represented elements. I then revisited Perry’s criticism for why relativism
doesn’t help with the problem of essential indexical and argued that the same
criticism can be made against contemporary relativists.
The second part of the chapter asked whether relativism can rely on egoism
as an explanation for why people would privilege their own perspective in evalu-
ating judgments. I argued that there are no reasons for an enlightened relativist
to behave in egocentric ways when discussing relatively true judgments. We’ve
seen that given the connection of moral judgments and actions it may be un-
avoidable at times to act on the basis of one’s own moral framework even when
it means harmful consequences for others. But only very strong reasons like the
preservation of one’s self may justify the action. In contrast, taste doesn’t have
such direct links to action, and not having a shared taste perspective doesn’t
prevent action in any way. Only by supposing that speakers are egoistic brutes
who don’t care about what is true for others can the relativist explain why
speakers would insist on evaluating the judgments of others from their own
point of view and disagreeing with those judgments.
Now, given that people do disagree about taste, what should we conclude
about the viability of relativism? I think it’s ruled out that people are en-
lightened relativists since we have no reason to suspect people of massive, stu-
pid egoism. In fact most of our criticism of relativism is a consequence of the
idea that speakers are supposed to be enlightened relativists. So why do all the
semantic relativists suppose that? The reason is simple. The main motivation
for relativism has been its alleged ability to explain why people disagree about
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taste. But if relativists argued that people aren’t aware of the truth of relativ-
ism, then the explanation of disagreement would rely on the idea that speakers
are really just talking past each others without realising it. But that’s precisely
their criticism of contextualism.
That speakers aren’t fully aware of the truth-conditions of their utterances is
the feared “semantic blindness” position that epistemic contextualists has been
criticised of (see e.g. (Hawthorne, 2004; Schiﬀer, 1996). If the relativists held
that language users are somewhat ignorant of the truth-conditions of their judg-
ments, they are making a move which, once again, can be likewise adopted by
the contextualists who would then have an equally good explanation of disagree-
ment. We will discuss “semantic blindness” again in Ch. 14: Perspectivism.
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12 Normative Disagreement
In this chapter we evaluate whether disagreements of taste are best understood
not as disagreements over the truth but as practical or normative disagreements.
In chapter 10: A Closer Look at Relativist Accounts we saw that MacFarlane
(2007) ultimately appeals to disagreement in attitude as an explanation of why
contradictory lekta give an impression of disagreement. In our discussion of
relativism it became clear that relativists have no other account of disagreements
of taste since at the level of thoughts speakers and hearers represent not merely
lekta, but lekta as true or false relative to various perspectives. Moreover,
we’ve seen that egoism isn’t a plausible explanation for why speakers would
systematically privilege their own perspective.
In the beginning of the chapter I summarise Ayer’s and Stevenson’s accounts
of moral and aesthetic disagreements which are the forerunners of contemporary
accounts of normative disagreement. Ayer held that the disagreements come
down to diﬀerences in values or preferences whereas Stevenson took them to
show diﬀerences in attitudes. Allan Gibbard (1990) builds on the foundations
of Ayer and Stevenson in his account of moral disagreement as disagreement
over systems of norms. MacFarlane talks of disagreement in attitude and co-
ordination, notions which come from Gibbard to whom MacFarlane also refers
regarding a possible evolutionary explanation of why we don’t like controversy.
The second section evaluates whether relativists could adopt the idea of
disagreements of taste as disagreements in attitude. First I give an overview
of Gibbard’s account of moral communication in order to evaluate whether it
provides a plausible model for how people use judgments of taste. Section 12.2.2
discusses the account that comes from combining MacFarlane’s relativism with
Gibbard’s account of the use of normative language, and argues that contextu-
alist accounts are equally suited to adopt the Gibbardian view. Section 12.2.3
argues that Gibbard’s account cannot be used to make sense of discussions and
disagreements about matters of taste.
The second part of the chapter (section 12.3) discusses other accounts of
disagreements of taste which rely on normative disagreements. Section 12.3.1
evaluates Recanati’s (2007) and Sundell’s (2011) views which hold that disagree-
ments of taste aim to influence which standards of taste some relevant group
ought to have. Section 12.3.2 discusses Richard’s (2004; 2008) account which
holds that when one disagrees about taste one aims to make the participants to
the conversation reconceptualise the issue in question. The final section argues
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that discussion about concepts makes sense in what I call Socratic disagreements,
that is, disagreements over the nature of some phenomenon like justice. How-
ever, I argue that if speakers believe relativism to be true as Richard holds, then
from their point of view there is no reason to engage in Socratic disagreements.
12.1 Emotivists on Disagreement
Let me begin by summarising the emotivist solutions to the problem of dis-
agreement of taste, defended by A. J. Ayer (2001) and C. L. Stevenson (1944;
1963). According to Ayer, moral and aesthetic judgments are not assertions and
they do not aim to make truth-evaluable statements. Rather, their function is
to express emotions and thereby to arouse the same feelings in others. Here is
Ayer’s description of what goes on when one makes a moral judgment:
The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing
to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, ’You acted wrongly
in stealing that money’, I am not stating anything more than if I
had simply said, ’You stole that money’. In adding that this action
is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am
simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said,
’You stole that money’, in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it
with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone,
or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of
the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is
attended by certain feelings in the speaker. (Ayer, 2001, 110).
In Ayer’s words, moral and aesthetic expressions are “pseudo-concepts” which
is unfortunately as detailed as his linguistic theory gets.46 With respect to pre-
dicates of taste an emotivist would hold that a judgment of taste such as “Tripe
46Ayer’s view bears some resemblance to Kant’s remarks about judgments of taste. Kant also
took judgments of taste not to involve concepts but he held that speakers behave pragmatically
as if they did: “The beautiful is that which, without concepts, is represented as the object of a
universal satisfaction.” (Kant, 2000, 5: 211 / 96). These judgments resemble judgments made
with concepts since the speaker presupposes that everyone would accept the same judgment:
Hence he will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a property of the
object and the judgment logical (constituting a cognition of the object through
concepts of it), although it is only aesthetic and contains merely a relation of
the representation of the object to the subject, because it still has the similarity
with logical judgment that its validity for everyone can be presupposed. (Kant,
2000, 5: 212 / 97)
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soup is disgusting” has no truth-conditions but is just another way of express-
ing particular kinds of negative feelings towards tripe soup, akin to sticking out
one’s tongue or making faces.
We saw in Ch. 1: Judgments of Personal Taste Moore’s (1922) criticism
according to which subjectivism cannot explain why there are moral disagree-
ments. Ayer was aware that Moore’s criticism applied to his account as well.
Since emotivists hold that value judgments don’t express propositions they must
explain why there appear to be disagreement while no contradictory judgments
have been made. Ayer claims that normally moral disagreements are not dis-
agreements over moral values but over facts about the cases, such as what was
the agent’s background knowledge and motives, or more generally, which actions
have which consequences.
However, if the disagreement persists once the speakers agree on all the
factual issues, it means that they endorse diﬀerent systems of values. But Ayer
holds that a system of values cannot be rationally argued for, only insisted upon.
As he puts it: “It is because argument fails us when we come to deal with pure
questions of value, as distinct from questions of fact, that we finally resort to
mere abuse.” (Ayer, 2001, 115). The disagreement that remains once the facts
are set straight is not a matter of anyone being wrong, it is simply an expression
of diﬀerent values or preferences. Why diﬀerent people have diﬀerent systems
of value is a question for psychology, not philosophy.
Now, whether or not Ayer’s explanation is plausible for moral disagreement
is not of our concern but it has some plausibility regarding matters of taste. If
we replace his talk of systems of value with tastes, there is certainly some truth
to the claim that tastes cannot be rationally argued for. For example, when we
discussed the example of the taste of the horse lasagne (section 1.1 on page 17),
we saw that ultimately there isn’t anything left to say if one likes its taste and
the other doesn’t. So according to the Ayerian view of disagreements of taste,
the disagreement over “Horse lasagne is delicious” does not concern the truth of
a claim where delicious attributes a property. Instead the judgment expresses
positive feelings towards horse lasagne, and the one who disagrees with it does
not share those feelings.
However, in evaluating Ayer’s proposal we need to separate two diﬀerent
claims. One claim is that tastes or moral values cannot be rationally argued
for, which is the claim we have admitted is somewhat plausible with respect
to taste. But that is not enough to explain what goes on in a disagreement
of taste. It also needs to be the case that people know that tastes or moral
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values cannot be rationally argued for, and that they thereby take each others
to be merely expressing preferences instead of giving arguments (once they are
beyond disputing the relevant facts).
The second claim is far from obvious, especially in the case of moral values.
Even if the first claim were true it would be a discovery of philosophers and
not reflected in the behaviour of ordinary speakers. There is no evidence that
everyone actually believes in a kind of folk emotivism. But again, with taste the
claim has some plausibility at least. As mentioned, De gustibus non disputan-
dum est is a live proverb which might be a consequence of some people realising
that taste is not within the realm of rational argumentation.
C. L. Stevenson (1944; 1963) who defended emotivism for ethical and aes-
thetic terms had a more elaborate explanation for why compatible propositions
give an impression of a disagreement. He treats ethical judgments as not in-
cluding only beliefs but broadly speaking pro or con attitudes, or what he calls
being for or being against. The attitudes are reflected in the emotive meaning of
moral expressions. Emotive meaning is a dimension of meaning which expresses
an attitude for or against, and it typically co-exists with a descriptive meaning.
Correspondingly Stevenson distinguishes between disagreement in belief and
disagreement in attitude. The former disagreement takes place when two per-
sons have incompatible beliefs, i.e. they believe propositions that cannot be
true at the same time. The kind of disagreement that Moore talks about is a
verbal expression of disagreement in belief: speakers express propositions which
cannot both be true. Disagreement in attitude in contrast does not require
contradicting beliefs but merely contradicting attitudes.
Stevenson describes disagreement in attitude as follows: “Two men will be
said to disagree in attitude when they have opposed attitudes to the same object
–one approving of it, for instance, and the other disapproving of it –and when at
least one of them has a motive for altering or calling into question the attitude
of the other.” (Stevenson, 1944, 4). Like Ayer, Stevenson is aware of the role of
facts in ethical arguments, so that sometimes coming to agree in beliefs causes
agreement in attitude as well. However, often that is not enough and two agents
may disagree in attitude despite of agreeing in belief.
In Ch. 2: The Evaluative Dimension of Judgments of Taste we took pre-
dicates of taste to be thick (in William’s terminology) or evaluation-added (in
Sibley’s terminology) terms. We analysed the evaluative component as attrib-
uting something like a disposition to cause a positive or negative experiential
state. If we compare Stevenson’s emotive dimension of meaning to that analysis
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we see an important diﬀerence. Stevenson reduces evaluativeness to the attitude
of being for or against which is conventionally associated with an expression.
Hence, an evaluative expression like good does not attribute anything. Instead
it expresses that a speaker has a pro attitude towards an object, and it invites
the hearer to share the attitude.
Let me now give some examples to illustrate how the emotivist view diﬀers
from the view that evaluative judgments don’t merely express but they also
attribute properties. When one expresses an attitude one is making manifest
an emotional state that one is having. Furthermore, given the empathy humans
usually feel towards each others and expect from others it is natural that one
wants to share the emotion. However, when one is making an evaluation one
is not expressing but asserting, and the main role of assertion is to impart
information (and also to submit one’s beliefs to be assessed for truth by others).
An evaluation typically conveys or expresses emotion too but that is not its
primary or only aim.
To give a simple example of the roles of expression and evaluation, suppose
two people are travelling by car at night when an elk runs to the road. The
driver breaks, manages to stop in time and exclaims “holy sh**!” to express her
fear. For whatever psychological reasons she will expect the passenger to share
the emotion. But suppose the passenger happens to be a war photographer with
nerves of steel who remains untouched by what happened. The situation shows
the diﬀerent emotional responses of the persons, nothing more. That may of
course cause them to disagree in attitude, for example if the driver is shocked
by the passenger’s calmness which she considers to be a failure to grasp the
genuine risk they were in.
Now suppose that the driver had said instead “That was scary”, to which the
passenger replies “I don’t think so. I’ve seen much worse”. Here we intuitively
have something more than a mere expression of emotions. The speakers are
making an evaluation of the dispositions of the situation in which they were in,
namely whether it causes fear or not. The passenger’s response poses a challenge
to the driver to rethink her evaluation of the scariness of the situation.
In the rest of the chapter we will consider whether a judgment of taste is
more like the expression of emotion rather than an evaluation of the disposi-
tions of objects or events. Allan Gibbard (1990) has incorporated Ayer’s and
Stevenson’s views on moral disagreements in his expressivist framework, and
Gibbard’s discussion of disagreements has influenced many contemporary de-
velopers of perspective-dependent accounts on taste.
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12.2 Relativism and Gibbard’s Theory of the Use of Norm-
ative Language
12.2.1 Gibbard on Normative Language
Gibbard (1990) is an expressivist, that is, he thinks moral judgments don’t
express truth-evaluable propositions but mental states of the speaker. However,
his account of moral language has two core components. First, he develops
the expressivist account including a formal framework, and second, he oﬀers an
account of the aims and use of moral language. We focus mostly on the latter;
let us call it Gibbardian pragmatics of normative language.
First, let me summarise what Gibbard takes moral and other normative
judgments to express. The background for the account is his view about norm-
ative judgments as judgments about the rationality of feelings. The rationality
in question should be understood as “subjective” rationality, that is, what it
makes sense to do from the agent’s limited point of view. Subjective rationality
guides actions in that one will try to do what one considers rational. Gibbard
takes rationality to be connected to the norms that one accepts so that whether
something makes sense to do depends on whether it is permitted by the norms
that the agent accepts.
Norms that one accepts are also connected to particular kinds of feelings. For
example, norms of morality are norms for the rationality of guilt and resentment.
Hence, if someone acts in a way that’s not permitted by the system of norms
that I accept, then it’s rational for me to feel resentment towards the agent
and to think that she ought to feel guilt. The same combination of norms and
feelings one ought to have extends to other normative domains besides ethics.
For example, aesthetic norms are norms for the rationality of diﬀerent kinds of
aesthetic appreciation. This is the idea of apt feelings in the title of Gibbard’s
book Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. We think diﬀerent situations merit diﬀerent
sentiments, and our normative judgments are judgments about which feelings
are apt in which cases.
Returning to our discussion of emotivism above, Gibbard’s account diﬀers
significantly from Ayer’s or Stevenson’s emotivism in his connecting feelings
with rationality. The emotivists hold that normative judgments are merely ex-
pressions of pro or con attitudes whereas Gibbard takes them to be about the
rationality of those attitudes. This brings us to his account of the use of norm-
ative language. Gibbard holds that unlike interjections, normative judgments
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invite others to share a sentiment or attitude. Gibbard can explain the diﬀer-
ence between the two by saying that interjections are mere expressions of feelings
whereas normative judgments are about the rationality of feelings. Hence Gib-
bard avoids the problem that expressions of emotions like “Damn!” or other
interjections play a diﬀerent conversational role than normative judgments like
“That was wrong”.
Gibbard argues that the point of normative talk is to coordinate our feelings:
The key to human moral nature, I suggest, lies in coordination
broadly conceived. The need for complex coordination stands behind
much of the way language works in our thoughts, in our feelings,
and in social life. It figures centrally in our emotional dispositions,
especially for such morally significant emotions as outrage, guilt,
shame, respect, moral admiration, and moral inspiration. Matters of
coordination, in the picture I shall sketch, stand squarely behind the
psychology of norms, and hence behind what is involved in thinking
something rational or irrational. (Gibbard, 1990, 26)
When we talk about what one ought to do or what is right or wrong in a given
situation we may influence each others by our emotional responses, including
using emotionally laden language. These evaluations of hypothetical or actual
situations which coordinate our normative systems Gibbard calls normative gov-
ernance.
Here, then, in brief, is the proposal. Normative discussion might
coordinate acts and feelings if two things hold. First, normative
discussion tends towards consensus. The mechanisms here, I shall
propose, are two: mutual influence, and a responsiveness to demands
for consistency. Second, the consensus must move people to do or feel
accordingly. That is where normative governance comes in. (Gib-
bard, 1990, 73)
In short, Gibbard’s account of normative language builds on the foundation that
we have a biologically determined need to coordinate our thoughts and actions.
We may influence each others’ systems of norms by (a) taking a stance on behalf
of some norm, showing our emotional reactions and using emotional language,
and by (b) demanding coherence from the judgments of others.
The second component is more important than it may seem at first. We can
think of a normative system as a list which ideally will state for every possible
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action whether it’s forbidden, optional, or required. In evaluating a particular
moral case one has to try to be systematic and give the same verdict regarding
any other relevantly similar case. But as we know from thinking about real
life situations there are typically many relevant moral or nonmoral dimensions
which may pull our evaluations to diﬀerent directions or bias our judgments.
Moreover, ordinary agents do not possess complete moral systems; our sys-
tems of norms do not give a verdict for every possible action. Coherently eval-
uating the unclear cases given an incomplete system of norms is hence part of
the demands of coherence. Being morally coherent is hard, and we may suppose
that a large part of moral discussions are aimed at sorting out our own and oth-
ers’ systems of norms and what follows from them. Indeed, Gibbard thinks that
philosophical discussions are continuous with ordinary normative discussions.
12.2.2 Relative Truth and Coordination of Attitudes
One reason why Gibbardian pragmatics of normative language is relevant to us
is MacFarlane’s (2007) claim that assessment-sensitive expressions are meant to
create controversy since it encourages coordination. I’ve argued that relativ-
ists including MacFarlane don’t have an account of disagreements of taste any
more than contextualists do. Hence, in this section we need to consider two
issues. First, can adopting Gibbardian pragmatics of normative language help
the relativist? And second, if it can, is MacFarlane’s relativism better suited
for adopting Gibbardian pragmatics than moderate relativists or contextualists?
Let us begin with the first question.
Here is an outline of a relativist account of judgments of taste with Gib-
bardian pragmatics of normative language. In talking about matters of taste
people know that there is nothing beyond relative truth and that everyone is
normally saying the truth (to them). However, given our biologically driven
need to coordinate our feelings and actions we are not happy if we don’t share
our attitudes. Therefore, when we discuss matters of taste we aim to influence
others and to coordinate our feelings.
We do this by taking a stance in behalf of some normative position (e.g.
that Italian food is the most delicious in the world), for example by making a
judgment of taste such as “There is no better food than pizza”. We can also
use emotive language –no doubt at least some predicates of taste like disgusting
or delicious are emotionally laden– or we can show our emotional reactions
by our expressions and behaviour. We also insist on coherence, although this
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component seems to play a negligible role in contrast to moral judgments.
So far so good. What is unclear is how to accommodate MacFarlane’s sugges-
tion that assessment-sensitive expressions would be somehow specifically suited
to create controversy in contrast to context-sensitive expressions. To repeat
his words: “Assessment-sensitive expressions are designed, it seems, to foster
controversy, where use-sensitive expressions preclude it.” (MacFarlane, 2007,
30). As we have emphasised when discussing the accounts of Kölbel, Lasersohn
and MacFarlane, if predicates of taste are circumstance- or assessment-sensitive,
speakers have to be able to fill in the relevant perspective at the level of thought.
The formal semantic diﬀerences created by assessment sensitivity hasn’t been
shown to correspond to any diﬀerence at the level of thought or understanding.
And what we should note about the relativist view with Gibbardian pragmatics
outlined above is that relative truth plays no role in explaining the point of
disagreements.
This brings us to the second question: is relativism better suited to adopt
Gibbardian pragmatics of normative language than for example moderate re-
lativists or contextualists? There is no reason to think so. A speaker-centered
contextualist holds that when one makes a judgment of taste of the form x is F,
the judgment is true iﬀ x is F from the perspective of the speaker. That is the
view which figures in the relativist literature as the prototypical form of con-
textualism that cannot explain disagreements of taste. But echoing MacFarlane
(2007), the speaker-centered contextualist can argue as follows:
If you say “skiing is fun” and I say “skiing is not fun”, it is not
because I think that the proposition you asserted is false given the
aﬀective attitudes you now have. Instead, I hope to change these at-
titudes. Perhaps, then, the point of disagreements of taste is to foster
coordination of contexts. We have an interest in sharing standards
of taste, senses of humor, and epistemic states with those around us.
A speaker-centered contextualist account coupled with Gibbardian pragmatics
of normative language would be very similar to the relativist view sketched
above. In making judgments of taste people know very well that what has
been expressed refers to the speaker, and that normally they speak the truth.
However, we want to share our attitudes. Hence we discuss matters of taste
in order to coordinate our feelings and actions. We do this by taking a stance
by e.g. making a judgment of taste and so on and so on –the details regarding
discussions about taste are exactly as in the relativist view since they come from
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Gibbard and have nothing to do with the semantic framework that one might
prefer.
In other words, if one wants to make sense of disputes of taste by adopting
Gibbardian pragmatics of normative language, there isn’t anything explanator-
ily relevant that the relativist can say but that a contextualist couldn’t. This
point can be emphasised by considering clear cases of disagreements in attitude
where there is no content under dispute. Here is an example.
(178) (a) Agnes: I love fois gras.
(b) Bob: How can you possibly like it? The geese have been tortured to
produce it.
(c) Agnes: Well, maybe it’s wrong to produce it but it still tastes great.
(d) Bob: I think it’s disgusting, I can’t believe you enjoy it.
This kind of dispute shows that there is no problem in holding that people
can try to influence each others’ attitudes even when they acknowledge that the
other one is speaking the truth and there isn’t any putative assessment-sensitive
expressions involved. Hence, one can perfectly well be a speaker-centered con-
textualist with Gibbardian pragmatics of normative language (or a flexible con-
textualist if one finds a way to avoid the problems posed in Ch. 8: Flexible
Contextualism). Moreover, a contextualist has an advantage over the relativist
in having entirely ordinary context-sensitive semantics for predicates of taste.
If the only explanation of disagreements of taste comes from Gibbardian prag-
matics of normative language, there is no motivation for relativism.
We’ve mentioned before that both relativism and contextualism have trouble
in explaining why people retract their past judgments. Gibbardian pragmatics
of normative language may be useful in explaining that as well. Suppose I now
love pickled eggs but didn’t use to. Even if I’ve spoken truly in the past in
saying that pickled eggs are disgusting, I do well to retract that judgment now
since it encourages coordination of attitudes. If my aim is to influence others it
makes sense to claim that I was somehow mistaken about my own taste rather
than to acknowledge my past correctness. After all, if I want others to find
pickled eggs delicious I shouldn’t happily admit that even I used to hate them.
By saying that I would be flagging the acceptability of diﬀerent points of view,
the opposite of coordination. That’s devious of course, but perhaps the desire
to coordinate trumps sincerity. So retractions can be considered as another
manoeuvre in a normative conversation if one finds Gibbardian pragmatics of
normative language attractive.
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Adopting a broadly Gibbardian view of the aims of normative discussions
can in principle be done by relativists and contextualists alike. But in fact it
doesn’t really make sense to be a relativist with Gibbardian pragmatics of norm-
ative language. If the explanation of the linguistic data comes from Gibbardian
pragmatics of normative language there’s no motivation to move to relativism
in the first place. Indeed, if one finds Gibbard’s pragmatic account compelling
and one is unhappy with the standard truth-conditional views like contextu-
alism, Gibbard’s expressivism or more recent forms of expressivism (see e.g.
Yalcin (2007; 2012)) might be a more promising story regarding the contents of
normative judgments. Unfortunately there is no space to discuss those views
here.
12.2.3 Why Gibbardian Pragmatics of Normative Language Is Not
the Answer
We’ve seen that Gibbardian pragmatics of normative language doesn’t help the
relativist since if one likes the view it is better to adopt ordinary contextualist
semantics. But whether anyone should adopt Gibbardian pragmatics of norm-
ative language for discussions about taste is another question. I think Gibbard
and the earlier emotivists are right in emphasising our desire to share our at-
titudes or feelings, and surely sometimes a disagreement of taste is merely an
attempt to influence others as in the example about fois gras above.
However, the story about coordination makes much less sense as an account
of judgments of taste in general than it does as an account of moral judgments.
In this section I argue that judgments of taste are not similar enough to moral
judgments in the relevant respects. Consequently, even if one thinks that Gib-
bardian pragmatics of normative language is at least partly the right account of
our use of moral language, it doesn’t explain our use of the language of taste.
Gibbardian pragmatics for moral judgments makes sense since we have major
incentives to coordinate our moral thoughts and actions with others. In forming
any kind of a society we need to agree on its rules for acceptable behaviour which
makes moral judgments the foundations of our social lives. Given the need for
a society, moral discussions are crucially important because they allow us to
decide on how one ought to act. Making moral choices is also diﬃcult so talking
about morality helps us make our moral frameworks better. When we expose
our views to others they may see inconsistencies where we ignore them.
In a society people don’t only need rules, they need plans of action for various
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possible situations. Moral discussions allow us to plan in advance by imagining
hypothetical situations and to decide what is the right course of action to take,
were that situation to materialise. Even if Gibbard is right in holding that
there’s a biological need to coordinate, we don’t need to look at some distant
past to see that moral conversations are as relevant as ever in helping us to
figure out how we ought to act and feel. Our view of the world is shaped by
our normative system but it also permeates the simplest guidelines for action.
One’s normative system plays a role in deciding such mundane issues as whether
it’s ok to do less chores at home than one’s parter or whether one should give
money to a beggar.
Now, let us compare moral conversations to discussions about matters of
taste. If we look back into the humans’ hunter-gatherer past we might say that
it was important to coordinate thoughts about which things were edible and
which were poisonous. But that’s about the only similarity there is to moral
conversations. There are two essential diﬀerences between morality and taste.
First, we don’t need to coordinate with others regarding tastes. Second, the
methods that make us coordinate our moral judgments do not work with the
case of taste. Let us look at each in turn.
As we’ve seen, trying to coordinate our moral thoughts is essential since
normative systems determine not only how we interact with others on daily basis
but also how our societies are organised. Coordinating our tastes in contrast is
of little importance. The cases where coordination of personal tastes matters
are quite limited: what to cook, where to eat or drink, what to do during
leisure times or holidays (and perhaps which movie or TV program to see or
which music to listen to though these may rather fall to the side of aesthetic
judgments). Moreover, the people who we need to coordinate with are limited
to the people with whom we do the above things, that is, friends, partners and
family. It might be nice to coordinate attitudes with those who accompany us
in our leisure time but it’s far from essential to our lives.
However, couldn’t one object that perhaps it’s very important indeed to
coordinate, given the importance of the above leisure activities to many people
nowadays? Maybe it’s not essential for our survival but given the easy lives
many people lead nowadays things like taste may be of utmost importance.
As the example about fois gras illustrated sometimes we care a lot about the
tastes of others, especially when we find them oﬀending. Now, it should be
emphasised that the fois gras case is not merely a matter of taste but a moral
matter. Coordination of tastes may matter a lot if the coordination ensures
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coordination of related moral attitudes, like condemning the production of fois
gras. Korsmeyer (2012) even argues that true connoisseurs cannot separate the
moral dimension of foods and drinks from their taste in which case a connoisseur
cannot find delicious something whose production they consider unethical. Since
food and its taste are closely connected to ethical choices (Hirvonen, 2013),
we should set aside the cases where an attempt at coordination of tastes is
a consequence of an attempt of coordination of moral values. However, one
should keep in mind that perhaps questions of taste and morality cannot be
clearly separated in many cases.
Whether or not there are people who would like to coordinate their taste
with others, judgments of taste cannot be coordinated by the methods that
Gibbard says guide coordination of moral thoughts. As we saw, according to
Gibbard normative discussions coordinate acts and feelings because of two fea-
tures. First, any normative conversation tends towards consensus because we
influence each others by taking stances, having emotional reactions and by de-
manding consistency. Second, if a consensus is reached it should change people’s
feelings and actions to match the consensus. Discussions about what ought to
be done in a hypothetical situation aim at that.
Suppose that there is a disagreement of taste for example about the taste
of anchovies. Anna thinks they are disgusting, Bengt thinks they are delicious.
Both have taken their stance and elicited their emotional reactions by the choice
of their words and perhaps by some suitable facial expressions. Do they have
a chance at changing each others’ minds? Hardly. No matter how much time,
eﬀort, eloquent language, arguments or manipulation one uses to convince you
that anchovies are delicious or disgusting, if you’ve tasted them recently and
know how they taste like, whatever they say won’t make you change your mind.
And the same goes for other judgments of personal taste.47
Demands of consistency don’t work in the case of taste either. Judgments of
taste are not like moral judgments which have to cohere both with underlying
broad moral principles and with judgments about other relevantly similar cases.
We don’t make judgments of taste on the basis of principles. On the contrary, if
one did, one could be accused of not having understood the point of judgments
47Here it’s again worth to point out the diﬀerence between the predicates mentioned above
that are the prototypical predicates of taste, and certain others which many have included as
predicates of taste, for example stylish, cool, or fashionable. I don’t think the latter depend
as much on personal tastes as the former (though they are probably used sometimes more
subjectively, sometimes more objectively, just like predicates of personal taste). Regarding
them the Gibbardian account seems much more plausible given the role of the community in
shaping what is considered stylish, cool or fashionable.
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of taste which is to “exercise taste”, i.e. to make a judgment based on experiences
of the object in question. Finally, there is hardly anything akin to “normative
governance” regarding taste, that is discussing hypothetical cases in order to
decide how one ought to act or feel in them. One may always speculate about
say, the taste of anchovy ice cream but one’s judgment of taste about it cannot
be settled before tasting it.
This brings us back to our discussion about the grounds of judgments of
taste and of moral judgments. We’ve seen that normally it’s infelicitous to
make judgments of taste without having been in the grounding experiential
state whereas moral judgments can be made merely on the basis of imagination.
So it’s no surprise that talking barely makes a diﬀerence with our judgments
of personal taste since they are grounded in direct, personal experiences. My
thoughts about say, fairness may be partly grounded in feelings but we also
recognise that sometimes our feelings may be misplaced. But it makes little sense
to think that our ordinary experiences about whether something is enjoyable or
delicious would be misplaced. We may recognise that a certain food would taste
delicious if we got used to its taste, or that some activity would be fun if we knew
better how to do it. But that doesn’t mean that we’re mistaken in currently
finding periwinkle disgusting or driving a car not fun.
12.3 Disagreement Over Concepts
There are other philosophers who have explained disagreements of taste as norm-
ative disagreements. Recanati (2007) and Sundell (2011) both hold that the
truth of judgments of taste depends on the taste of some relevant group, though
Recanati prefers a relativist semantics whereas Sundell defends contextualism.
In Ch. 8: Flexible Contextualism we saw that a view which takes the relevant
perspective to be that of a group can explain most disagreements as disagree-
ments over how the group judges the object or event in question. However, there
are certain kinds of ordinary disagreements for which that explanation doesn’t
work, and both Recanati and Sundell have argued that those are over how the
group should judge the matter.
In Ch. 8: Flexible Contextualism we also saw the problems of views which
take the truth to depend on a group. The truth-values can be totally unintuitive
to the speakers who are unable to track the truth, and there is a permanent mis-
match between the grounds of making judgments of taste and what determines
the truth of those judgments. Richard (2004; 2008) defends a relativist view
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which avoids those problems since he holds that all disagreements of taste are
normative disagreements –they are about how best to conceptualise things.
Richard defends his view primarily for gradable adjectives, but in his (2004)
he argues that the same explanation holds for predicates of taste (his (2008)
account of predicates of taste is more complex). Now, in Ch. 3: Gradability and
Perspective Dependence we saw the Barker (2013) argued that the vagueness of
gradable adjectives can explain the faultless disagreements that judgments of
taste give rise to. Recanati, Richard and Sundell likewise argue that at least
some judgments of taste are not about the tastes of the group but about how the
predicate of taste in question ought to be used, either in the particular context
or more generally.
In the following sections we will discuss whether one could explain all dis-
agreements of taste as attempts to influence how one should use predicates of
taste. We will first look at Recanati’s and Sundell’s group accounts and then
Richard’s speaker-centered relativism.
12.3.1 Disagreeing to Influence the Group’s Standards
We’ve seen that Recanati (2007) is among the critics of the notion of faultless
disagreement. Moreover, he doesn’t think it makes a diﬀerence regarding the
explanation of disagreements whether an element of truth-conditions is part of
the content or of the circumstance of evaluation. Recanati defends a Kaplan-
style moderate relativism but his motivations come from considerations about
the philosophy of mind. Despite of his relativism he explains disagreements
mostly in a classical way as being over the truth of an Austinian proposition.
Like other relativists Recanati holds that a lekton does not contain a per-
spective. But instead of defending the usual speaker-centered relativism, he
holds that the lekton’s truth depends on the perspective of the speaker and the
community in which the speaker and the hearers belong. Recanati also adds
that how the standards of the community are determined can be flexible so that
sometimes it’s e.g. the taste of experts that matters. Hence his view is like
flexible contextualism except that the perspective is not part of the content.
However, there are disagreements that the view cannot explain as disagree-
ments over the truth of the expressed content. In the problematic cases two
speakers who are speaking in behalf of the community disagree because one
of them judges in a way that she knows to diﬀer from the judgments of the
community. She thus seems to be knowingly saying something false. Recanati’s
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explanation is that the standards of the community are never fixed. Hence
rather than intending to say that “according to the standards of the community,
p” the speaker is taking a stance, holding that the standards should be such
that they make p true.
Sundell (2011) discusses a similar case in response to Lasersohn’s (2005)
criticism of group contextualism. In a standard disagreement person A says p
and person B responds not-p. As we’ve seen, group contextualism or relativism
can say that A thought that p was true given her taste and her beliefs about
the taste of B. But in fact p is not the case given the taste of A and B, so B
corrects her. Now, Lasersohn points out the following problem. If we take the
same disagreement but reverse the order of the judgments the same explanation
no longer works. Let us look at Sundell’s examples; we’ll call the first, standard
disagreement the Eggo Waﬄe and the second the reversed Eggo Waﬄe.
(179) (a) Alphie: Eggo Waﬄe Cereal is delicious.
(b) Betty: Nuh uh, Eggo Waﬄe Cereal is not delicious. (Sundell, 2011,
268)
Sundell explains the Eggo Waﬄe in the standard group contextualist way, saying
that the disagreement is about whether Eggo Waﬄe Cereal is delicious to the
group which consists of Alphie and Betty. Here is the reversed case which
illustrates the problem pointed out by Lasersohn:
(180) (a) Betty: Eggo Waﬄe Cereal is not delicious.
(b) Alphie: Oh yes it is! (Sundell, 2011, 283)
Again the group consists only of Alphie and Betty. But now, given what Betty
said Alphie knows that the cereal isn’t delicious according to the group’s stand-
ard. Consequently his utterance cannot be explained the same way as the Eggo
Waﬄe.
Sundell echoes Recanati in holding that judgments of taste don’t merely
describe but they also take a stance on what the contextual standards ought
to be. He holds that cases like the reversed Eggo Waﬄe can be explained as
a metalinguistic disagreement where Alphie is trying to influence the group’s
standards. Here is how Sundell describes the situation:
In addition to its descriptive eﬀects, Alphie’s utterance has meta-
linguistic eﬀects regarding the appropriate usage of delicious. In
particular, his utterance conveys the information that in the present
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context, the relevant standard is (or at least should be) such that
Eggo Waﬄe Cereal does satisfy it. [...] In (1) [(179)], Betty points
out that Alphie is mistaken in his claim about how the group stand-
ard rates Eggo Waﬄe Cereal. In (34) [(180)] by contrast, Alphie
intentionally excludes Betty from that group. (Sundell, 2011, 283)
In Ch. 3: Gradability and Perspective Dependence we saw that Barker (2013)
emphasised that disagreements over judgments with vague predicates may be
about the context in the sense that the judgments aim to influence the context.
Sundell refers to Barker’s (2002) earlier defence of the same position and claims
that the reversed Eggo Waﬄe is an instance of such disagreements over the
context.
However, there are crucial diﬀerences between Barker’s cases and the re-
versed Eggo Waﬄe. The core of Barker’s disagreements over the context is that
with vague predicates there is indeterminacy over the cutoﬀ point in the con-
text. Given the symmetry of the speakers’ epistemic situation they can try to
influence where the cutoﬀ point is set since there are many acceptable cutoﬀ
points. Thus, as we saw when discussing Barker’s view, he distinguishes two
features that give rise to disagreements over the context: (i) irrelevance of non-
linguistic facts in solving the issue, and (ii) epistemically symmetrical situation
of the discourse participants.
Now, the reverse Eggo Waﬄe doesn’t have the first of these features. Betty’s
taste is a relevant non-linguistic fact in solving the issue of what is the standard
of deliciousness in the context. The diﬀerence between Sundell’s and Barker’s
accounts is that Barker doesn’t think that predicates of taste are perspective-
dependent in any way. Indeed, we criticised Barker’s account on the grounds
that by explaining disagreements of taste on the model of other vague predic-
ates it fails to take into account the role of personal experiences as the grounds
of judgments of taste. But Sundell, like Recanati, thinks that the group’s per-
spective determines the truth.
The disagreement in the reversed Eggo Waﬄe is hence not due to indeterm-
inacy of acceptable cutoﬀ points. As Sundell says, Alphie responds the way he
does because he excludes Betty from the group. But in the context of Betty’s
utterance where the group still consists of Betty and Alphie, there is no ac-
ceptable cutoﬀ point for deliciousness such that Eggo Waﬄe counts as delicious.
Alphie is thus saying something he knows to be false given the context of Betty’s
utterance. He is eﬀectively changing the context by excluding Betty from it,
207
thereby ending the common discussion. For Betty it wouldn’t make much sense
to continue a conversation where her opinions have been ruled out as irrelevant.
The explanation is thus similar to Recanati’s and it relies on taking a stance on
what the group’s standards ought to be, rather than aiming to accommodate a
judgment which fits within the group’s actual but vague standards.
Before we consider the plausibility of taking disagreements of taste as dis-
agreements over what the standards ought to be, we should remember the prob-
lems of a view which holds that judgments of taste depend on the taste of a
group. First, there are the problems that became apparent when we looked at
the details of Glanzberg’s flexible contextualism. These include the unintuit-
iveness of the truth-values of judgments of taste, speakers’ inability to track
the truth, and the a mismatch between the intuitive grounds of making judg-
ments of taste and what determines the truth of those judgments. Moreover,
Sundell’s and Recanati’s views have the bizarre consequence that two disagree-
ments which are identical except for the order of the judgments (as illustrated
by the Eggo Waﬄe and the reversed Eggo Waﬄe) require an entirely diﬀerent
kind of explanation.
Given the problems that group contextualism and relativism have, it is better
to give up the idea that the truth of judgments of taste depend on a group and
explain all disagreements as normative disagreements. In the section below we
consider Richard’s view which gives up the idea that truth depends on a group
but which takes disagreements of taste to be normative disagreements.
12.3.2 Disagreement Over How to Conceptualise Things
Richard’s (2004; 2008) account avoids the problems of group perspectivalism
since he holds that the truth of judgments of taste depends on the speaker.
Richard defends a relativist semantics but he combines it with an account of
assertions as taking a stance on what the concept in question means in the
context. It should be noted that Richard (2004) defends his view for all gradable
adjectives so his main examples are about the use of rich rather than about a
predicate of taste.
Richard’s arguments for relativism come partly from considerations about
the problems of contextualism and partly from considerations about gradable
adjectives. Since gradable adjectives don’t have determinate extensions there
are many equally good sharpenings of them. Richard holds that thinkers who
accept diﬀerent sharpenings of some vague concept are all equally correct –hence
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relativism. However, when there is disagreement over the truth of a judgment
that contains a vague expression it’s not because the speakers take the other to
have spoken falsely. Rather, they aim to influence how the other conceptualises
the issue.
Richard gives the example of disagreement over whether a person is rich.
Even when the comparison class is fixed there are many acceptable cutoﬀ points
for what counts as rich. The disagreement is about trying to make the other
change their understanding about richness. Let me quote Richard’s description
of what goes on in such cases:
Suppose that I assertively utter ’Mary is rich’, when it is not
antecedently settled for conversational purposes whether Mary is in
the term’s extension. My statement, that Mary is rich, is as much an
invitation to look at things in a certain way, as it is a representation
of how things are. In saying that Mary is rich, I am inviting you to
think of being rich in such a way that Mary counts as rich. If you
accept my invitation –that is, if you don’t demur, and carry on the
conversation– that sets the standards for wealth, for the purposes of
the conversation, so as to make what I say true. It is this idea –that
an assertion can be as much an invitation to conceptualize things in
a certain way, as a representation of how things are– that is missing
from the picture of assertion on which the objection [to relativism]
rests. (Richard, 2004, 226)
Except for Richard’s commitment to relativist semantics, does his account of
disagreements diﬀer from Barker’s who held that such disagreements are over
the cutoﬀ point of an expression in the context? Richard emphasises that the
disagreement is not metalinguistic, and it’s not merely over how the expression
ought to be used in the context. Rather, it’s about the concept : for example,
about what it is to be rich. Richard holds that such disputes are not over facts
but about “ways of looking at things”, of conceptualising certain phenomena.
And since he holds that the truth of vague claims is relative to individuals his
view has the advantage that judgments made in diﬀerent contexts can be taken
to conflict whereas a story which takes disagreements to be over the context
cannot explain that.
Recanati and Sundell held that in certain disagreements speakers take a
stance on what the group’s standards should be. Richard’s account is quite
similar except that he doesn’t think the standards of the groups play any role
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which is an advantage given the problems of group views highlighted when
discussing flexible contextualism. But both kinds of views hold that a speaker
is taking a stance on how a certain phenomenon, say deliciousness, should be
understood, even when they know that others are speaking the truth (either
given the group’s current standard or given their concepts).
The question we need to answer is whether that is a plausible account of
disagreements of taste. First, what is the point of reconceptualising if the con-
cepts that speakers have are equally accurate or reasonable? Here is Richard’s
answer:
Suppose that you and I conceptualize some matter in diﬀerent
ways. Perhaps you find things funny that I do not; or I find a certain
way of being in the world sexy while you don’t [...] I can try to think
my way into your way of thinking about things, or you can try to
do this with mine. One or the other of us may find benefits in the
reconceptualization. It may be easier to process certain information,
or make predictions. It may make us happier, or more satisfied, or
just strike us that things make more sense in one or another way
if we think as the other does. If one of us finds such benefits, we
may trade in our old way of thinking of humor, sexiness, maturity,
or knowledge for the new one. As I see it, such Gestalt shifts don’t
have to be a matter [sic] shifts in the overall truth of one’s world
view.
Richard’s answer seems to be that even if the various conceptualisations are
equally correct from the descriptive point of view, there are other reasons besides
truth or information sharing that may influence one to change one’s viewpoint.
That seems right about many topics. For example, the proverbial glass can be
equally truthfully described as half full or half empty, but the person who sees
it half full may thereby be happier.
12.3.3 Socratic Disagreements
The worry with Richard’s account is that given our diﬀerent tastes, the story
of reconceptualising might not make much sense with judgments of personal
taste. Let us first think a bit about the idea of reconceptualising. Concepts are
about things in the world, and it’s not clear whether it’s possible to distinguish
between disagreements over how to conceptualise a certain phenomenon and
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how to understand that phenomenon. Part of trying to understand the nature
of a certain phenomenon is to inquire into the language used to talk about it.
Philosophy of language typically forms a part of any metaphysical inquiry.
For example, when we want to know what is justice, we need to look at diﬀerent
cases and observe which ones we would intuitively call instances of justice or
injustice. We then try to construct a theory which makes sense of our usage as
much as possible. Let us call Socratic disagreements the kind of disagreements
which aim to understand better the nature of some phenomenon.
The disagreements that Richard describes look like Socratic disagreements.
But can we have Socratic disagreements about taste if relativism is true and
we know it to be true? It doesn’t seem to make sense to conceptualise the
world the same way as someone who actually doesn’t share our taste. Here’s
an illustration. Suppose you and I know that tastes are relative. We’re both
equally good at drawing landscapes but I find it boring whereas you find it very
enjoyable. You are enthusiastically talking about landscape drawing to which I
say “It’s not fun”. You disagree and try to convince me as follows: “But isn’t it
a great feeling when the landscape begins to take shape in the drawing and you
feel like your lines are coming to life?”. I can see that that’s how you experience
it, but to me it’s just tedious work which leaves me cold. Since I don’t enjoy
drawing landscapes, you have no chance of convincing me by describing me your
experiences. It would make no sense for me to reconceptualise my understanding
of fun so that drawing landscapes is included, given that I don’t enjoy it.
The point is that if we know that relativism is true about taste, then we
also know that people’s tastes diﬀer. Therefore we should also know that if
they disagree with us there’s no point in trying to convince them. In the case of
taste we know that the diﬀerences in our judgments is not merely due to diﬀerent
conceptualisations but due to our diﬀerent experiences. Since a relativist holds
that those experiences make our judgments true, trying to make someone change
their mind amounts to convincing them to accept beliefs that don’t really fit
how they are. The reasons Richard gives for reconceptualising –seeing things
from a diﬀerent point of view and so on– are absent with judgments of taste,
and therefore it isn’t a good explanation for why we disagree about taste. I
should emphasise that I think Richard’s account might work perfectly well with
aesthetic expressions or expressions that are about taste but have less to do
with direct personal experience, e.g. stylish. These considerations apply equally
to Sundell’s and Recanati’s theories.
There is one caveat to make regarding the scope of my argument. Richard
211
(2004) does hold that the truth of judgments about gradable adjectives (and
know) depends on the speaker. However, since he defends the account mainly
for other adjectives than predicates of taste, he might not think that there is
any extra taste or perspective dependence in the case of taste predicates besides
the subjectivity they have due to their vagueness. If his view is that predicates
of taste are relatively true just because of the vagueness they exhibit, then
his view faces the same criticism that we made against Barker (2013) in Ch. 3:
Gradability and Perspective Dependence. Finally, I should add that the criticism
of his view is only targeted to judgments of taste, and whether his relativism
works for other gradable adjectives is outside the scope of our discussion.
12.4 Summary of Chapter 12
This chapter evaluated accounts which hold that disagreements of taste are
not about whether those judgments are true or not. We first had a look at
Ayer’s and Stevenson’s emotivist accounts of disagreements which have influ-
enced contemporary views on evaluative expressions and disagreements. We
then considered whether Gibbardian pragmatics of normative language would
be helpful in explaining disagreements of taste. MacFarlane states that the aim
of disagreements of taste is ultimately to coordinate our tastes, not to disagree
over the truth of the contents in question. I’ve given three arguments for why
adopting the Gibbardian pragmatics doesn’t help the relativist.
First, a contextualist can equally adopt Gibbardian pragmatics and since
contextualist semantics is well understood and traditional, it’s better to be a
contextualist than a relativist if –as I’ve argued– the semantics plays no role
in explaining the linguistic data. Second, whereas we can see why we would
want to coordinate our views on morality, it’s hard to understand why anyone
would want to coordinate personal tastes. And third, I’ve argued that the
methods that Gibbard says we use to coordinate our moral beliefs do not work
in coordinating our tastes. To conclude, Gibbardian pragmatics of normative
language is designed to explain the general features of conversations about moral
matters, but conversations about taste are not relevantly similar to them. We
don’t really have a need to coordinate with our tastes and hence it’s just not
plausible that disagreements of taste are all about attempts at coordination.
There’s also a more general worry regarding Gibbard’s expressivism. He may
be right about the general features of normative conversations and of our desire
to coordinate, but we still need to understand why normative conversations have
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those features and why we want to coordinate. After all, a simplest explanation
would be that coordination is merely a by-product of going through reasoning
which allows us to converge in believing the truth.
The second part of the chapter looked at Recanati’s, Sundell’s, and Richard’s
accounts of disagreements of taste. Recanati’s and Sundell’s views are highly
similar to Glanzberg’s group contextualism whose problems we’ve seen earlier.
Moreover, their accounts end up having to give two very diﬀerent explanations
to two kinds of disagreements whose only diﬀerence is the order in which the
conflicting judgments are made. Richard explained disagreements of taste as re-
conceptualisations of the issue under question. I’ve argued that discussions over
concepts make sense as Socratic disagreements. But when the truth is relative
and the speakers know it –as Richard thinks is the case– Socratic disagreement
makes little sense.
This chapter concludes our discussion of relativism and contextualism. Since
both accounts in their various forms have proved unsuccessful, we will next con-
sider a theory which gives up perspective-dependent semantics and consequently
opts for an error theory of taste discourses.
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Part IV
Alternatives to Contextualism and
Relativism
13 An Error Theory for Discourses About Taste
In the previous two parts of the thesis we saw that neither contextualist nor re-
lativist accounts are satisfactory. The major problem with the views discussed
in the previous chapters is the lack of a successful general explanation for dis-
agreements of taste. In order for us to explain why people disagree about taste
we need to understand disagreements from the point of view of the speakers. In
other words, we need to know what is it that they take themselves to be doing.
What I will argue for in this chapter is that disagreements of taste are best
explained as people aiming to have a Socratic disagreement, as I called dis-
agreements over the nature of some phenomenon. However, a Socratic disagree-
ment only makes sense either when the proposition in question isn’t perspective-
dependent, or the speakers don’t take it to be perspective-dependent. I argue
that indeed, speakers do not take predicates of taste to be perspective-dependent
which explains why they disagree. This chapter presents arguments to show that
the folk view about taste is objectivism.
Now, given the assumptions that the contents of expressions are determined
by people’s beliefs and intentions and that objectivism is the folk view, then pre-
dicates of taste should get perspective-independent semantics. However, since
we’ve rejected taste objectivism as an untenable metaphysical view, there are no
objective taste properties that can make perspective-independent judgments of
taste true. Therefore, positive judgments of taste come out false. Such an error
theory is familiar from metaethics where many have argued for a similar clash
between apparently objectivist judgments and non-objectivist metaphysics.
The chapter has two main aims. The first is to argue that objectivism is
indeed the folk view since it best explains most of the linguistic data. The
second aim is to put the error theory forward as a serious alternative to the
currently defended views. In the next chapter we will have a closer look at the
metasemantics behind error theories and I will argue that the error theorist’s
interpretation of intention-based metasemantics is not a good one. Therefore I
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will ultimately reject the error theory, but if one endorses their metasemantic
approach it’s better to adopt an error theory of taste discourses than either
contextualism or relativism.
13.1 Objectivism as the Folk View About Taste
In Ch. 2: The Evaluative Dimension of Judgments of Taste we discussed taste
objectivism which holds that objects or events have taste properties which do not
depend on the perceptions of anyone. We saw that the view was metaphysically
implausible and concluded that taste properties depend on the responses of
creatures. Nevertheless, we should not expect that metaphysical truths are
somehow inherent either in people’s conceptions of things or in language which
reflects the former.
Indeed, semantics and metaphysics don’t always match. Thus, even if object-
ivism about taste is false it might nevertheless be the folk view about taste, i.e.
the beliefs of the majority of the speakers about taste may hold that truths about
taste do not depend on variable perspectives. Recent perspective-dependent the-
ories hold that the falsity of objectivist metaphysics is not an esoteric fact but
something that everyone is supposed to know. If the falsity of objectivism is
indeed known by everyone, then non-perspectival semantics would be implaus-
ible as it would assign contents that the speakers wouldn’t take themselves as
asserting, and those contents would also be false.
However, we have seen that perspective-dependent theories in the form of
contextualism and relativism are not successful. Therefore we need to consider
seriously the possibility that the way people talk about taste is a consequence
of their believing in objectivist metaphysics. This section argues for that con-
clusion by looking at the kinds of discussions people have about taste, and of
the role of critics and experts on taste in our cultures. The next section focuses
on disagreements and argues that they are best explained as Socratic disagree-
ments, the notion of which I introduced in section 12.3.3.
The arguments I give thus rely on the best explanation of various uses of
judgments of taste. Currently such considerations are the best evidence we have
for folk theories of taste since we don’t know what people really think about
matters of taste. Some experimental psychologists and philosophers have began
to address the issue and I discuss their studies in the Appendix. However, I
argue that each of the studies either has some flaws or it doesn’t show what
the authors claim it does. Therefore the existing experimental data is at best
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suggestive.
Let me now oﬀer some considerations in order to show that a lot of the ways
people talk about taste makes best sense if we suppose that the underlying
folk theory of taste is objectivism. Note that we need not suppose that people
have some clearly formulated view in their mind or that they are aware of the
consequences of that view. Rather, my claim is that most judgments of taste
are made with the vague assumption that tastes are relevantly similar and that
there are non-relative truths about questions of taste, no matter how hard or
even impossible it is to discover them.
First, think about the long discussions people have surrounding matters of
taste. For example, I’ve been impressed with the conversations one can induce
in Italians by asking them questions like “Which is the best kind of pasta?”. Or
watch the French talk hours and hours about food and try making sense of it
thinking that they’re all just talking about their own taste. Or, imagine that
you’re having a meal at a relative’s or a friend’s place and they ask you how
the meal was. If people were subjectivists about taste it should be ok to say “I
didn’t like it”. But by saying that you would actually be implicating that the
food wasn’t good, objectively speaking, thereby insulting the cook.
The very idea of good and bad taste makes sense only on the background
of objectivism: if taste was just a matter of personal likes and dislikes, what
would it mean that someone has a bad taste? Admittedly, we can talk of bad
taste ironically or as an exaggeration. But nevertheless, there is even a a certain
amount of consensus regarding what counts as bad taste. For example Stern
and Stern (1990) oﬀer a fascinating look into visual and cultural phenomena
that are broadly considered to be of bad taste –ironically of course, but if taste
was merely a personal matter, talk of bad taste would not work, even ironically.
It is worth pointing out that what is considered bad taste is certainly linked to
a class society and to ideas of distinguishing one’s self from the lower classes
(Bourdieu, 1984). Nevertheless, that sociological truth is unlikely to be any
more obvious to people than are metaphysical truths about taste.
The importance of matters of taste is shown in the pleasure we take in
discussing and disagreeing over the values of things: which foods or drinks are
good and why, which clothes are pretty or stylish, which activities are most fun.
Serious discussions about taste certainly make most sense if we suppose folk
objectivism. The point of explaining to someone why one shouldn’t add ketchup
to a bolognese sauce is typically not because one personally doesn’t like it, but
that there is something inherently (gustatorily) bad about the combination.
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By convincing another of what one considers to be a truth about taste (e.g.
“There shall be no ketchup in bolognese sauce”) one aims to make them better
oﬀ. That’s the point of truths: they’re informative, and knowing truths usually
makes life easier. In contrast, truths about one’s personal taste are irrelevant
to pretty much anyone else. Supposing that judgments of taste are always
subjective fails to make sense of the importance we grant to discussions about
taste in our lives.
Admittedly it is diﬃcult to tell genuinely objectivist judgments from mere
exaggeration or loose talk. But still, objectivism about taste is not only a an
unreflective attitude people occasionally lapse into but a sort of default approach
to taste which is manifest in various forms in our societies. Any travel guide is
filled with authoritative statements about the gustatory or other taste-related
values of places, activities, cocktail bars, pubs and restaurants, and the same
holds of other guidebooks and reviews in general. People follow the advice
because they trust that the critics are sophisticated, knowledgeable and able
to discriminate the good from the bad. If the advice leads one for example to
eat food that seriously displeases one, a typical response is to think that the
critic doesn’t know what she is talking about; she doesn’t have a good taste,
and shouldn’t be working on a profession that requires it.
Let me give an example of the kind of cultural phenomenon that I take to
manifest objectivism about taste. Here’s a quote from an article by the French
correspondent of the BBC news:
Take one picture I saw recently (...) It was supposed to be a
bitter-sweet comedy (...) What we got was two hours of incon-
sequential, plotless twaddle (...) Or take the comedy Le Vilain (The
Villain) which has just come out. It is billed as an oﬀbeat caper (...)
my 14-year-old daughter and I both agreed, on emerging, that there
was one minor drawback: it wasn’t funny. (...) My point is that
(...) what we had been led to believe was that these films were actu-
ally pretty remarkable. (...) It was the serious critics in Le Monde,
Le Figaro and elsewhere, who used adjectives like hilarious, tender,
burlesque, complex, original.”
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_
correspondent/8474488.stm)
The quote is from an article that aims to show how the French culture is doing
poorly because they refuse to see its poorness, and instead even the serious
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critics praise mediocre cinematic works. The author is so confident in his own
and the 14-year-old daughter’s abilities of discerning what is genuinely funny
that he concludes that all the critics are either self-deluded or intentionally
misleading because they want to maintain that French movies are still great.
The author even admits later in the article that others in the audience did find
it funny: “I may not have found Le Vilain funny, but a lot of people in the
audience were in stitches.” Still, that doesn’t deter him from holding that the
movie just wasn’t funny.
Again, ironic or not, the journalist’s very argument on the poor state of
French culture relies on his own ability to track the funniness of films (an ability
he considers superior to the abilities of all those others in the audience who were
in stitches). If subjectivism about taste was indeed the default view as most
philosophers hold, the author would have simply concluded after the film that
his sense of humour is diﬀerent from that of the French. But instead, he goes
for an elaborate conspiracy theory of lying critics because he believes that they
really do evaluate the film as he does –as not funny.
I hold that the above examples are evidence for the view that objectivism is
the folk view. But I also want to add that there shouldn’t be anything surprising
that it is the folk view. After all, our tastes are pretty much alike. Compare
matters of taste to some clearly objective matters of fact like whether a certain
economical or historical theory is correct. In the latter case there are major
epistemological obstacles in finding out the truth, but clearly there is a truth.
Likewise we may suppose that it’s diﬃcult to find the truth about taste but
often we do agree, and when we don’t, we need to keep on searching for the
truth.
We know that with matters of taste education and experience change us
and make our tastes more refined. So it is a rather natural assumption that we
would converge in our tastes if only we had the same experiences, and there-
fore diverging judgments can be interpreted as manifesting for example lack of
experience. Now, I’ve mentioned that we don’t have any actual data about
people’s beliefs about taste, and my above considerations are based on limited
observations. Nevertheless, the idea that objectivism is the folk view of taste
explains all the uses I’ve mentioned and therefore should be taken seriously.
Are there arguments aiming to show that objectivism is not the folk view?
MacFarlane (2014) argues that people realise the falsity of objectivism because
of its epistemological consequences:
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Although I have known some objectivists about “tasty”, most
people seem to recoil from the view. They do not think that there is
a “fact of the matter” about whether a thing is tasty in the way that
there is a fact of the matter about whether it is red or deciduous or
acidic. What underlies this intuition, I suggest, is a realization that
if “tasty”, like “poisonous”, expresses an objective property of things,
then our ordinary methods for deciding which things to call “tasty”
are radically defective. What methods are these? To a pretty good
first approximation, we call a food “tasty” when we find its taste
pleasing, and “not tasty” when we do not. (MacFarlane, 2014, 4)
Let us try to spell out MacFarlane’s argument a bit. He says that if we suppose
that objectivism were true, then we would have to conclude that relying on our
own tastes as the grounds for our judgments of taste is a very fallible method to
find out the objective taste properties. Why? Presumably because we disagree
about taste a lot, and if objectivism is true, in every disagreement of taste at
most one can be correct. Perhaps the idea is that if we believed in objectivism
we would be much more careful in making our judgments because we would
know the large possibilities of error. But we do make judgments of taste all the
time on the basis of our own tastes.
First, if that’s the argument I think MacFarlane intellectualises people too
much. Being often wrong would only deter the careful types from making as-
sertions. And there are normally no consequences of making a judgment of
taste that turns out to be considered false and therefore there’s no reason to
be cautious. Secondly, there is no conflict between the idea that we make judg-
ments on the basis of our own taste and that objectivism is true; all we need
is the assumption that normally our senses correctly track the value properties
of things. Now, people are known to think of themselves as better than most
others in all kinds of domains, so it wouldn’t be surprising that they think their
taste is superior. And since in a genuine disagreement of taste it’s very hard
to conclude who if any is right, people won’t often be shown wrong. MacFar-
lane’s claim about the radical defectiveness of the ordinary method is thus an
exaggeration.
We should also distinguish between a justified and a true assertion. Even
if objectivism were true, we still wouldn’t have other methods besides our own
taste to use (besides the word of authority but that’s mostly not available).
Since in most cases its the best method there is, and as said, its verdicts nor-
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mally aren’t proven to be false, it would seem that people are justified in making
judgments of taste. In that sense even an objectivist could admit that a judg-
ment of taste is “faultless”. But it doesn’t follow that every judgment of taste
is true; that depends on whether the agent indeed tracks the value properties.
To give an analogy, imagine that there were a society most of whose members
perceived colours somewhat (but not radically) diﬀerently, and no authority to
say whose colour perception was the accurate or normal (compared to other
humans) one. These people would know that things are red, green, blue, or
so on, and they would do their best given their variant perceptions to figure
out which objects have which colours. Even if they would very often disagree,
they wouldn’t give up on the belief that the objects have their true colours,
even if they were fallible in attributing them. And if their opinions would
often converge, they would be justified in using their vision as the grounds –
albeit fallible grounds– for their judgments. The objectivist view on taste and
disagreement is pretty much like that.
Thus, the objectivist will hold that one may be justified in taking something
to be fun or delicious given one’s limited previous experiences, but whether
something is fun or delicious is not just a matter of one’s current likes and
dislikes. Experience can teach us, and just as we come to change many of our
beliefs regarding the “objective matters of fact” (e.g. that the funny furniture
in the living room is called a chaise longue, or that whales aren’t fish), we come
to change our beliefs about taste.
13.2 Disagreements of Taste As Socratic Disagreements
Let us return to the notion of Socratic disagreements introduced in the previous
chapter. I will argue that disagreements of taste aim to be Socratic disagree-
ments and we engage in them because we believe in an objective truth about
matters of taste. In other words, disagreements of taste are Socratic in the sense
that just like Socrates’ discussions aimed to uncover truths about diﬃcult to
grasp phenomena like justice, disagreements of taste are likewise attempts to
find out truths about taste.
Let me first give a speculative story for why we have Socratic disagreements
about taste in the first place. Predicates of taste are learnt like any other
predicates. Suppose a child who is learning new words hears judgments of
personal taste, for example “This pizza is delicious” or “There’s a fun movie in
the TV tonight”. What is first observable to the child is merely that the people
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appear to like the pizza and that they laugh or seem amused when watching
the movie. And supposedly, once the child is old enough to participate in
such reactions, they realise that the predicates apply to things that cause such
reactions. So whenever the child is amused by something she says it’s fun, and
when something tastes really good, it’s delicious.
But now, tastes diﬀer so eventually there must come a time when the child
encounters someone who isn’t similarly amused and who disagrees with the
child’s judgment. “What is going on?” asks the child herself, puzzled. Clearly
the game they were playing is fun since she is amused. She might insist that
the game is fun and think that her friend is stupid. But then again, how does
the child know that she was using the predicate correctly? After all, she only
ever observed people’s external behaviours, thinking that those correlate with
their inner responses. But fun things don’t always correlate with smiling or
laughing (roller coasters come to mind here). Moreover, she will notice that
things she used to think were fun are not fun anymore and she thinks that’s
because she now knows better. So perhaps the occasional disagreements makes
her aware of the possibility that she doesn’t always know whether applying fun
is appropriate.
Generally, the words of our language are governed by public conventions.
Therefore we don’t think that our private impressions are enough to fully de-
termine how to apply predicates of taste either. We might take our private
impressions merely as guides to the relevant properties, but the correctness of
the attributions is a public matter, just like with any other predicate that we
apply to objects outside ourselves. Moreover, we discuss matters of taste be-
cause we assume –sometimes reasonably, other times not– that our tastes are
relevantly similar, and that therefore we can calibrate the uses of our words
beyond our rough private impressions. Disagreements are cases where we take
our own experiences as evidence for our own point of view but where we are nev-
ertheless seeking for the objective truth, not the truth about how we experience
the object.
The problem with the method is that the Socratic inquiry will never find
the truth about taste: even though our tastes may be roughly similar, they
are not similar enough so that there could be a unique truth about matters
of taste. And maybe that is why disputes about taste are sometimes perfectly
reasonable, sometimes entirely intractable. A reasonable dispute can take place
if the speakers are similar and engage in something like a calibration of the
words –not necessarily permanent calibration, but at least for the purposes of
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the conversation. Or they may even practice a long-term inquiry into what
should be meant by delicious as applied to diﬀerent foods. But if the speakers
are not relevantly similar and they don’t realise that, the discussion is bound
to be confused.
For example, suppose two people discuss the taste of Brussels sprouts. One
of them happens to be a supertaster and the other a taster.48 Neither of them
like the vegetable but the supertaster finds it nasty and horrible, the taster
merely somewhat unpleasant. The taster thinks that the supertaster is just
exaggerating whereas the supertaster thinks the taster is being overly meek in
her opinions about the vegetable that is obviously terrible. There is really no
way for ordinary people to track such diﬀerences: both of them would agree
that the Brussels sprouts taste bitter, but there isn’t a fixed scale on what level
of bitterness deserves to be called very bitter, or nastily bitter. So they might
think they are trying to find out the truth about Brussels sprouts. There isn’t
anything that would make them realise that their diﬀerent opinions are not just
due to the way they conceptualise bitter, but also to how bitterness tastes to
them.
To conclude, I think the most sensible story of disagreements of taste is
that they are Socratic disagreements which aim to discover the truth about the
nature of the object or event in question. We assume that our tastes are similar
and that is often true. When we are lucky and we do experience the object
or event in a similar way our discussions may be perfectly rational. If we do
disagree, it might be because we don’t conceptualise things in exactly the same
way. But more often it’s because we just don’t have the same experiences and
our tastes are too diﬀerent for us to be able to discuss the matter. But since
we don’t realise that, our disagreement may be intractable, endless, and make
little sense.
Now, let me address some possible objections. First, one can point out that
contradicting judgments of taste don’t systematically give an impression of a
disagreement as we saw with the cases by Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) in
Ch. 8: Flexible Contextualism. That’s true, and in section 13.5.1 below I take
up what I said when discussing the cases and argue that any successful theory
must distinguish between objectivist and subjectivist uses. The former give rise
to Socratic disagreements whereas the subjectivist uses typically don’t lead to
48In section 2.3 we looked at the data about genetic variation in tasting bitter flavours
as evidence against objectivism about taste. Supertasters taste many foodstuﬀ as extremely
bitter, tasters somewhat too bitter, and non-tasters not too bitter.
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disagreements at all.
A second objection goes as follows. As I say in my speculative story above, a
child learns that a predicate of taste is applied when they cause a certain reaction
in one, for example that of amusement. Doesn’t this mean that they learn
precisely the perspective-dependent theory that MacFarlane was advocating:
“To a pretty good first approximation, we call a food “tasty” when we find its
taste pleasing, and “not tasty” when we do not.” (MacFarlane, 2014). What
I’ve argued above is that the experience is taken to constitute evidence for the
judgment of taste, but it is not taken to be infallible evidence. For example,
judgments about colours are made on the basis of one’s personal experiences.
Nevertheless we presuppose that objects have their colours and if we disagree
about the colour of something we know that usually we just need to consult
more people to find out the answer.
A third possible objection emphasises that we learn that our personal exper-
iences about objects vary since that is manifested by ubiquitous disagreements.
Therefore a person should realise at some point that there’s just isn’t enough
similarity between our experiences for them to be evidence for objective proper-
ties of objects. Here it’s important to point out in which way predicates of taste
are diﬀerent from colour predicates. Our colour judgments are grounded in our
visual experiences and since there are plenty of examples of colours around us
all one has to do is to learn to correctly name diﬀerent instances of colours. If
we did always disagree about colour attributions, we probably would conclude
that colours are perspective-dependent.
In contrast, with taste we don’t have such prototypes of e.g. what is deli-
cious. Therefore there is more room for discussion and reflection over whether
something should count as being delicious. Therefore, a disagreement doesn’t
need to manifest a clash of experiences. For example, suppose one calls a certain
pizza delicious but a disagreement arises leading to a discussion which shows
that the hearer disqualifies the pizza from being delicious because the crust is
too thick. Maybe the speaker hadn’t really paid attention to the thickness of
pizza crusts before, and she may begin to think that a certain kind of crust
is indeed essential to a delicious pizza. In such a case the disagreement does
lead one to re-conceptualise delicious as applied to pizzas. The disagreement
thus wasn’t just due to two clashing experiences, but to one person not paying
attention to a relevant experience that is part of the overall experience of the
pizza, namely the consistency of the crust.
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13.3 From Objectivist Folk Theory to Perspective-Independent
Contents
Suppose that objectivism is the folk theory of taste. Above I was mainly de-
scribing the diﬀerent ways that judgments of taste are used, remaining neutral
on the semantic contents of judgments of taste. However, many philosophers
hold that the speakers’ beliefs and intentions and the meanings of expressions
are intimately connected. For example, Gricean metasemantics holds that it is
the intentions of the speakers that ultimately determine the contents of utter-
ances (Grice, 1989). Here is Neale’s description of the Gricean view on meaning
determination:
The important metaphysical question is this: what determines
what a speaker said on a given occasion? And the Gricean answer
I subscribe to is this: certain specific intentions the speaker had in
producing his utterance. These intentions are referential and pre-
dicational, and they are severely constrained by the speaker’s tacit
grasp of syntax, of the meanings of the words he uses, and of the
way rational, co-operative beings function, his beliefs about the audi-
ence, about the context, and about the topic of conversation, and
probably a whole lot more. (Neale, 2007, 359, footnote 7)
If intentions are essential to utterance contents, then one could argue that the
objectivist beliefs influence the contents of judgments of taste. If a speaker
believes in objectivism, he intends to make an objectivist judgment, and –
supposing that the constraints described by Neale above are observed– the pre-
dicate of taste in the judgment will get a perspective-independent content. And
the Gricean approach doesn’t only have consequences for particular utterances.
Since we are supposing that objectivism is the default view of the speakers,
the meaning of predicates of taste should be perspective-independent, as a con-
sequence of the folk view.
The Gricean view is manifest in the following citations from Mackie which
illustrate his move from what the speakers intend to talk about to the meanings
of moral expressions:
The ordinary user of moral language means to say something
about whatever it is that he characterizes morally, for example a
possible action, as it is in itself, or would be if it were realized, and
not about, or even simply expressive of, his, or anyone else’s, attitude
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or relation to it. But the something he wants to say is not purely
descriptive, certainly not inert, but something that involves a call
for action or for the refraining from action, and one that is absolute,
not contingent upon any desire or preference or policy or choice, his
own or anyone else’s. (Mackie, 1977, 33)
I conclude, then, that ordinary moral judgments include a claim
to objectivity, an assumption that there are objective values in just
the sense in which I am concerned to deny this. And I do not think
it is going too far to say that this assumption has been incorporated
in the basic, conventional, meanings of moral terms. Any analysis
of the meanings of moral terms which omits this claim to objective,
intrinsic, prescriptivity is to that extent incomplete [...]. (Mackie,
1977, 35)
If one agrees with Grice’s and Mackie’s views on metasemantics as being de-
termined by what a speaker intends to say, and one agrees that folk objectivism
best explains people’s uses of judgments of taste, then one has an argument for
perspective-independent semantics for predicates of taste. The argument holds
that given that people believe taste properties to be independent of perspective,
the meaning or semantic value of predicates of taste has to be perspective-
independent too.
The line of reasoning that leads to the view is familiar from the defenders
of an error theory of moral judgments. One of the presuppositions that we’ve
made together with other theorists of taste is that taste objectivism is false. If
one also accepts that speakers intend to make objectivist judgments, and that
speakers intentions determine meaning, one can argue for an error theory of
judgments of taste. In the next chapter we return to the issue of metasemantics
but let us next look at how an error theory of taste discourses is like.
13.4 Error Theory for Taste Discourses
Suppose that we conclude that the best explanation for the way people talk
about matters of taste is their underlying objectivist beliefs. A natural conclu-
sion is that perspective-independent semantics is correct nevertheless given that
speakers intend to make perspective-independent judgments. However, since ob-
jectivist judgments attribute taste properties that aren’t instantiated we end up
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with an error theory about taste discourse. The possibility isn’t considered in
the literature, and for example Lasersohn dismisses it as follows:
I assume that our primary goal is to give an analysis of sen-
tences containing predicates of personal taste which assigns them a
coherent semantics, [footnote 4: Therefore I do not consider “error”
theories, which assign such sentences incoherent or automatically
false readings.] (Lasersohn, 2005, 650)
But there are no reasons to dismiss error theories out of hand since for many
expressions they are clearly the best choice. And indeed, taking for granted
certain premises an error theory of judgments of taste seems quite plausible.
First, let us look at error theories generally. An error theory usually refers
to a theory that holds that some particular expression or an area of discourse
has truth-conditional semantics and is used to make non-fictional assertoric
judgments, but these systematically fail to be true.49 The most well-known
error theories are metaethical views which hold that our basic moral vocabulary
is in a fundamental way flawed and consequently positive attributions of moral
predicates (e.g. Killing is wrong) are either false or don’t get a truth-value
(depending on some further commitments; for a discussion, see Joyce (2001, ch.
1)). This characterisation is vague and incomplete but for our purposes the
basic idea of the view should be clear enough.50
What kind of flaws of language then lead to systematic falsehoods? The
typical problem is that the relevant judgments aim to predicate a non-fictional
property but the predicate has an empty extension.51 Examples of such ex-
pressions include scientific terms like phlogiston and terms that belong to failed
explanatory schemes like astrology and numerology, or various belief systems
that posit supernatural things like spirits, witches or magic –atheists of course
include religions in this category. Some have defended an error theory for pre-
dicates referring to abstract objects including numbers (Field, 1980).
49The label has also been used of “semantic blindness” views which take the speakers to be
somewhat ignorant of the truth-conditions; see Schiﬀer (1996); Stanley (2005a).
50For the problems involved in trying to spell out an error theory, see Kalderon (2005, ch.
3).
51We won’t discuss the diﬀerences and similarities between utterances about fictional prop-
erties or entities and utterances about merely non-existent properties or entities. It’s possible
that a theory about fictional language could be applied to utterances about the latter, hence
making the allegedly erroneous utterances true, but true about fiction rather than the real
world. Joyce (2001) argues that moral language fails to state truths and hence ought to be
reinterpreted as talk of fiction. Kalderon (2005) argues that despite of the failure of moral lan-
guage to state truths that’s not what we do anyway: rather, we engage in fictional discussions
when we talk about morality in order to express our non-cognitive attitudes.
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Other popular candidates for an error theory are epistemic expressions and
most importantly the verb know. Skepticism has been and is still a serious
alternative (see e.g. Unger (1975)). Finally and most relevantly for our pur-
poses, one can be an error theorist for expressions that purport to denote a
property which turns (or turned) out to be a relation. Examples include judg-
ments about mass, movement and simultaneity (Boghossian, 2006), and moral
expressions (Mackie (1977); Joyce (2001)).
An error theory of taste discourse is an instance of the last type. The view
holds that given that objectivism is the folk view of taste, predicates of taste have
perspective-independent semantics. Perspective-independent semantics is thus
taken to be a consequence of the concepts that the speakers have. But, there
are no objective taste properties that can make the perspective-independent
judgments true. Therefore a judgment like Jellied eels are delicious is false
since nothing has the perspective-independent property of deliciousness.
An error theory might seem excessively radical. Could it really be that
we can have apparently perfectly coherent discussions over some topic while
actually saying mere falsehoods? The answer is yes, as evidenced by the large
numbers of mistaken empirical assumptions which are slowly being replaced by
the discoveries of the sciences. Just the example of religious beliefs is enough
to make the point. Even a religious person will have to admit that billions of
people hold masses of false beliefs about religion since not all religions can be
true, and an atheist holds that even more people are constantly being guided
by a very large number of false beliefs.
At the core of an error theory is the claim that people’s beliefs about some
domain are inconsistent or false. Generally it does seem that people hold a very
large number of false empirical beliefs, and they do use expressions intending to
refer to something whereas those expressions in fact either refer to nothing or
at least they don’t refer to the things they imagine the expressions to refer to.
Therefore the mere imputing of error to people shouldn’t be in itself objection-
able. If one accepts that objectivism is the folk theory of most people, and that
meanings are determined by the beliefs people have, then the case for an error
theory is very strong indeed.
Finally I should make a caveat and point out that certain expressions which
some theorists take to be predicates of taste, for example funny, stylish, fash-
ionable or cool might be candidates for a view where the relevant property is
taken to be dependent on the responses of the experts. Such a view would
give up the intuition of many relevant perspectives, but it wouldn’t be an error
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theory since it would take the truth to depend on the tastes of some privileged
individuals. The above expressions do not seem “personal” the same way as
e.g. fun or delicious, because the judgments about the former are not grounded
merely in one’s experiential states. Doerfler (2012) defends a view like that for
funny, and Pountain and Robins (2000) argue that certain attributions of cool
to persons are true in virtue of a certain specific psychological attitude which
makes its holder cool (in contrast to the more “personal” uses of cool with which
the speaker expresses her approval or appreciation).
Before we get to some objections to an error theory of taste discourses, let
me summarise the argument thus far. First I’ve argued that people’s uses of
judgments of taste, including disagreements of taste, are best explained by tak-
ing them to hold an objectivist theory of taste. Second, the Gricean view which
holds that people’s beliefs and intentions determine meanings is very widespread
and often accepted without much argument. If one holds the Gricean view and
that the folk theory of taste gets the metaphysics of taste fundamentally wrong,
then an error theory looks plausible. I haven’t said much about the metase-
mantics since that will be the core topic of the next chapter, but let us for the
moment set the issue aside. I will next consider some possible objections to an
error theory and answers to them.
13.5 Objections to Error Theory of Taste
13.5.1 Subjectivist Uses
Above I illustrated the objectivist uses of judgments of taste, made with the
presupposition that there is an objective truth about taste. But I’ve argued in
Ch. 8: Flexible Contextualism that at the other extreme there are subjectivist
uses where one merely aims at stating something about one’s own taste. For
the moment we don’t need to take a stance on whether the diﬀerence is also a
semantic diﬀerence, but we are supposing that there is a pragmatic diﬀerence
between the two uses. For simplicity, let me speak interchangeably of judg-
ments and uses of judgments so as not to get bogged down to questions of the
judgments’ content.
One makes an explicitly subjectivist judgment of taste by using various lin-
guistic tools for subjectivising one’s judgment, for example:
(181) To me curry wurst is delicious.
(182) I find curry wurst delicious.
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Now, I’ve argued that some judgments of taste are pragmatically or truth-
conditionally equivalent to explicitly subjective judgments, despite of superfi-
cially being ordinary judgments of taste like “Curry wurst is delicious”. Argu-
ably, subjectivist judgments are revealed by the speaker’s behaviour in situations
where a disagreement might arise or one’s past judgments are brought up. For
example, subjectivist uses won’t give rise to serious, ongoing disagreements. Let
me illustrate. Suppose Alice finds oysters disgusting. She is now at a restaurant
with Bob where we can imagine the following exchange to take place:
(183) (a) Alice (pointing at oysters): Look, oysters! They’re disgusting.
(b) Bob: No they’re not, they’re delicious.
(c) Alice: I find them pretty gross.
Suppose that in (183a) Alice only intended to express her own disgust towards
oysters. Since she didn’t make an explicitly subjective judgment Bob can negate
the sentence she used. However, since Alice never meant to talk about anyone
else’s taste she doesn’t insist on the disgustingness of oysters and instead she
reformulates her judgment in an explicitly subjective form in (183c). By doing
that she signals that she isn’t disagreeing with Bob but only making a statement
about her own taste. The exchange (183a) - (183b) is an instance of the kind of
“faultless disagreement” that the relativist and contextualist theories typically
focus on. Alice and Bob are making judgments that seem to contradict, but we
feel that both are entitled to their opinion and neither is at fault.
In some situations one’s past, conflicting judgment of taste may be brought
up. As we saw, MacFarlane (2009; 2014) has used the fact that people may
retract their past judgments of taste if they’ve now changed their minds as
an argument for the assessment sensitivity of predicates of taste. However, an
account of predicates of taste must also explain why sometimes people don’t
retract their judgments. Here is an example. Some years have passed since
Alice and Bob’s previous dialogue. Alice has come to love oysters, and she is
again in a restaurant with Bob who doesn’t know about her change of heart.
(184) (a) Alice: Oysters are so delicious!
(b) Bob: What? Last time we met you said they’re disgusting.
(c) Alice: I know, my taste has changed. They were disgusting to me
then.
Here Alice again emphasises that her previous judgment was about her taste
back then, rather than taking back what she said as false.
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Now, in what kind of situations are predicates of taste used subjectively?
First, a person who thinks that “there’s no disagreeing about taste” will only
make subjectivist judgments of taste. She intends to only speak about her own
taste and consequently she only discusses matters of taste in the Socratic sense
when they know their interlocutor have a relevantly similar taste and thus they
can disagree with the aim of mutual conceptual calibration.
A subjectivist speaker doesn’t retract her past judgments either, unless she
realises that her taste was temporarily aberrant. Note that a person may be a
subjectivist about some area of taste, for example what is fun, but an object-
ivist about something else, say deliciousness. However, subjectivist uses aren’t
limited to people who are convinced of the truth of subjectivism. If one is an
objectivist about taste, one may make a subjectivist judgment when one only
wants to talk about one’s own taste.
Now, it’s controversial that there are both subjectivist and objectivist uses
of judgments of taste, but I’ve argued that the distinction allows for the best
explanation for all the linguistic data. The distinction can also account for
diﬀerent intuitions about disagreements, and for the way speakers behave in
disagreements. For example, Francén (2010) argues that even though we take
there to be disagreements of taste, on reflection we realise that the disagreement
isn’t really about anything whereas with for example moral judgments the sense
of disagreement persists:
I think, however, that our intuitions about disagreement are dif-
ferent in the case of taste than in these other cases: even though we
sense disagreement here [in a dispute over the deliciousness of a pie],
on reflection we (or most of us at least) also think that it is not a dis-
agreement over some fact about the pie. We think instead that what
is displayed in conversations like this are diﬀerences in standards of
taste. Erica likes the taste of the pie, Jacob doesn’t. We think that
there is no diﬀerence over and above that: the conversations do not
signal that Erica and Jacob disagree about whether the pie has some
property independent of the relation it stands in to their standards
of taste; neither does it signal that they disagree about the relation
it stands in to their standards of taste respectively. So, we feel on
reflection, there is nothing they really disagree about, in the sense
of having conflicting beliefs about some matter of fact—they merely
diﬀer as to what pleases their palates. (Francén, 2010, 21).
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Francén here illustrates the point of view of a subjectivist speaker, the reflective
“us” which probably includes philosophers and other people who think about
the issue slightly more theoretically. Maybe we feel that there is nothing that
Erica and Jacob are disagreeing about and that they are merely displaying their
diﬀerent tastes. Nevertheless, they may very well take themselves as having a
genuine, meaningful debate about the deliciousness of the pie.
Now, in the previous chapters I argued that neither contextualism nor re-
lativism can make sense of all the data, as they can only account for the cases
that support the subjectivist interpretation. But then there are all the cases
of ongoing disagreements, retractions and so on that I’ve highlighted. A non-
perspectival semantics with an error theory has a great explanation for the
latter, but is as such unable to account for the subjectivist uses. However,
the problem is less serious than that of contextualism and relativism. If one
holds that predicates of taste are semantically perspective-dependent and that
speakers know it, it’s extremely diﬃcult to explain the objectivist uses as we’ve
seen. But if one holds that predicates of taste are semantically perspective-
independent, and can always hold that the subjectivist uses exist thanks to
pragmatics.
In section 8.5 I argued that a pragmatics-based flexible contextualism is one
way to explain the subjectivist uses of judgments of taste. A view that is rich
enough to account for all the data is a perspective-independent semantic account
of predicates of taste coupled with a truth-conditional pragmatics according to
which the subjectivist uses are true in virtue of free enrichment. Hence, such a
hybrid view would accept that the error theory is true for the objectivist uses
where speakers don’t have a perspective in mind, but in conversations where the
speaker intends make subjective judgments and the hearer correctly interprets
them, thanks to free enrichment their judgments get to be true.
13.5.2 How Could Our Judgments of Taste Be False When They
Make Total Sense?
Another objection to an error theory of judgments of taste goes as follows:
“Clearly it’s devastating to realise that all of our positive judgments of taste
–both beliefs and utterances– are false. If an error theory is true for some
expressions, then we need to either revise the vocabulary or to give it up entirely.
But there doesn’t seem to be anything wrong with our ways of talking about
taste, so there must be something wrong with the claim that our judgments are
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false.” In other words, an error theory argues that a whole domain of discourse
is somehow flawed. But if at the same time we are totally happy with those
discourses and find them useful, then doesn’t that show that the error theory is
wrong?
Now, suppose that we the theorists, accept that in fact an error theory
for some group of expressions is true. What then? If the error is due to an
entirely mistaken explanatory scheme, for example astrology, there’s no need to
try to salvage it in any way. It should be entirely given up and the expressions
should be recognised as referring to something merely fictional. However, the
situation is very diﬀerent with expressions that were or are taken to denote a
certain property, it has turned out that no such property exists but that there
is something systematically present when those property attributions are made.
This is the case with the talk of motion, simultaneity and duration, perhaps with
moral expressions, and we are considering it as a view about taste predicates.
With these expressions the error is not total, and hence we should aim at revision
rather than elimination of the vocabulary in question.
However, even without revision false judgments of taste would be useful.
Let us consider how communication is aﬀected if an error theory is true for
some area of discourse. First, think of the well-known and commonplace cases
of utterances with questionable truth-values. There are no zombies, yet I can
successfully convey something quite specific by remarking to a friend who’s had
a rough night that he looks like a zombie. Did I say something true? There
are no zombies so literally speaking it’s not possible to look like a zombie.
Nevertheless, the friend would understand what I mean, and we all understand
judgments made about Pegasus, Donald Duck, demons and telepathy.
When people didn’t yet know that witches don’t exist they still had per-
fectly interpretable discourses about witches. Most of their utterances about
witches were of course false (e.g. “The witch who lives next door has left a
dead marmot on my doorstep”, “I must have been cursed by a witch” etc.), but
they partly managed to communicate what they wanted: beliefs about witches,
those dangerous beings with supernatural powers. They failed in the other aim
of communication, that of stating truths. Thus, we need to first consider two
consequences of communication: the sharing of information, and the beliefs that
are conveyed. The content of the judgment is the main source of information
whereas the making of the judgment allows the hearer to infer that the speaker
believes in the content of the judgment.
If everyone in the linguistic community shares the same false beliefs, com-
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munication works as if the judgments were true. For example, If you and I are
believers in witches and you tell me you have been cursed, I become alarmed and
maybe recommend you to contact another witch who will perform a counter-
curse. No communication breakdown takes place because we share our strange
set of false beliefs. And that is the situation regarding objectivist judgments of
taste: the speakers are embarked on their common search for the unattainable
goal, the objective truth about taste.
As theorists we can thus say that since all the objectivist speakers are un-
wittingly engaged in the same fiction about objectivist truths about taste, their
discussions make perfect sense to themselves even if their judgments are in fact
false. Communication only fails if the speakers disagree about what exists, which
is why a discussion about taste between an objectivist and a subjectivist maybe
somewhat confused. There is also a third dimension of judgments to consider:
the pro-attitudes they may convey. Since judgments of taste are evaluative
judgments, they inform others both of one’s beliefs and of one’s attitudes. For
example, if one tries to make an objectivist judgment by saying “Champagne is
the most delicious drink in the world”, the making of the judgment allows the
hearer to know that the speaker enjoys champagne even if the judgment is false.
Now, if one is a subjectivist, how should one interpret objectivist judgments?
One should simply reinterpret objectivist speakers as if they were making a
judgment about their experiential state, i.e. a subjectivist judgment. Given
that we know that people normally make judgments of taste on the grounds of
their own experiences we can’t go far wrong in interpreting them as making a
subjectivist judgment instead of an objectivist one.
So even if an error theory is true for both judgments about witches and of
judgments of taste, what makes the situation with taste happier than that of
the witch-believers is that the utterances of taste objectivists are not far from
the truth, in that there are closely related reinterpretations which makes them
true. Objectivism is thus close enough to being true without it causing any real
disruptions in our ordinary lives.
And arguably, a very large number of our ordinary statements are not quite
true anyway. For example, is France hexagonal and Italy boot-shaped? Was
it really 3pm or four past three when you answered the question about what
time it was? Do you really know what you’ll do next summer given everything
that might happen and interfere with your plans? Exaggeration and sloppiness
are commonplace but both contribute to falsehoods: our utterances are very
often false but nearly true. Does it matter whether that is due to a slight
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conceptual error, exaggeration or sloppiness? I can’t see why it would as long
as the falsehood is close enough to truth.
13.6 Summary of Chapter 13
In this chapter we began the project of finding a suitable alternative semantic
account for contextualism or relativism. In the end of the last chapter I argued
that the idea of trying to influence how others conceptualise matters really
comes down to what I called Socratic disagreement, that is, inquiries into the
nature of things, including the concepts we think with. Socratic disagreements
make perfect sense in a quest for truth but not if truth is relative.
This chapter presented an argument for an error theory of taste discourses.
The starting point was to argue that most of the uses of judgments of taste can
be best explained by taking the speakers to believe in objectivism about taste.
That includes explaining disagreements of taste as Socratic disagreements whose
aim is to find an perspective-independent truth about questions of taste. Now, if
one accepts that the folk theory about taste for most speakers is objectivism, an
error theory begins to seem plausible, given that a very common approach to how
predicates get their meaning what the speakers intend to say by those predicates.
If the majority of the speakers intend to make objectivist judgments of taste then
naturally predicates of taste have perspective-independent semantics. However,
since the folk theory gets the metaphysics wrong the judgments end up false.
In the end of the chapter I considered two objections to an error theory for
taste. The first one is the existence of subjectivist uses. Certainly the error
theorist has to account for them, and one way to do it is to hold that they are
due to pragmatic free enrichment. The second objection was the claim that
an error theory is implausible because if our judgments of taste were indeed
systematically false we couldn’t communicate so well with them. I’ve argued
that the truth or falsity of utterances is only one aspect of communication.
Moreover, according to the error theory judgments of taste are not entirely oﬀ
the mark as say, astrological judgments are, and therefore they are close enough
to truths to also be informative.
The case I’ve made for the error theory has been rather uncritical. That is
because I think that the main objection to it comes from metasemantics and
requires a separate discussion. That is one of the aims of the next chapter where
I will argue that the Gricean metasemantics that underlies an error theory for
discourses about taste should be understood in a more externalist way.
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14 Perspectivism
In the previous section I flagged that ultimately where I think the error theory
goes wrong is in its metasemantic commitments, in other words in its presup-
positions about how the contents of expressions are determined. Previously we
encountered the topic of metasemantics in Ch. 8: Flexible Contextualism when
we discussed two possible metasemantic accounts for context-sensitive expres-
sions. This time the question is broader and concerns the determination of
contents of expressions more generally.
The problem in discussing the topic is that the theorists we have discussed
are mostly silent about their metasemantic commitments. However, the con-
textualists and relativists we have discussed rule out that speakers could be
ignorant of the truth-conditions of expressions, as we’ve seen in their commit-
ment to the Principle of Semantic Competence (section 9.3.2 on page 139). This
commitment is reflected in relativists criticism of contextualism, arguing that
they can only explain disagreements of taste by taking speakers to be “semantic-
ally blind”, i.e. as being mistaken about the truth-conditions of judgments of
taste. It’s not entirely clear why one would accept the Principle of Semantic
Competence, but I suggest that it is a natural consequence from a certain un-
derstanding of the Gricean intention-based metasemantics.
The main aim of this chapter is to argue for another interpretation of the
Gricean metasemantics. The focus is on how we can tell which intentions a
speaker has. I give examples to show that people may be mistaken about their
own intentions. Thus, rather than believe people’s self-attributions of intentions,
the best method for attributing them intentions is by looking at their behaviour
more generally. We should take them as having intentions that best explain
their actions. What determines the contents of expressions are those intentions,
and consequently it is well possible that a speaker doesn’t know what she means.
What typically explains people’s actions the best are their true beliefs about
some phenomenon that they are causally related to. Thus, as long as there
is something that their beliefs systematically track, that thing should be what
they intend to talk about, even if they had false beliefs about what they are
referring to.
I argue that the metasemantic approach explains how predicates of taste
can get perspective-dependent contents even though people are ignorant of their
perspective dependence. I call the resulting view perspectivism. The view thus
combines the truth-conditions of simple subjectivism with the explanation of
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people’s linguistic behaviours coming partly from their tracking perspective-
dependent properties, and partly from their mistaken objectivist folk meta-
physical / semantic theory. Once I’ve presented the view I summarise how it
explains the intuitions about taste that we started with in the beginning of the
thesis, as well as the linguistic data. I conclude with a comparison of the views
we have discussed.
14.1 How to Tell What a Speaker Intends
The last chapter argued that if the folk view on taste is objectivism, then the
semantics of predicates of taste should be perspective-independent. The step in
the argument that we didn’t yet discuss in any detail was how one gets from a
folk view on some topic to an account of the meanings of certain expressions.
The underlying view on meaning determination has been most famously defen-
ded by Grice (1989), and it holds that the meaning of expressions is inherited
from the speakers’ intentions to refer to certain things in the world.
We saw that Mackie’s defence of moral error theory relies on a Gricean theory
of meaning. Let me repeat the quotes from Mackie:
The ordinary user of moral language means to say something
about whatever it is that he characterizes morally, for example a
possible action, as it is in itself, or would be if it were realized, and
not about, or even simply expressive of, his, or anyone else’s, attitude
or relation to it. But the something he wants to say is not purely
descriptive, certainly not inert, but something that involves a call
for action or for the refraining from action, and one that is absolute,
not contingent upon any desire or preference or policy or choice, his
own or anyone else’s. (Mackie, 1977, 33)
I conclude, then, that ordinary moral judgments include a claim
to objectivity, an assumption that there are objective values in just
the sense in which I am concerned to deny this. And I do not think
it is going too far to say that this assumption has been incorporated
in the basic, conventional, meanings of moral terms. Any analysis
of the meanings of moral terms which omits this claim to objective,
intrinsic, prescriptivity is to that extent incomplete [...]. (Mackie,
1977, 35)
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The line of thought behind an error theory for judgments of taste is the same.
Ordinary speakers believe that taste qualities are objective, as illustrated by
the way they use judgments of taste. When they make judgments of taste they
intend to attribute objective taste qualities, not to express their subjective atti-
tudes. Therefore, the meaning of predicates of taste is perspective-independent.
But since there are no objective taste qualities, judgments of taste are false.
The way speakers have come to mean objective taste properties by predicates of
taste is via the common belief that taste properties are objective. They intend
to express those beliefs by their judgments of taste.
In broad outline the Gricean picture of meanings being determined by in-
tentions seems right. But how do we actually know which intentions a speaker
has? The clear cases are ones where the speaker intends a freely enriched pro-
position, for example if they intend the sentence “I haven’t had breakfast” to
mean they haven’t had breakfast that morning. In those cases the speaker can
always make the enriched proposition explicit if she is misunderstood or asked
what she meant. I’ve argued that with subjective uses of judgments of taste the
speakers are able to do that.
However, those are cases where a sentence is used with the intention that
it expresses something beyond its conventional meaning. But we need to also
look at cases where a speaker intends to express exactly the content that a
sentence in a context is conventionally taken to have. For example, a person who
says “Anchovies are delicious” normally intends to mean whatever that sentence
means. We can’t just ask speakers what they intend to say by the sentence
because they wouldn’t be able to tell. And not only that, they would probably
come up with an inaccurate folk semantic account of what the judgment means.
One way to attribute intentions to speakers is by looking at their shared be-
liefs about some domain and to take the terms from that domain to incorporate
those beliefs. That is Mackie’s method which moves from the folk theory of
morality to the meanings of moral terms. But the approach doesn’t take suﬃ-
ciently into account the referential intentions that speakers have. They might
intend expressions to convey certain beliefs but they also intend to talk about
phenomena in the world, for example what is right and wrong. In Mackie’s
theory those intentions are frustrated. Let me next argue for a diﬀerent method
of attributing intentions.
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14.2 Intentions Explain Actions
What I want to argue for is that the best method to know the intentions of
speakers is by observing their behaviours, including their judgments and other
linguistic behaviours. We then attribute those intentions that best explain the
person’s behaviour. In other words, speakers might not always be in a priv-
ileged position to tell which intentions they have. For the sake of clarity, let me
distinguish between two types of intentions. I’m supposing that there are the
cases where the explanation of the person and their own explanation of them-
selves match. In those cases the intentions that best explain their actions are
also the intentions that they would say they have. Let us call these transparent
intentions. But additionally there are intentions that a speaker wouldn’t know
that they have but which should be attributed to them because those intentions
make the best sense of their actions. Let us call them nontransparent intentions.
Let me give some examples of nontransparent intentions. Take referential
intentions: an agent intends to refer to a certain object in the world by the use
of some word. Now, what one refers to doesn’t only depend on one’s mental
description of the object. For example, suppose that Lucy thinks there are two
separate individuals, the Shady Stalker and the Charming Stranger who are
in fact a unique individual called Bob. It’s night and Lucy is walking home,
noticing a shadow lurking nearby. She calls a friend and says “The Shady Stalker
is here again!”. If asked who she intended to refer to she would describe the
properties of the Shady Stalker, and she would explicitly deny intending the
person with the Charming Stranger’s properties. However, we who know better
can tell that Lucy intended to refer to Bob who is both a charming stranger and
a shady stalker. In this case the best explanation of her linguistic behaviour
comes from attributing to her the nontransparent intention to refer to Bob.
Now, Lucy has a false idea of how the person who she is referring to is,
but she is nevertheless referring to Bob with all his properties. Her referential
intention thus succeeds in refererring to a worldly entity, despite of false beliefs
about that entity. Now, an intention-based metasemanticist might try to argue
that given Lucy’s confusion, she didn’t in fact succeed in referring to anything.
After all, when she said “The Shady Stalker is here again” she really didn’t
intend to refer to the charming stranger who spoke to her at a bus stop and
that she had a coﬀee with the other day. But since there is no man who is
merely the Shady Stalker and not also the Charming Stranger, her judgment
that the former is there again is false.
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However, the view becomes quite implausible when we see the amount of
error it would generate. Suppose Lucy’s friend runs to her rescue. Lucy points to
Bob, saying “He is the Shady Stalker!” According to the view we are considering,
the Shady Stalker refers to no one so her judgment is false. Suppose Lucy never
finds out that the stranger and the stalker are the same. Then all her beliefs
about “both” would be false since her referential intentions are such that neither
definite description (or name) gets to refer. That just seems wrong. After
all, if Lucy were to find out the truth, she would rather realise that she had
been talking about the same man all along, not that she hadn’t manage to talk
about anyone. Indeed, I think that the Lucy who has learnt the truth is in the
position of the knowledgeable theorist who can now better explain her past self
by attributing nontransparent intentions she didn’t know she had.
Suppose we accept that Lucy, despite of her confusion, did manage to refer
to Bob. What is it that makes her refer to Bob despite of her transparent
intentions to refer to a person who doesn’t have all of Bob’s properties? The
natural answer is her causal relations with Bob. He has caused Lucy’s thoughts
about him, and under whichever description Lucy thinks about him she does
intend to refer to that man she has met, Bob. Now, these same considerations
about reference determination apply to predicates too. Suppose that there is
some object in the world that people are causally connected to, for example
bears. People intend to talk about those things, and create a convention to call
them bears.
Now, imagine that people held false beliefs about bears. For example, the
Finns used to believe that bears are sacred and that they’ve descended to the
Earth from the constellation of Ursa Major. A bear shouldn’t be called by the
term karhu which refers to bears (at least nowadays; we don’t want to beg the
question) since it was thought that it might hear it and come to the speaker.
To fool the bears Finns invented many new words which also refer to the bear,
thinking that it won’t understand those. (Haavio, 1967) Did karhu mean bear
even though Finns intended to refer to a sacred creature with a magical origin
by the word?
Suppose that we take very seriously the intentions that the ancient Finns
would attribute to themselves. Imagine that Tapio’s sheep has been killed at
night and he correctly suspects that the killer is a bear. Carelessly he cries out
“My favourite sheep has been killed by a bear!”. What Tapio thinks he intends
to talk about is a bear-like animal who is otherwise exactly like a natural bear is,
but it’s also sacred, its forefathers descended from the skies, and it understands
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that karhu is used to talk about it. So should we say that Tapio’s utterance is
false since there is no such thing that killed his sheep? I don’t think so.
If we want to understand Tapio’s behaviour we do best to take him as re-
ferring to a profane creature with the usual evolutionary origins rather than to
a magical creature. After all, it’s not a magical creature that caused anyone to
have the word karhu but bears. Also, Tapio’s beliefs about bears are caused
by bears, and therefore his predicate should refer to them. He is right to think
that a bear killed his sheep, he would be wrong to think that a sacred creature
killed his sheep.
I’ve given the above examples to show that attributing intentions should
come from a broader theory that explains people’s actions. The examples show
that people should be interpreted as intending to refer to some object in the
world that has caused the thoughts about it, even if they have false beliefs about
it or they wouldn’t recognise themselves as having the said intentions. But the
same considerations apply also when we think of how the words of a language
come to have their meanings. There too we have to think of what the people
were intending to name. For there to be a language in the first place there has
to be physical objects that people can commonly refer to. If there wasn’t such
external “anchoring” for words, how could people know what others intend to
refer to by their words which don’t yet have a conventional meaning?
I take these considerations to have the following consequences. What a per-
son intends is not always transparent to them. The best method to attributing
intentions to a person is by looking at their behaviour and attributing them in-
tentions that best explain their actions. But most importantly, the same holds
regarding intentions to name things. When we explain what people who name
stuﬀ intend to talk about, the reference has to be something causally relevant
that other people can be in causal contact too. Thus, only in exceptional cases
should we hold that a term fails to refer, since normally a term can be introduced
only if there is an object that causes beliefs about it.
Of course there are cases where the people are highly confused and they try to
name something which fails to be causally explanatory, for example supernatural
beings. In those case it is indeed diﬃcult to say what the meaning of those
terms are, and how the terms came into being. However, I will argue that with
judgments of taste there are properties that cause people’s judgments of taste,
and those properties should be the referents of predicates of taste.
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14.3 Predicates of Taste Refer to Perspective-Dependent
Properties
The method to attribute intentions thus needs to look at agents and interpret
them as having those intentions that make the best sense of their behaviour.
Now, an error theorist of taste could say that that is what they are doing.
After all, as was argued for in the previous chapter, the reason for thinking that
people are objectivists is that it best explains their linguistic behaviour. Folk
objectivism certainly best explains certain linguistic behaviours, for example
why people disagree, retract and make cross-contextual reports.
However, not all of people’s behaviours are explained by taking predicates of
taste to have perspective-independent contents. What is it that causes people
to have beliefs about matters of taste? Or what causes people’s actions such as
seeking chocolate and avoiding anchovies? It can’t be objective taste properties
since those don’t exist. On the contrary, people come to make judgments of
taste because of their experiential states. In Ch. 5: The Grounds of Judgments
of Taste we saw that people make judgments of taste on the basis of their
experiential states. What their beliefs track are thus perspective-dependent
properties, for example that haggis has the disposition to cause them feel disgust,
or that playing badminton has the disposition to cause them enjoyment.
So what is it that a person intends to talk about when they make a judgment
of taste? They intend to attribute the property whose presence they’ve exper-
ienced and which caused them to have their belief. And that is a perspective-
dependent property. Therefore, given our metasemantic approach, predicates
of taste should have as their referents those perspective-dependent properties.
In other words, just like simple subjectivism holds the semantic content of a
predicate of taste refers to the speaker. For example, Anna’s judgment “Tar fla-
voured sweets are delicious” is roughly equivalent in content to “For Anna, tar
flavoured sweets are delicious”. However, their intention to refer to a perspective-
dependent property is a non-transparent intention so speakers wouldn’t attrib-
ute it to themselves.
Those properties exist so we avoid an error theory. By taking the contents
of judgments of taste to be perspective-dependent we explain why people judge
the way they do, and what makes their judgments true. Perspective-dependent
properties also gives reasons for non-verbal actions. For example, if Anna thinks
“Pizza is delicious” then she also has a pro tanto reason to eat pizza. Why is
that? Because she believes that pizza is delicious on the grounds of having
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been in an experiential state of gustatory pleasure as a consequence of eating
pizza. But again, her belief is a reason for her to eat pizza only if we interpret
its content as “Pizza is delicious to Anna”. In contrast there is no necessary
relation between beliefs about objective taste properties and motivation.
14.4 Intention-Based Metasemantics and Semantic Com-
petence
It might come as a surprise that I argue that judgments of taste have the
content that simple subjectivism takes them to have. After all, the problem of
simple subjectivism was pointed out already in Ch. 1: Judgments of Personal
Taste. The issue was of course that simple subjectivism can’t explain why people
disagree since it holds that in a disagreement of taste speakers utter compatible
propositions. However, where my view diﬀers from simple subjectivism is in
taking speakers to misinterpret judgments of taste.
We concluded that predicates of taste refer to perspective-dependent prop-
erties since those properties are the ones that cause people’s judgments and
actions. But it is us the theorists who attribute those intentions which makes
the intentions non-transparent. Speakers fail to attribute themselves the right
intentions but moreover, they might attribute themselves intentions that they
don’t have, namely intentions to refer to objective taste properties. The fact
that people believe in folk objectivism causes them to have a folk semantic the-
ory that matches their flawed metaphysical view. I’ve argued that where Mackie
went wrong is in taking people’s explicit judgments about morality as a guide
to their intentions. But people are not the best judges of their own intentions.
The case of speakers misinterpreting their referential intentions regarding
judgments of taste is analogous to the case of Lucy and Bob who is both the
Shady Stalker and the Charming Stranger. Lucy intends to refer to Bob when
she speaks of the Shady Stalker, but she would explicitly deny that she intends
to refer to the Charming Stranger. She would say things like “The man I’m
talking about is not charming and he’s not the man I had coﬀee with.” But she
would be wrong.
Likewise, an ordinary speaker might insist: “When I make a judgment of
taste I don’t intend to say only how things taste to me. I intend to talk about
how things are objectively, in themselves!”. But she would be wrong: she has
no access to such properties. She is simply mistaken on the nature of taste
properties and consequently, of what she intends to talk about. That speakers
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so misinterpret themselves and others is what explains that they disagree about
taste, retract their past judgments and make cross-contextual reports.
In earlier chapters we encountered the Principle of Semantic Competence
which held that speakers master the meanings and truth-conditions of the words
in their language. Does my view imply that speakers are semantically incom-
petent? Well, first we have to ask what exactly the Principle of Semantic Com-
petence precludes. Obviously, speakers aren’t expected to be able to give any-
thing like necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the application of some term.
However, they are expected to be able to correctly apply ordinary terms and
to correctly judge the truth-values of judgments when they know the relevant
facts.
Let me give some examples of arguments that rely on semantic competence.
Diana Raﬀman argues on the basis of semantic competence that the extensions
of vague predicates must depend on what she calls psychological contexts:
Since our actual applications of vague predicates vary with psy-
chological context, it follows that if the (true) extensions of these
predicates do not thus vary, then we are linguistically incompetent
in their use. But of course we are not incompetent in the use of
these words. (Raﬀman, 1994, 66)
She thus holds that given our semantic competence we apply vague terms cor-
rectly. Therefore, all that is needed is an account which explains how a pre-
dicate’s threshold is determined in a particular context so that it can make the
judgments true.
Epistemic contextualism has been criticised on the basis that it must posit
some “semantic blindness”, i.e. ordinary speakers make mistaken truth-value
judgments of knowledge claims and they treat the claims as if they were context-
insensitive. The problems are similar to those faced by contextualism about
taste, discussed in Ch. 8: Flexible Contextualism. For example, people would
report knowledge claims made in two separate contexts as disagreeing even if
the standards of knowledge in them were diﬀerent, and they would retract their
true past knowledge claims if they wouldn’t be true according to the standards
of the current context. But such behaviour is not compatible with speakers
knowing that know is context sensitive.
Schiﬀer (1996) criticises epistemic contextualism on the basis that it predicts
speakers to be somewhat ignorant of the context sensitivity of the verb know
but that is simply unacceptable (note that Schiﬀer calls that aspect of epistemic
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contextualism an “error theory”):
I conclude that, as far as I can see, there is no plausible semantic
theory that will resolve sceptical paradoxes in the way the Contex-
tualist requires. If the proposed semantics were correct, then the
extreme error theory would be needed to explain why we appear
to have a paradox in the first place. But that error theory has no
plausibility: speakers would know what they were saying if know-
ledge sentences were indexical in the way the Contextualist requires.
(Schiﬀer, 1996, 328)
Stanley (2005a) compares the behaviour of know to all kinds of context-sensitive
expressions and concludes that since none of them behaves like know, it cannot
be context-sensitive. Now, one might think it’s possible that an expression’s ex-
tension is context-sensitive but in a way that is much less transparent to speakers
than indexicality or other forms of obvious context sensitivity. However, both
Schiﬀer and Stanley consider that as a reductio of the position.
Perspectivism bears obvious similarities to epistemic contextualism and one
could try to criticise it because it accepts the existence of semantic blindness.
But I think that the Principle of Semantic Competence shouldn’t be accepted in
the first place. Given the Gricean intention-based metasemantics the principle
may seem to just follow from it. Since intentions determine meanings, of course
people know the meanings since they know their intentions. But I’ve argued that
people don’t know their intentions. They are not in a privileged position to know
their intentions better than others, and therefore they may be mistaken about
meanings as well. Hence, if one accepts the method of attributing intentions
that I’ve argued for, one accepts that people may well be semantically blind.
Thus my view is committed to the possibility of semantic blindness. But
there are also excellent independent arguments for the existence of semantic
blindness. If people are as semantically competent as the critics of semantic
blindness take them to be, then how come ordinary language and reasoning leads
to so many paradoxes? For example, an unsuspecting subject presented with a
sorites series would come to conclusions that they themselves would recognise
as paradoxical. Peter Unger’s work (1975; 2006a; 2006b) is a masterful example
of solid arguments from ordinary language that lead to conclusions no ordinary
person would accept, such as the non-existence of ordinary objects and persons.
Another example of people’s semantic incompetence comes from their beha-
viour regarding knowledge claims. As mentioned, epistemic contextualism pos-
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its semantic blindness of the context-sensitivity of know. But as DeRose (2006)
points out, ordinary speakers have to be semantically confused anyway. They
make knowledge claims all the time but become skeptics when you present them
with a skeptical argument. However, once they’re out of the skeptical context
they immediately forget about their newly discovered skepticism and go back
to making knowledge claims.
I’ve argued that ordinary speakers display a confused set of behaviours re-
garding judgments of taste. They make judgments of taste on the basis of their
own experiences but still disagree with others as if they were speaking about
the same properties. Their behaviour makes sense when we accept that they
intend to talk about perspective-dependent properties. But they misinterpret
themselves and others as intending to talk about an objective property, and
this misinterpretation causes them to disagree about taste. Nevertheless they
are not at all as clueless as the error theory would have them. They systemat-
ically track natural, perspective-dependent properties; they judge truly on the
grounds of their experiential states, and their judgments of taste provide perfect
reasons for their actions.
In the previous parts of the thesis we saw that there isn’t a single view which
could explain all the uses of judgments of taste, make those judgments come out
true and still accept the Principle of Semantic Competence. There has to be
error somewhere, and I’ve argued that it’s a mistake to believe in the Principle
of Semantic Competence in the first place.
14.5 Revisiting the Intuitions and the Linguistic Data
Let me now summarise the view I defend, and then go through its explanation
of the core data about the intuitions and uses of judgments of taste. Perspect-
ivism holds that the contents of predicates of taste depend on the speaker’s
perspective. Hence, if Bob utters “Stalking people is fun”, the content can be
paraphrased as “Stalking people is fun for Bob”. His judgment is true iﬀ stalk-
ing people is fun for Bob. In other words, the truth-conditions are as in simple
subjectivism, and judgments of taste are true or false only relative to a possible
world.
In the first chapter I listed three intuitions that a theory of judgments of
taste should accommodate. First one was the Intuition of Many Relevant Per-
spectives, which holds that the truth of judgments of taste may depend on
various perspectives. Perspectivism can clearly explain that as perspectives
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vary along with speakers. The second intuition was the Intuition of No Fault.
That too is accounted for. Speakers make judgments of taste as a consequence
of tracking perspective-dependent properties, so they normally speak the truth.
The third intuition was that there are disagreements of taste. My explanation
for disagreements is that they are misunderstandings, based on speaker’s folk
objectivism. People mistakenly think they are attributing objective taste prop-
erties and that therefore their judgments contradict. But in fact their judgments
don’t contradict and there is no disagreement over any content.
What is worth pointing out regarding disagreements is that only the ob-
jectivist speakers are thus confused. I’ve argued that we need to distinguish
between objectivist and subjectivist judgments. According to perspectivism,
subjectivist speakers are the ones who’ve got it right. They know the right
metaphysics and thereby they understand that their judgments of taste depend
on their own perspective. And as mentioned they don’t disagree either unless
they’re certain that the person they’re speaking with has a very similar taste
which allows them to engage in conceptual calibration.
The explanation for retractions is the same as for disagreements. An object-
ivist speaker mistakenly thinks she was wrong in the past and that now that her
taste has become more accurate she needs to retract her past falsehood. How-
ever, given perspective-dependence, her past judgment was (and is, of course)
true. Her perspective just happens to be diﬀerent which is why she now judges
diﬀerently. Again, a subjectivist knows that her past judgments of taste are
true so she will not retract them.
Cross-contextual disagreement and says that reports are equally a consequence
of the speakers’ mistaken objectivist folk semantics. They don’t realise that the
contents are perspective-dependent, and thereby they treat judgments of taste
as if they were perspective-independent. Thus it is a mistake to report appar-
ently contradicting judgments of taste made in diﬀerent contexts as disagreeing,
just like it would be a mistake to take them as contradicting in a single context.
In Ch. 5: The Grounds of Judgments of Taste I argued that sometimes
the relevant perspective includes others besides the speaker, and in exceptional
cases the speaker may take someone else’s perspective entirely. How is that to
be explained? I think that in those cases the context makes some perspective or
perspectives particularly salient, and thereby the speaker may freely enrich their
judgment so that it comes to express a proposition it normally couldn’t express.
For example, in the case where Anna and Craig are planning a camp for children,
the children’s perspectives are salient and relevant. Therefore, they can intend
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their judgments to refer to the children’s perspectives since the hearer can easily
grasp that that is what is intended. However, as I argued in that chapter, the
cases where a judgment of taste refers to some other perspective are rare.
Now, accepting that there is free enrichment brings up an interesting worry.
If one can freely enrich judgments of taste by intending them to mean something
other than they usually do, why don’t the judgments of taste of objectivists get
perspective-independent contents? After all, isn’t that what they intend to say?
Not quite. I’ve argued that there are transparent and non-transparent inten-
tions, and transparent intentions are the ones that speakers can correctly self-
attribute. But I’ve argued that the objectivist is mistaken about their intentions.
They simply have a false belief that the property they intend to attribute is an
objective property rather than a perspective-dependent one. Therefore an ob-
jectivist doesn’t actually intend to make an objectivist judgment. Rather, they
have a non-transparent intention to attribute a perspective-dependent property.
14.6 Conclusions
In the thesis we have discussed in depth three perspective-dependent theories
–contextualism, relativism, and perspectivism– and the error theory which takes
the semantics of taste predicates to be perspective-independent. What distin-
guishes perspectivism from the other two perspective-dependent views is that it
distinguishes between the objectivist and subjectivist speakers, and holds that
objectivist speakers misrepresent the truth-conditions of judgments of taste. It
thus explicitly endorses that speakers are “semantically blind”. As we’ve seen,
the basic objection against speaker-centered contextualism has been that it can
only explain the linguistic data by positing semantic blindness. But that move
is considered both ad hoc and violating any reasonable metasemantics.
Now, the theorists of taste we have discussed are not explicit about their
metasemantic commitments except in rejecting the possibility of semantic blind-
ness. Therefore we cannot compare the metasemantic accounts that the views
rely on. However, one common metasemantics is the Gricean intention-based
view. I’ve discussed a version of the view which takes speakers to know their
intentions, thereby being in a privileged position to say what they mean by their
utterances. That is one metasemantics which might be behind the insistence on
the Principle of Semantic Competence and the rejection of semantic blindness.
I’ve argued that the intentions that speakers attribute themselves are a con-
sequence of their folk metaphysics and folk semantics. Therefore they might
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be quite mistaken about their own intentions. The method I defended for at-
tributing intentions looks at the behaviour of people and attributes them those
intentions that make best sense of their actions. I argued that the worldly ob-
jects or events that systematically cause people’s beliefs are usually what people
intend to talk about. Those objects are the referents of their expressions even
if speakers have mistaken views about how those objects are.
This method holds that since people may attribute themselves intentions
that they don’t actually have, they may also be mistaken about what they mean
by their utterances. Hence the possibility of semantic blindness is a consequence
of the metasemantics I’ve advocated and there is thus nothing ad hoc about
accepting its existence. Moreover, I think perspectivism gives a very coherent
picture of the various linguistic data, explaining them as a consequence of either
folk objectivism or subjectivism.
In contrast, contextualism and relativism are unable to get most of the lin-
guistic predictions right, given that they hold that speakers know predicates of
taste to be perspective-dependent. And that was the reason that many contex-
tualists and relativists have ultimately either defined surprising notions of dis-
agreement or argued that disagreements of taste are something like normative
disagreements. I’ve argued that disagreements of taste are not even disagree-
ments. However, people believe that they are expressing contradictory propos-
itions which makes them believe that they are disagreeing. Perspectivism thus
avoids having to rely on or to invent non-standard accounts of disagreements as
well.
In sum, I’ve argued that perspectivism is a view which accounts for all the
intuitions and predicts the right data. The theory relies on one version of the
intention-based metasemantics on the one hand, and on the folk objectivist
story on the other. I take one of the virtues of the theory to be its explanation
of the linguistic data from the point of view of the speakers. Given folk ob-
jectivism and its consequent perspective-independent folk semantics, speakers
interpret judgments of taste as objectivist judgments. I’ve argued that that
makes best sense of the various roles of judgments of taste in our societies and
daily lives. Nevertheless, whatever people think they are doing when they make
judgments of taste, their judgments end up being only about their own tastes.
And therefore, de gustibus non disputandum est, as the Romans already knew.
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15 Appendix: Experimental Data on Intuitions
15.1 Intuitions of Relationalism
Cohen and Nichols (2010) made a survey of intuitions regarding whether the
subjects thought certain expressions express relational properties. Their target
is intuitions about whether colour is relational, which they define as follows: “Let
colour relationalism be that form of colour realism according to which colours
are constituted (partly) in terms of relations to subjects (possibly inter alia).”
(Cohen and Nichols, 2010, 218). In addition to colour words red and green they
tested intuitions about rectangular, round, sweet, bitter, sour and delicious. We
are interested in especially the last word, though sweet, bitter and sour are not
that diﬀerent from the typical predicates of taste as we will see.
The method was to present the subjects with a scenario with aliens who have
learnt English to native-level fluency, but whose perceptual systems are some-
what diﬀerent which sometimes causes them to disagree with humans whether
a certain term applies. The subjects are asked to judge in disagreements over
the application of the above words whether only the alien or only the human is
right, or if instead neither is incorrect. Here is an example of a scenario they
oﬀered and of the alternative answers the subjects had to choose from:
Andrew the alien and Harry the human view a ripe tomato in
good light, at a distance of 1 metre. Harry says that the ripe tomato
is red, while Andrew says that the very same ripe tomato is not red
(in fact, he says it is green). Which of the following do you think best
characterizes their views? (Check one and give a brief justification
for your answer.)
(1) The tomato is red, so Harry is right and Andrew is wrong.
(2) The tomato is not red, so Andrew is right and Harry is wrong.
(3) There is no fact of the matter about unqualified claims like
‘the tomato is red’. Diﬀerent people have diﬀerent visual experiences
when they look at the same object, and it is not absolutely true or
false that the tomato is red. (Cohen and Nichols, 2010, 222).
The take the third answer to show intuitions in favour of relationalism. The
survey showed that the relationalist intuition was had by almost all (98.5%) of
the subjects in the case of delicious, by a vast majority (72.5%) with sweet,
bitter and sour, by about half (47%) with colour terms and one third (30.9%)
with rectangular.
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What might have slightly biased the subjects is that the third answer is
very elaborate and oﬀers a good justification for why it would be the “right”
answer. So rather than testing existing intuitions it oﬀers a plausible-sounding
theoretical point of view that the subjects may be drawn to irrespective of what
they previously thought. However, even if that is the case, the bias should be
equally present in all of their answers so one can conclude at least that the
subjects are not relationalists to an equal degree about the diﬀerent qualities.
Another issue that might have aﬀected the generality of the results is that
the scenarios use aliens who have been stipulated to have diﬀerent perceptual
systems. But suppose that two humans disagree about matters of taste or
colours. Do they think that each is equally correct since they have diﬀerent
experiences? It is perfectly possible that one of them has a somehow worse
perception of the relevant object, due to e.g. colour blindness, lack of training
in discerning flavours, habituation to huge quantities of salt or sugar and so
on. So the results do not show that people are relationalists also within human
perceptual capacities.
Folds-Bennett and Nichols (2003) tested children between 4 and 6 years of
age to find out whether they had relationalist intuitions regarding judgments
about something being good, bad, beautiful, yummy, fun, boring and icky. Their
method was to first ask the child if they agreed that a particular object is e.g.
yummy; if they agreed, they were asked the following “preference dependence”
question:
You know, I think grapes are yummy too. Some people don’t
like grapes. They don’t think grapes are yummy. Would you say
that grapes are yummy for some people or that they’re yummy for
real? (Folds-Bennett and Nichols, 2003, B27).
If they answered that grapes are yummy for some people, that was taken to
indicate a relationalist intuition. Almost all the children chose the first answer
in the preference dependence question, i.e. that things are yummy, fun, boring
and icky for some people. In contrast, with aesthetic or moral properties most
held that things are e.g. good “for real”. Regarding moral properties there are
some clear methodological problems with the survey, but we need not worry
about moral expressions.52 What is interesting is that the children seem to
52The for some people in good / bad for some people does not work exactly the same way as
it does with the other expressions since there is another, competing reading. Where F stands
for a predicate, we can paraphrase F for some people roughly as F according to some people
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have an intuition that favours relationalism about matters of personal taste,
but also that they favour non-relationalism about aesthetic judgments.
15.2 Intuitions of No Truth-Value
Cova and Pain (2012) made a survey of intuitions regarding various judgments
of taste containing the following expressions: beautiful, good and disgusting (in
the gustatory sense), pleasant and unpleasant (to touch) and ugly. They gave
the subjects dialogues of two friends who are disagreeing over various topics
such as whether Proust is the author of In Search of Lost Time, whether a
pasta with ketchup is good or whether the scream of a turkey is ugly. Moreover,
they had scenarios with judgments about beauty or ugliness of works of art or
design, natural objects and human beings to see whether there was a diﬀerence
between people’s intuitions regarding diﬀerent subject matters.
The subjects had to choose between four answers regarding which of the two
friends is right:
1. One of them is right and the other is not.
2. Both are right.
3. Both are wrong.
4. Neither is right or wrong. It makes no sense to speak in
terms of correctness in this situation. Everyone is entitled to his
own opinion.” (Cova and Pain, 2012, 245).
The answers were scored according to a “normativity” scale from 0.0 - 3.0 with
3.0 the maximum normativity, meaning that the subjects would answer (1).
Answer (4) gave the least scores on the normativity scale. The subject’s answers
on the factual questions like whether Proust wrote In Search of Lost Time scored
close to 3.0, whereas their answers to the questions on taste scored less than
0.5, and there was no significant diﬀerence between their normativity scores.
Based on criticism of the tests they made an additional survey which was
meant to rule out a bias of the results based on the subjects having to make
judgments about judgments, rather than straight aesthetic judgments. In the
survey the subjects first had to think about a work of art that they think is
beautiful. They then had to imagine someone disagreeing with them about the
judgment, and again they had to choose between the four alternatives of who is
right. The results mirrored those of the survey described above.
but with good / bad it can also mean does good to some people which is the most natural
reading of for example doing sports is good for you.
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Cova & Pain also received criticism on not testing comparative judgments,
but they have been tested by Goodwin and Darley (2008) who asked the opinion
of the subjects of judgments such as “Shakespeare was a better writer than Dan
Brown” and “Miles Davids was a better musician than Britney Spears”. The
subjects had three options; the judgments were either (i) true, (ii) false or
(iii) “just an opinion or an attitude”. Rather surprisingly, 84% chose (iii) when
asked about Shakespeare vs. Dan Brown and 96% with Miles Davis and Britney
Spears.
These results are interesting, not least because there was no diﬀerence between
people’s attitudes towards judgments of personal taste and aesthetic judgments.
The results with the comparative judgments are quite surprising too. However,
the surveys have some problems in their design. First, let us look again at the
answers the subjects had to choose from in the Cova & Pain survey:
1. One of them is right and the other is not.
2. Both are right.
3. Both are wrong.
4. Neither is right or wrong. It makes no sense to speak in
terms of correctness in this situation. Everyone is entitled to his
own opinion.” (Cova and Pain, 2012, 245).
The last answer seems primed to be chosen: it is long and explanatory and
sounds very reasonable. In contrast the first three answers oﬀer no explanation
for why that answer would be the “right” answer and the subjects are not oﬀered
a chance to justify their choice. So for (4) to fit with the others, it should rather
be just “Neither is right or wrong”. The design thus seems to show a bias from
behalf of the authors.
Secondly, it is not clear what judgments about the people being right or
wrong tell us about the cases. Right and wrong can be used in many more ways
than true or false can. For example, a dance teacher can ask a student to show
the third arabesque and if the student shows the right position she can answer
that’s right but not that’s true. Being right can also be attributed to persons in
evaluating their actions. For example, suppose Arwen and Aragorn are fighting
and Arwen throws a glass of water on Aragorn’s face after he calls her You dumb
elf. Bilbo, witnessing the scenario may evaluate Arwen by saying She was right;
he deserved it.
This illustrates the possibility that in the survey the subjects are not taking
a stance on the truth-evaluability or the truth-values of the judgments, but on
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the speakers as agents. It is perfectly consistent to hold that one of the speakers
says the truth in judging that the Mona Lisa is beautiful, therefore the other
says a falsehood, but that neither of them is wrong in making their judgments.
And indeed, the first answer “One of them is right and the other is not.“ refers to
the agents, not to the judgments (which will aﬀect the subjects’ interpretation
of both and neither in the other answers). Hence, the subjects are made to think
about the matter in terms of the qualities of the agents rather than the truth
of the judgments. Therefore, all we can conclude from the survey is that the
subjects think that people are not making mistakes as agents when they make
contradicting judgments of taste; a strong intuition also among philosophers, as
we saw in the previous section.
The comparative judgments survey by Goodwin and Darley (2008) is equally
problematic with its three possible answers: (i) True, (ii) False or (iii) Just an
opinion or an attitude. Again the third answer is longer and more elaborate.
Furthermore, the just in (iii) implicates a contrast between the judgment being
an opinion or an attitude and the judgment being true or false. That is puzzling
since at least opinions are normally true or false (what is meant by attitudes
is not clear). So how are the subjects to understand (iii)? Some possibilities
include: “The judgement is an opinion or an attitude which is neither true nor
false”; “The judgement is an opinion or an attitude and thereby neither true nor
false”; “The judgment is opinion or an attitude whose truth or falsity we don’t
know”; “The judgement is an opinion or an attitude and thereby its truth value
is irrelevant”?
These are just some possibilities, each of which would lead to a very diﬀerent
understanding of the results. Given these problems I think we cannot make any
conclusions regarding the results of the surveys, besides perhaps that they show
that the ordinary subjects share the intuition that no one is making a mistake,
discussed in Ch. 1: Judgments of Personal Taste.
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